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FROM THE EDITORS
There is a powerful undercurrent of thought throughout our defense establishment that doubts the value of the study of history for addressing today’s security
challenges. It is sometimes said—and more commonly assumed—that the pace
of technological development in this new age of networked communications and
precision targeting is rapidly rendering obsolete the lessons of past international
conflicts. In remarks delivered to the Naval War College’s Twentieth International
Seapower Symposium on 20 October 2011 as the inaugural Hattendorf Prize
Lecture, the distinguished British naval historian N. A. M. Rodger defends the
study of history by military professionals and contemporary statesmen. Like it
or not, he argues, we cannot escape the grip of history, which continues to shape
basic assumptions we make about today’s world whether or not we recognize it
fully. Professor John Hattendorf, chair of the Naval War College’s Department of
Maritime History, is the author most recently of Talking about Naval History: A
Collection of Essays (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2011).
That conventional historical narratives are frequently flawed and in need of
challenge and reinterpretation, as Rodger also suggests, is well illustrated by our
lead article. William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., in “The Secretary and CNO on 23–24
October 1962: Setting the Historical Record Straight,” offers a meticulous reconstruction of one of the most storied incidents of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the
alleged confrontation between Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and
then–Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George Anderson over the Navy’s handling of the “quarantine” of Cuba. On the basis of personal interviews with contemporary participants as well as recently declassified intelligence, Manthorpe is
able to dismiss the long-accepted idea that the CNO was culpably unresponsive
to higher authority in withholding critical information about the movement
of Soviet transport ships from his civilian superiors. Captain Manthorpe, USN
(Ret.), a career naval intelligence officer, was himself one of the briefers of the
CNO and senior Pentagon officials during the most dangerous crisis of the Cold
War, of which this year is the fiftieth anniversary.
In “Globalization, Security, and Economic Well-Being,” Stephen M. Carmel
explores the structure of global trade as it has evolved in the period following
World War II and its implications for international security. He argues that this
second great age of globalization is fundamentally different from the age that
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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culminated in World War I in ways that are not generally appreciated. The twin
technological revolutions of containerization and the Internet over the course of
the last several decades have brought about a little-noticed transition from trade
in goods to trade in “tasks,” thereby greatly complicating the assignment of provenance and ownership of goods and services throughout the global system. Any
disruption of the now tightly calibrated global supply chain is liable to have large
ripple effects that as a result are difficult if not impossible to predict. Unlike Norman Angell, the great prophet of the first age of globalization, Carmel does not
draw the inference that global economic interdependence will deter war between
major powers. Stephen M. Carmel is a vice president of Maersk Line, Limited, as
well as a member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel. This article
is adapted from an address delivered on 19 October 2011 to the Twentieth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College.
In “Replacing Battleships with Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific in World War II,”
Thomas C. Hone also challenges the received wisdom, in this case concerning the
transformation of naval war fighting by the United States in the course of World
War II in the Pacific theater. His overall thesis is that it is a mistake to equate the
story of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific War with the rise of aircraft carriers. There
was, rather, a gradual evolution in both operational art and technology resulting
in an effectively integrated combined-arms fleet that in many respects remains
the model for today’s U.S. Navy. Thomas Hone, a retired Naval War College faculty member, recently coauthored Innovation in Carrier Aviation.
Finally, Christofer Waldenström, in “Sea Control through the Eyes of the Person Who Does It: A Theoretical Field Analysis,” provides an unusual operationallevel analysis of the problem of exercising sea control in potentially contested
waters, particularly in constricted littoral areas. The analysis is structured, using
the analogy of driving an automobile, by identifying the various tasks that must
be continuously performed by a naval commander in order to ensure that ships
dependent on his protection maintain a “field of safe travel” until reaching their
destination. Dr. Waldenström is lead scientist in the war-gaming section of the
Institution of War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College.
WINNERS OF OUR ANNUAL ARTICLE PRIZES
The President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to the winners of the
annual Hugh G. Nott and Edward S. Miller competitions for articles appearing
in the Naval War College Review.
The Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors of the best
articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the Review in the previous
publishing year. Cash awards are funded by the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20
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This year’s winner was Vitaliy Pradun, for “From Bottle Rockets to Lightning
Bolts: China’s Missile Revolution and PLA Strategy against U.S. Military Intervention,” which appeared in the Spring 2011 issue ($1,000).
The second-place winner was Stephen Downes-Martin, for “Operations Assessment in Afghanistan Is Broken: What Is to Be Done?,” which appeared in our
Autumn 2011 issue ($650).
Three articles were selected for honorable mention: “Captains of the Soul:
Stoic Philosophy and the Western Profession of Arms in the Twenty-First
Century,” by Michael Evans (Winter 2011); “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s
Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” by Daniel J. Kostecka (Winter
2011); and “The Future of Aircraft Carriers,” by Robert C. Rubel (Autumn 2011).
The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S. Miller for
the author of the best historical article appearing in the Naval War College Review
in the same period. This year’s winner is Thomas G. Mahnken, for “Asymmetric
Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles off Guadalcanal, 1942–1943” (Winter 2011,
$500).
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335,
309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION
Statement of ownership, management, and circulation (required by 39 USC. 3685, PS Form 3526-R, September 2007) of the Naval War College Review, Publication Number 401390, published four times a year
at 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. General business offices of the publisher are located at
the Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of publisher is
President, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of editor
is Dr. Carnes Lord, Code 32, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and
address of managing editor is Pelham G. Boyer, Code 32A, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport,
R.I., 02841-1207. Owner is the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., 20350-1000.
The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and its exempt status for federal incometax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months. Average number of copies of each issue
during the preceding 12 months is: (a) Total number of copies: 8,846; (b)(1) Requested subscriptions
(outside Newport County): 7,353; (b)(2) Requested subscriptions (inside Newport County): 218; (c)
Total requested circulation: 7,571; (d)(1) Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside Newport County):
122; (d)(3) Nonrequested by mail other classes: 75; (d)(4) Nonrequested distribution outside the mail:
860; (e) Total nonrequested distribution: 1,057; (f) Total distribution: 8,628; (g) Copies not distributed:
218; (h) Total: 8,846; (i) Percent requested circulation: 88%. Issue date for circulation data: Summer 2012;
(a) Total number of copies: 8,995; (b)(1) Requested subscriptions (outside Newport County): 7,417;
(b)(2) Requested subscriptions (inside Newport County): 214; (c) Total requested circulation: 7,631;
(d)(1) Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside Newport County): 121; (d)(3) Nonrequested by mail
other classes: 71; (d)(4) Nonrequested distribution outside the mail: 960; (e) Total nonrequested distribution: 1,152; (f) Total distribution: 8,783; (g) Copies not distributed: 212; (h) Total: 8,995; (i) Percent
requested circulation: 87%. I certify that all information furnished is true and complete.
Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor
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THE HAT TENDORF PRIZE LEC TURE

“The Perils of History,” an expanded version of remarks delivered on
20 October 2011 at the Naval War College’s twentieth International
Seapower Symposium as the Hattendorf Prize Lecture, 2011, by the
inaugural laureate of the Hattendorf Prize, N. A. M. Rodger.

A

ccording to Hegel, we learn from history that we do not learn from history.*
We also learn that historians are deeply unreliable, and never more so than
when they are foolish enough to predict the future. Historians, in fact, would
certainly be the worst possible guides to the policy maker, were it not for the
alternative. But the alternative is not other people with better information but
other people with no information, for it is the past that makes the present and
the future. All of us, as individuals, as organizations, and as societies, have personalities that are made up of our experiences. It is memory that makes us what
we are, and to lose memory is to lose personality. In this age of dementia, many
of us are painfully familiar with what happens when people lose their memories,
but though individuals can lose their minds, societies and organizations (like
navies) never escape their past. All we know comes from our experience, and all
our experience is of the past. The future, which it would be very convenient to
know, is regrettably inaccessible; the present constantly slips between our fingers.
Only the past makes us who we are, and it shapes our understanding of the world.
The question is not whether we should or whether we can learn from the past; we
have no choice, if we are to learn at all. Recent or distant, history is all we have to
go on, and we cannot escape it.
To read the writings or listen to the speeches of public figures is to encounter a
dense tissue of historical references and allusions. Sometimes they are conscious
references to historical events that form, or are believed to form, part of the common stock of social memory. Occasionally they are the fruit of serious knowledge
of the past, but more often they refer to some of the common myths that bind

* “What experience and history teach is this—that nations and governments have never learned
anything from history, or acted upon any lessons they might have drawn from it.” Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, introduction to Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1832).

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 7

11

10/31/12 9:48 AM

8

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 1, Art. 20

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

nations and societies together. Usually these myths have historical roots, but in
the process of shaping national identity they tend to lose any close relation with
the truth of what really happened. Where do they come from, these urban myths
and long-exploded fallacies that form so much of the discourse of public life?
Half-remembered primary-school lessons, anecdotes overheard in the pub, newspapers read over someone’s shoulder seem to have more power to form opinion
than any scholar could dream of. “Practical men, who believe themselves to be
quite exempt from any intellectual influence,” wrote J. M. Keynes, “are usually the
slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the
air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”*
Our problem is not that we know too little history to understand the present but
that we know too much, and most of it is wrong.
Even when it is right, moreover, the history that is put to use is often the
wrong history. In September 2011 a short article appeared in the Economist that
†
reviewed the situation of the euro, quoting an unnamed ambassador: “I feel
like a filing clerk in Berlin in 1945. The work of government goes on, even as the
war approaches.” Inspired by this remark, the anonymous author indulged in
an extended range of military metaphors and allusions to events of the Second
World War. Clearly he wanted to show off his knowledge of that war, but it was
not obvious that it told the reader anything at all about the financial crisis. There
is of course a very relevant history that could and should have been deployed—
the history of currency unions. The history of the Zollverein (which led to the
unified currency of the 1871 German Reich); of the Latin, Scandinavian, and
East African currency unions (which all failed); of the West African franc and
the Belgium-Luxembourg currency link (still flourishing)—all offer relevant lessons. The eighteenth-century New England monetary union shows that common
currencies can circulate without political union, while the history of the United
States over its first century shows that a political union does not require a common currency (at least initially). All these would have been highly instructive
historical excursions; the Second World War was mere self-indulgence, and even
if the journalist had been a real expert in it, it would still have been irrelevant.
What is more, real expertise is no guarantee that history will guide us in the
right direction. There could be no better nor more apposite example of the expert
historian than Captain Alfred T. Mahan, and yet in reading his great works we
can easily see that he was wrong to assume that certain features of the world he
had grown up with would last forever. For him the sea was always commanded
* J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan /
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1936), p. 383.
† Charlemagne [pseud.], “In the Brussels Bunker,” Economist, 17 September 2011.
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by a single, dominant European naval power, and Britain was the only plausible
candidate. He looked forward to the day when the U.S. Navy would be capable
of joining an alliance with Britain, but he clearly did not expect that there would
ever be more than a handful of serious naval powers. Though he lived in the
first great age of free trade and liberal economics, he did not foresee that the
result would be the creation of many advanced economies and modern navies all
over the world. Nor did he realize that the growth of the U.S. Navy, to which he
dedicated his career, would inevitably make it impossible for Britain or any other
European power to dominate the seas of the world single-handed. Consequently
he has relatively little to say to our age of naval coalitions.
Most common and most destructive of all, however, are not appeals to the
lessons of real history, nor even conscious references to shared myth, but unconscious assumptions that reveal themselves in turns of phrase and habits of
thought. This is history at the deepest and most universal level, the history that
lies below the foundations of every intellectual construction and undermines so
many of them. This is the history that everybody shares and nobody needs to
think about; these are the assumptions that are never challenged. This history is
everywhere, but much of it is bad history, and the longer it goes unchallenged,
the more dangerous it becomes. This history provides people with ready-made
solutions to new problems, and it “proves” that they are the right solutions.
Whatever the locus of action, from national government down to precinct, whether
in an executive body or a legislative committee, some participants are almost sure to
start with favorite, long-developed schemes. Their inclination will be to ignore whatever seems not to fit and to define the problem as one calling for solutions they have
handy. Their arguments will be supported, more than likely, by analogies.*

The analogies will be drawn from experience, that is, from history, and most
likely from the history that has the most emotional power.
Traumatic events dig deep foundations in the national psyche. In Britain the
appeasement of Hitler has long been such an event. Sir Anthony Eden’s response
to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 was clearly shaped by
his determination never again to appease a dictator. But events suggest that the
precedent of Hitler was not very helpful in dealing with Colonel Nasser, and one
cannot help thinking that if Eden had confronted and analyzed it he would have
realized as much. In other crises since, the reflex never to appease a dictator has
evidently served British governments rather better. For the United States the
equivalent trauma is Pearl Harbor. It was the image that leaped to many minds
* Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers
(New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 235.
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on that “day of infamy,” 11 September 2001, when the terrorists attacked the Twin
Towers, and it evidently shaped President Bush’s response, which was to declare
war on somebody at once and invade somewhere as quickly as possible. Even at
the time, many observers doubted if it was wise to raise a criminal gang to the
status of a sovereign state or whether invasion of one or two countries, however
unpleasant they were, was really the best response to an international terrorist
movement.*
Today, Pearl Harbor visibly lurks just below the surface of much discussion of
U.S. relations with China. Clearly there are excellent reasons for the United States
(and the world) to pay close attention to China, but to me it seems that the case
differs in most respects from that of Japan in the 1930s and that the mere fact
that China constitutes a potential threat to U.S. interests from approximately the
same part of the world is a bad reason for drawing conscious—or, more dangerously, unconscious—parallels with 1941. It is especially dangerous because of one
notable difference: in 1941 the Pacific naval powers were (as a consequence of the
Washington naval treaties) so far apart that they were largely out of each other’s
range, but today the United States and China have many opportunities to clash in
and around the China seas. A sudden emergency generated by some unexpected
incident is the worst possible moment to be guided by unconscious historical
parallels. Moreover, the Chinese too have their traumatic moments in history that
are likely to shape their responses in any confrontation with an external power.
In their case, it is the myth-history of the Opium War that is endlessly invoked to
†
explain how to resist foreign aggression. This history would be well worth study
by American policy makers.
Since history is impossible to escape and bad history is difficult to avoid, the
historian has at least the essential function of distinguishing the two, of warning
against bad history and false analogy. Historians may have no special qualifications to predict the future, but at least they can check the misuse of the past. For
strategists and policy makers, however, this may not be enough. I know from
experience that people can be very annoyed with historians who insist how much
better qualified they are than anyone else to avoid the dangers of predicting the
future by false analogy with the past but then refuse to risk their reputations
by making any predictions at all. The historian must always be intensely conscious that history never repeats itself exactly; historical parallels are never really
* A recent contribution to the large literature on this theme is John W. Dower, Cultures of War: Pearl
Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010).
† Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War 1840–1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of
the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill:
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 299–303.
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parallel, and the “lessons of history” are at best general warnings, not specific
instructions. It has been well said that “history never repeats itself, but sometimes
it rhymes.”* Historians cannot help noticing resemblances between the present
day and the periods they study, and these may at least suggest pitfalls to avoid and
possibilities to exploit.
I myself have recently been studying the nineteenth century, and I believe
there are suggestive similarities between that era and our own in two dimensions:
diplomacy and strategy, and economics and trade. In diplomacy and strategy we
may concentrate on the leading European nations, for in the nineteenth century
the great powers were still essentially European. The United States, as the century
wore on, increasingly acquired the economic potential to act as a great power, but
in practice it remained largely absorbed in its own internal development; it did
not choose to involve itself deeply in world affairs, and (except during the Civil
War) its armed forces were negligible. For almost forty years after the Congress
of Vienna ended the Napoleonic War, the peace of Europe was largely assured by
the “Concert of Europe”—meaning the loose, informal grouping of the victors in
that war—to preserve stability and restrain French expansionism. This was then
disrupted by the Russian war of 1852–55 (rather misleadingly called the Crimean
War, since its origins lay in the Levant and its most decisive campaign was fought
in the Baltic), followed by the German and Italian wars of unification.
In 1871 the creation of the German Second Reich marked the emergence of a
new, powerful, and expansionist military power in Central Europe. For the last
thirty years of the century and the early years of the next, Europe (and by extension the world as well) was increasingly destabilized by the rise of two hungry
and ambitious powers, Germany and Russia, and by the decline and vulnerability of two extensive empires, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.
Comfortable, possessor powers like Britain and France had imperial ambitions
and rivalries across the world but hoped to keep the peace within Europe by restraining aggressors and supporting existing frontiers. The British in particular
feared that a collapse of the Ottoman Empire would allow Russia to expand to
the Mediterranean and threaten the vital imperial sea route to India. Toward the
end of the century the British became increasingly worried that Russian expansion in Central Asia would place the Russian army within direct striking distance
of India—though the modern eye and modern maps suggest that the very long
distances and very high mountains that separated them would have put an invasion far out of practical reach.
Retrospect suggests that Britain’s preeminence was under growing threat from
the 1870s at latest. British statesmen, however, like the vast majority of world
* The remark is usually attributed to Mark Twain, but there seems to be no good source for it.
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leaders in every age, had learned their view of the world as young men and did
not substantially change it as they grew older. The leaders of that generation had
formed their outlook in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, when it seemed that Britain
had nothing to fear from Continental rivals and nothing to lose from what Lord
Palmerston (twice prime minister) called “splendid isolation.” For them British
preeminence was a given, a product of history and economic dominance that
no one could doubt or challenge. There was no need to spend much money on
the navy, still less the army, because only savages would be ignorant and foolish enough to challenge them. The only superpower dominated the world by
political and economic rather than military strength. It has been well said that
“superpowers in any age function much on strategic credit. Their writ, that is,
runs much more on the basis of their reputation for effective coercion than on
the actual exercise of power.”* Reputation was cheap and effective, there had been
no credible military threat to Britain for half a century, and British political leaders of the generation of Disraeli and Gladstone found it difficult to take seriously
the idea that there might be another in the foreseeable future.
This confidence rested on Britain’s economic superiority. By 1815 Britain was
the world’s leading trading nation, with an unsurpassed financial strength that
had allowed it to finance the entire allied war effort in the closing stages of the
Napoleonic War. In the succeeding years of peace the Industrial Revolution gathered pace, and in the 1840s the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts
threw open British shipping and overseas trade to international competition and
ushered in the era of free trade. This was the first age of globalization, when the
free movement of capital and technology and the progressive removal of barriers
to trade led to a very rapid increase in international prosperity. It also led to the
rise of new industrial powers abroad. From being in the 1840s the only advanced
industrial economy in the world, Britain was by the end of the century only one
of several, some of them having much greater populations, land areas, and stores
of natural resources than its own.
It was obvious to contemporaries that British economic preeminence was under threat, and it seemed to many that ambitious rivals might easily translate that
threat into military terms—or rather, naval terms, for all credible strategic threats
to Britain were necessarily naval ones. By the 1880s the old-fashioned and quite
unrealistic fears of an unexpected surprise attack across the Channel had been
largely abandoned. In their place came a newer and more credible threat to Britain’s worldwide trade, to an economy now heavily dependent on imported food
and raw materials and exported manufactures. Moreover, this threat no longer
* Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York: Free
Press, 1992), p. 142.
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came entirely from rival European powers. Advanced economies were rising in
other parts of the world, some of them showing signs of spending their wealth
and industrial capacity on modern navies. For two centuries the British had been
able to dominate the seas of the world indirectly by keeping their main fleet at
home, for defense against their neighbors, who were their only serious enemies.
By the late 1890s two small but modern navies, those of the United States and
Japan, were rising in distant seas that could not be dominated from Europe.
British strategists recognized their country’s radical and unique dependence
on seaborne trade but were divided in their response. Some feared attack and
planned various strategies of defense. Others placed more or most of their trust
in the development of international law. The rise of the global economy was paralleled in the second half of the nineteenth century by the rise of a new kind of
international law, founded on international treaties signed by most, if not all, of
the leading powers. The first of these was the Declaration of Paris of 1857, which
professed to outlaw privateering (though the United States refused to sign and
still claims the right to issue letters of marque). More important were the Hague
and London Conferences of 1908–1909, which set out to write international rules
to protect wartime trade, define contraband, and forbid blockade. The Declaration of London proposed to establish an International Prize Court that would
have been the first international court with jurisdiction over sovereign states
(though only if both parties chose to appeal to it).
The proposed Prize Court never came to fruition, and the force of these international agreements, like all their predecessors, rested on “customary international law,” which essentially meant the capacity of neutrals to restrain belligerent
navies. Behind this expectation that neutral powers would have real influence
over belligerents lay a clear understanding of the complexity and vulnerability
of the web of international trade, on which all advanced economies were heavily,
and mutually, dependent. Any form of economic warfare at sea, it was presumed,
would ruin all the participants and render war impossible to sustain. In the era of
globalization, therefore, modern war would have to be short if it were to be possible at all, and the capacity to keep it going would depend largely or entirely on
neutrals’ freedom to trade. The First World War was to falsify almost all of these
expectations, in the process ruining the leading belligerents and wrecking the
world trading system. In place of free trade it brought an age of protectionism,
financial crisis, economic collapse, and another world war.
What, if any, resemblances may we find between this world and our own?
First, we must obviously increase the scale from Europe to the whole world. That
done, we may see some suggestive parallels between the postwar settlements of
1815 and of 1945. The Cold War was scarcely a “Concert of Europe,” but in both
cases the wartime allies continued to dominate the postwar world and prevent
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their rivalries from leading to war, except among client states on the strategic
periphery. Once again a new age of free trade and surging economic growth
lifted nations in some parts of the world from poverty into the status of advanced
economies in two generations. Once again this huge advance in world prosperity depended entirely on ships trading across free and open seas. Once again it
is very widely assumed that the complexity and interdependence of the modern
world trading system makes it unthinkable that any advanced state would contemplate disrupting it by war. Today, however, the new age of free trade seems to
be threatened by financial collapse and political instability in ways reminiscent
of the 1890s. Ambitious rising powers once more press against the weaknesses of
existing empires.
A comparison of Japan then and China now suggests itself—but I have already
suggested that I think this is simplistic and dangerous. I think there may be more
to be learned by comparing modern China* with Bismarckian Germany. Both
are populous states in central positions with historic pretensions to imperial
status, and with rapidly growing economic and military strength to back them.
In both cases dazzling economic growth tends to conceal the extent to which the
economies remain backward and dependent on foreign technology and finance.
In both cases political unity and constitutional structures remain fragile, and foreign policy is marked by aggressive insecurity. Growing prosperity and power will
no doubt continue to reconcile many tensions, but the Chinese regime would be
vulnerable to any serious economic or political check. This is an uncomfortable
reflection, for this is the classic situation in which unstable dictatorships attempt
to rebuild crumbling support at home by reckless adventures abroad. The world
has a heavy investment in China’s economic growth and political unity. A China
growing smoothly to become a prosperous and advanced economy with a large
stake in world security and peace and a huge market open to trade would be very
much in the interest of all. A nuclear-armed China sliding backward into poverty
and instability presents incalculable risks. A large sector of public opinion in the
United States regards China’s strength as a threat, but it is China’s weakness that
ought to worry us.
So ought the fragility of the world economic system. Piracy and protectionism, to name only the two most obvious dangers, are capable of inflicting grave
damage on world prosperity. The Somalis have shown how easy and profitable
is piracy for ransom, in the tradition of the North African regencies, and there
is plenty of scope for others to imitate them. Protectionism in the wake of a
world financial crisis did much to bring on the Second World War, and there are
populist politicians, in the United States and elsewhere, willing to try again. A
* Some elements of this comparison can also be applied on a smaller scale to Iran.
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regional war, in, say, the Middle East, could have destructive effects on essential
international trades, notably in oil. In these and other aspects the machinery of
international free trade is delicate and easily deranged. Precedent suggests that
international law, naval power, and the enlightened self-interest of trading nations are relatively feeble defenses. I do not want to predict that another major
war is coming soon, but it is certainly not impossible, and if there is any truth in
my comparison with the late nineteenth century, the analogy is not encouraging.
Navies have unequaled flexibility as instruments of deterrence and diplomacy,
and in the present state of the world it seems to me that their most urgent task
is to win the peace.

N. A. M. RODGER

Dr. Rodger, a leading British naval historian and Fellow of the British Academy, is
a Senior Research Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. His recent books include The
Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815 (2004) and The
Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 1660–1649 (1997).
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Rear Admiral Christenson became the fifty-third President of the U.S. Naval War College on 30 March 2011.
The fourth of six sons of a Navy Skyraider pilot and a
Navy nurse, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1981.
At sea, he commanded USS McClusky (FFG 41), Destroyer Squadron 21 in USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74),
Carrier Strike Group 12, and the USS Enterprise (CVN
65) Strike Group. He most recently served as President,
Board of Inspection and Survey. He also served as the
antisubmarine warfare officer and main propulsion
assistant aboard USS Cook (FF 1083); as aide to Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group 1 in USS Long Beach
(CGN 9); as weapons officer aboard USS Downes (FF
1070); as Destroyer Squadron 21 combat systems officer,
in USS Nimitz (CVN 68); and as executive officer of
USS Harry W. Hill (DD 986). He deployed eight times
on seven ships, twice in command of McClusky.
Ashore, he commanded the Surface Warfare Officers
School in Newport, and as a new flag officer he served
as Commander, Naval Mine and Anti-submarine
Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas. He also
served at the U.S. Naval Academy as a company officer, celestial navigation instructor, assistant varsity
soccer coach, and member of the admissions board;
at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, in the Strategic
Initiatives Group; and on the Joint Staff, in J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) and as executive assistant to the
assistant chairman.
He graduated with distinction and first in his class from
the Naval War College, earning his master’s degree in
national security and strategic studies. He was also a
Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy.
Rear Admiral Christenson has been awarded the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (five
awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (two awards),
the Navy Commendation Medal (five awards), and
the Navy Achievement Medal.
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Professional Competence—What They Admire Most

MEDAL OF HONOR award recipient Vice Admiral James Bond Stock-

dale was the fortieth President of the Naval War College. I recently
had the great honor of delivering the sixteenth annual Stockdale Lecture at the
University of San Diego, with Mrs. Sybil Stockdale in the audience. I learned
afterward in feedback about the lecture that during the “Q&A” I had provided
a most unexpected answer to a midshipman’s question concerning leadership.
Over the course of my seven commands I have always loved the opportunity
to meet with the men and women under my command. One of my favorite
questions has always been, “Who is the sailor [“sailor” being defined as everyone from recruit to admiral] you served with at sea that you admired the most,
and what were the qualities that made you select that person?” The question to
me that evening in San Diego was, “What trait should be focused on to ensure
future success?” Upon hearing the question my mind immediately accessed the
thousands of actual answers I had heard to my own question, and the answer was
obvious and overwhelming. Despite the fact that the theme of the lecture would
presumably point me to answer “ethical leadership,” I replied with the truth as I
see it—which is professional competence, meaning, usually and specifically, “they
knew how to fight the ship.”
Upon reflection, however, I would argue that a sailor who fails to demonstrate
ethical leadership is immediately passed over in any consideration of a list of
“best leaders.” Ethical leadership is necessary even to enter the arena of leadership
worth remembering. Also, it is important that the definition of “sailor” include
everyone from recruit to admiral. In fact, the first couple of hundred times I
asked the question I actually said, “. . . the officer you served with at sea that you
admired most . . . ,” until a sharp Army student at Newport’s Senior Enlisted
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Academy asked me why my question was limited to officers. Touché! I changed
the question, and from then on the answers always included admiration across
all ranks of service.
Similarly, it would be a mistake to presume that professional competence is
limited to knowing how to “fight the ship.” This naval war college was founded by
Admiral Stephen B. Luce in no small part because what is meant by professional
competence for naval officers continues to change over their years of service.
Knowing how to fight a ship, a fleet, a navy, a nation, a coalition—these things
sailors must know if they are to serve their nation well until their last days in
uniform. Our Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, knows
it, and his tenets “Warfighting First,” “Operate Forward,” and “Be Ready” reflect
this spirit and make clear the order of priority.
This past August, the Naval War College hosted a remarkable event. In conjunction with the Navy’s Fleet Synchronization Conference (which is hosted by
Fleet Forces Command and normally takes place in Washington), the CNO requested that the Naval War College conduct a “Required Operational Capability”
session, or “ROC drill.” ROC drills are commonly used by the Army as a kind of
mini-rehearsal of a prospective operation, using markers on a map to represent
units. These markers are moved around in accordance with the plan so that
commanders and their staffs can more easily visualize the physical and temporal
relationships among the units as the operation progresses, helping them to spot
potential conflicts and problems beforehand. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, an Army officer, has taken to using this technique on a grand scale to
achieve coordinated thinking among the services and the combatant commanders. Admiral Greenert had participated in these joint ROC drills in the past and
decided the technique would be useful within the Navy, so he tasked the College,
with leadership by Fleet Forces Command, to set one up.
The War Gaming Department turned to and produced an amazing map of the
world on a canvas twenty-four feet by forty-four feet, with 670 scaled ship models
and markers representing all current forces and those expected to be available
several years hence. The war gamers did extensive research into projected readiness levels and positioning of all the Navy’s forces and produced a lay-down on
the map that the admirals (virtually all three- and four-star officers) could use to
visualize operations and discuss how they would conduct them and support each
other in both steady-state situations and contingencies. The event was very well
received by the CNO and fleet commanders, and we expect that ROC drills will
become a routine occurrence.
Quite apart from their immediate practical utility, these events represent the
rebuilding of an institutional relationship that served the Navy so well in the
years between the two world wars. In that era, games and studies at the College
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were reported to the Navy Staff and the General Board, and in a number of different ways these results were incorporated into fleet experimentation. Feedback
from the fleet would influence the direction of subsequent studies at the College.
This triad—College, Navy Staff, fleet—was highly effective in preparing the Navy
for the war to come. After the war, in part due to the emergence of highly technical and semiautonomous warfare communities, the triad gradually broke apart.
The introduction of the ROC drill may serve to revive this mutually reinforcing
relationship, a prospect that promises to enhance Navy effectiveness and efficiency as well as facilitate the process of innovation.
In many ways the Naval War College is experiencing a renaissance in terms
of its influence on Navy thought. The founding of the College of Operational
and Strategic Leadership, the creation of a true command and staff course, the
Maritime Advanced Warfighting School, the revival of the Global War Game, and
a host of other initiatives—now including the ROC drills—signal a bright future
for the College and its contribution to the Navy and the nation.

JOHN N. CHRISTENSON

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 19

23

10/31/12 9:48 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 1, Art. 20

William Manthorpe served for twenty-four years as
a naval intelligence officer. During the Cuban missile crisis he was an intelligence briefer to the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Secretary of Defense, and other
senior officials. He retired as a captain. Subsequently,
he served for sixteen years as a Senior Executive in
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as the
Director of Net Assessment, Special Assistant to the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and, finally, as the
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. He is currently
researching and writing on various aspects of intelligence and naval history.
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THE SECRETARY AND CNO ON 23–24 OCTOBER 1962
Setting the Historical Record Straight
Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)

T

he Cuban missile crisis was a defining moment in the career of the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) at the time, Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr. His
leadership of the Navy during the crisis has become the most prominent role accorded to him in history. Yet his relationship during the crisis with the Secretary
of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, has been cited as the factor that brought to a
premature end his tour as CNO and his naval career. Among the events that affected the admiral’s relationship with the secretary during the crisis were those
that took place on 23–24 October 1962 in CNO’s Intelligence Plot (IP)—part
of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), located adjacent to but separate from
CNO’s operational Flag Plot and charged with providing all-source intelligence
to the CNO, cleared Navy staff, and others.
Unfortunately, much of what has been written about what went on in CNO IP
during those two critical days is inaccurate in two significant aspects—first, what
occurred between the admiral and the secretary during the evening of the 23rd;
and second, what transpired between the IP staff and the secretary overnight and
during the morning of the 24th.
With regard to the evening of the 23rd, the earliest book on the Cuban missile crisis, Elie Abel’s The Missile Crisis, described an event that, in the context of
his narrative, took place on 24 October.1 That event had two parts. One involved
Admiral Anderson taking the secretary aside and explaining why a destroyer was
out of position. The second part involved a description of the secretary aggressively questioning the admiral about how the quarantine would be conducted
and the admiral responding defensively and heatedly. The date of 24 October
and the details of that event were repeated shortly thereafter by Graham Allison
in his Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, long considered the
definitive book on the subject.2 In interviews with both authors and again in his
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oral history collected by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the admiral
acknowledged the first part of the story. But he said that his recollection of the
words and actions attributed to him when questioned by the secretary about
the quarantine operations were not as portrayed in the accounts.3 Both authors
noted the admiral’s denial but used the story, as told by Abel on the basis of unidentified sources, in their books.4
Thus the date of 24 October and the story of that event have been included,
in some form, in almost all histories of the Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, despite
subsequent interviews with both principals, they have even appeared in the official history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in a history of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in the authorized biography of Admiral Anderson, and on
the website entry recording his burial at Arlington National Cemetery.5 It is only
recently that published research has shown that the event actually occurred on
23 October, not the 24th.6
With respect to what occurred on the morning of the 24th, Robert Kennedy,
in his Thirteen Days, described how the president and his advisers gathered in
the White House, tensely awaiting the arrival of the first Soviet ships at the quarantine line and worrying about how the presence of a Soviet submarine would
affect events as the quarantine was enforced. The book recounts how, at the last
minute, ONI informed the president and the group that the Soviet ships had
turned back. That brought the reputed exclamation by Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, “We’re eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked.” 7 As a
result of that story a number of historical accounts have suggested that IP, on behalf of Admiral Anderson and the Navy, did not adequately inform the secretary
and president of the activities of the Soviet ships that had been approaching the
quarantine line.8 Those accounts are based on clearly secondhand information
by representatives of other intelligence agencies, individuals who had no direct
knowledge of what occurred in IP.9
Thus it seems appropriate to set the record straight, on the basis of firsthand
recollections (as complete and accurate as fifty-year-old memories will allow) of
those who were actually in CNO IP with the admiral on those days and on official
documentation prepared when memories were fresh.10
22 OCTOBER: THE FUSE OF CRISIS IS IGNITED
Monday, 22 October, was a day of final diplomatic, policy, and operational preparations before the president’s evening speech announcing the establishment of
what he would call a “quarantine” of Cuba. But for IP it was most significant as
the day when the submarine presence in the area of the Navy’s deploying quarantine forces became apparent. The first report was of a visual sighting of a Soviet
Zulu-class (NATO designation) long-range, diesel-powered attack submarine
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refueling from a naval support tanker, Terek. That submarine had been operating off the mid-Atlantic coast and was preparing to return to home waters. The
Navy’s underwater Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) then gained contact on
another submarine, which when sighted by a patrol aircraft was identified as a
Foxtrot-class (NATO designation) diesel-powered attack submarine.11
On the basis of those operationally derived reports,
CNO immediately alerted his Fleet Commanders to the possibility of submarine attack with: “I cannot emphasize too strongly how smart we must be to keep our heavy
ships, particularly carriers, from being hit by surprise attack from Soviet submarines.
Use all available intelligence, deceptive tactics, and evasion during forthcoming days.
12
Good luck.”

At 7 PM that evening, President John F. Kennedy told the nation that “unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now
in preparation” in Cuba. Therefore, he announced, “to halt this offensive buildup,
a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba
is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or
port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back.”13
Immediately after that speech and for the rest of the night, IP became a hotbed
of briefing activity. Soon after the broadcast, a call came from the Defense Intelligence Agency watch in the Joint Chiefs of Staff situation room that Secretary
McNamara was en route to IP with the CNO, the Secretary of the Navy, and
others for a briefing on the submarine and merchant ship situation. The party
was duly briefed on the merchant-shipping activity, as shown on the IP plotting
boards. The submarine intelligence briefer, Lieutenant Commander John R.
“Jack” Prisley, then briefed the secretary personally on the submarine situation,
kneeling next to his chair and using a special handheld folding plotting board.
That evening briefing established what was expected to be the regular schedule of
formal IP briefings for the secretary: they were to occur each morning at about
9 AM, before he went to the White House, and at about 10 PM, before he retired
to his office for the night. Following the briefing, Secretary McNamara visited
the office of the CNO for discussions of the quarantine and the establishment of
surveillance.14
23 OCTOBER: A DAY OF TENSE WAITING
At about 3 AM on Tuesday morning, 23 October, when all seemed quiet, the door
to IP opened and in strode Secretary McNamara and a couple of his assistants.
He did a quick tour and then dropped himself into a chair in front of the plotting board, on which was displayed an ocean chart and a map of Cuba. After
staring at the plot for a few minutes he began to question the ONI duty officer,
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Commander Robert E. “Bob” Bublitz. The secretary’s principal concern seemed
to be the Cuban navy’s eight Soviet-supplied Komar (NATO designation) guidedmissile boats. As part of his regularly assigned duties, Commander Bublitz had
been responsible for the collection of intelligence on those boats, and he was able
to respond fully and accurately to the secretary’s questions. Seemingly dissatisfied
that the duty officer was so sure of himself, the secretary harrumphed, got out of
his chair, and left the plot without another word.15
As the morning of the 23rd progressed, the atmosphere became tense as the
Navy and IP waited to see what the Soviets would do in response to the president’s announcement. Would the Soviet merchant ships maintain their courses
and speeds toward Cuba? How would they act as they approached the quarantine
line? How would they react when challenged? How would the Soviet submarines
now known to be taking up positions near the quarantine line act to support the
merchant ships or respond when prosecuted by our operating forces?
At about 9:45, with Lieutenant Thomas Rodgers on hand as the principal
briefer and Lieutenant Commander Prisley as the submarine briefer, the secretary was apprised of the merchant-ship and submarine situations. The Flag Plot
operations briefers covered the plans for Navy low-level overflights of Cuba.
McNamara then went directly to the White House to meet with the president
and his advisers.16
Meanwhile, reports had been arriving indicating that in the early morning hours of the 23rd, Moscow time, a message of very urgent precedence had
been sent to a number of Soviet merchant ships. Also, the Soviet intelligencecollection trawler Skhval, operating in the Atlantic, had received and relayed a flashprecedence message. But the reports of those unusual communications offered no
insights into their purposes, because in those days the National Security Agency
(NSA) produced only “information, not intelligence.”17
Apparently as a result of those urgent messages, the ships began relaying urgent messages to others, and from others to Moscow, and reporting their own
positions. Thus throughout 23 October, intelligence reporting provided the latest direction-finder (DF) positions of many ships, as well as their last reported
true positions and previous DF positions.18 That information was plotted in IP
and then “dead-reckoned” ahead to project estimated dates and times of arrival
at the quarantine line. At that time, while the purpose of the unusual and urgent
Soviet communication activity was unknown, it was assumed that it was related
to instructions for the ships as to how they should approach the quarantine line
and respond to U.S. intercept attempts.
Thus, during the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on that evening,
the President instructed McNamara to review all details of instructions to the Fleet
Commanders regarding procedures to be followed in the blockade. There was

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 24

28

10/31/12 9:48 AM

War College: Winter 2013 Review

MANTHORPE

25

extended discussion of actions to be taken under various assumed Soviet resistance
activities such as (a) failing to stop, (b) refusing to be boarded, (c) ships turning
19
around, heading in another direction, etc.

Secretary McNamara then held a press conference in which he announced that
an effective quarantine would be established at 10 AM Eastern Daylight Time on
the 24th. He also announced that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designated Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval
operations, as their Executive Agent for the operation of the quarantine and the quarantine forces. In turn, Admiral [Robert] Dennison, Commander in Chief, Atlantic is
the responsible Unified Commander. And operating under him in direct charge of
the quarantine force will be Vice Admiral Alfred Ward, Commander of the Second
20
Fleet.

THE EVENING OF 23 OCTOBER: TENSION ERUPTS
Following that press conference, as the CNO Report briefly notes, “at 2045 [8:45
PM], Secretary McNamara had requested information concerning the first ships
which would be intercepted, and Admiral Anderson consulted with Admiral
Dennison on the matter.” That entry indicates that Secretary McNamara was
interested in how the operations of the quarantine would be implemented, but
its unusual brevity suggests that the details of how he expressed that interest
and what went on after he did so would be inappropriate for an official report.
Although, accordingly, what actually happened that night in Flag Plot and IP
between Secretary McNamara and Admiral Anderson was not officially recorded,
an account of what supposedly happened was provided by Abel and has long
been included in almost every story of the Cuban missile crisis since. But it has
always been said to have occurred on the 24th, not the 23rd, when at least some
of what Abel and others have described actually happened.
Admiral Anderson later said that the event was “not even of sufficient importance for me to write down in my diary.”21 But others did the job for him. The
best items of evidence that the event did not take place on 24 October but rather
on the 23rd are, first, the brief, circumspect entry in the CNO Report for the
23rd indicating that a McNamara-Anderson meeting did occur; and second, the
CNO’s Office Log for the 24th, which reports that by the time of the secretary’s
arrival in Flag Plot that evening the admiral had already departed for home and
that Admiral Claude V. Ricketts, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, was the duty
CNO. Thus, no McNamara-Anderson meeting could have occurred that night.22
Additionally, though they date the event to the 24th, all the published accounts
provide good internal evidence that the event actually occurred on the evening of
the 23rd. The Abel story says, “McNamara asked about the first interception: exactly what would the Navy do?” The History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
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relates, “According to McNamara’s account, when the CNO informed him that a
Soviet vessel would reach the quarantine line the following day, McNamara asked
what he would do when it got there.” Since the quarantine was to be implemented
on the morning of the 24th, questions about the “the [upcoming, in context] first
interception” and “what he would do” when a Soviet ship reached the quarantine
line the “following day” all must have been asked on the evening of the 23rd.
They would not have been asked on the night of the 24th, by when it was clear
that the Soviet ships would not be
The belief of historians that there was a “fail- penetrating the quarantine line.
ure of intelligence cooperation” and their perThere is no doubt that on the
plexity as to why ONI held up information evening of the 23rd McNamara
critical to the president’s decisions appear to be and Anderson had a meeting, one
unfounded.
that Anderson termed an “incident” and Defense Department
historians have called a “confrontation.” That event did include Anderson taking
the secretary aside to explain a submarine contact, and it also included a contentious discussion of quarantine operations. But it occurred quite differently than
Abel’s unnamed sources and the elaborations of others have reported. Certainly,
as Abel originally said, “Witnesses only disagree.”
That evening, at the time of his regular evening brief, the secretary went to
Flag Plot first, where he apparently began questioning whether a destroyer was
out of place.23 The admiral, not wanting to discuss that matter with the secretary
in the crowded Flag Plot, took him into IP, accompanied by Deputy Secretary of
Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth, and their respective
military executive assistants. It is possible that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs, Arthur Sylvester, followed that group in. McNamara and Anderson
sat in chairs at a small table in front of the sliding display boards, with others
standing behind or to the sides.
As usual, Prisley knelt next to McNamara with his plotting folder to give his
submarine intelligence presentation, explaining also why the destroyer was out of
the line. When Prisley had finished but was still kneeling beside him, McNamara
took out his thin Eversharp pencil and used it as a pointer to tell Admiral Anderson to move certain destroyers to certain positions and to move aircraft surveillance to a certain area. The CNO tried three times to tell the secretary that Admiral Dennison, to whom he had given operational control, was experienced and
capable, needing only to be told what the secretary wanted to accomplish—he
would move the forces as necessary. Twice the admiral asked the secretary what it
was he wanted to accomplish by those moves, so he could tell Admiral Dennison.
Finally McNamara asked the CNO whether he knew what an order was, and the
admiral replied, “Yes, sir”; McNamara repeated his directions, saying, “This is
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an order,” and walked out. The CNO then took Prisley, along with his plotting
folder, next door to Flag Plot to use the secure phone to give Admiral Dennison
the secretary’s orders.24
As a result of that telephone call, the CNO Report states,
they [Anderson and Dennison] decided that they should go after the Soviet vessels
Kimovsk and Gagarin, effecting contact at about the same time on the 24th. The
approximate locations of both ships were known by direction finder fixes and they
felt search aircraft would have a good chance of spotting them. The [antisubmarine
aircraft carrier] Essex group would be used to intercept them.
Another approaching ship, Poltava, was to be assigned for interdiction to [the heavy
cruisers] Newport News, Canberra, and four destroyers. It was believed that the intercept would be made late on the 24th.
In a memorandum relating these plans, Admiral Anderson said that there was a hazard of possible submarines in interdicting the first two ships, but pointed out that the
interception would be made by a Hunter/Killer Group.

In that memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Anderson also made
an attempt to avoid another operational decision-making session with the secretary, by stating, “From now on, I do not intend to interfere with Dennison or
either of the admirals on scene unless we get some additional intelligence, which
we are hoping for.”25
The realization that this event occurred on 23 October makes it easier to
understand how it developed as it did. The secretary’s support of the blockade
had probably been the deciding vote in the president’s decision to establish a
quarantine.26 Just hours before he had been told by the president to “review all . . .
instructions to the Fleet Commanders.” Thus, he was asking detailed questions
and giving detailed orders because of what he viewed as his personal responsibility to ensure the success of the quarantine operation. The admiral, for his part,
likely considered that, the president having reviewed the Navy’s plans for the
quarantine on the 21st, the authority and responsibility for conducting the quarantine had been delegated to him and the Navy. The president had said, “Well,
Admiral, it looks as though this is up to the Navy.” Anderson must have felt that
his reputation was linked to the success of the operation, having replied to the
president, “The Navy will not let you down.”27 Furthermore, he and the secretary
had again discussed the plans on the evening of the 22nd.28 Finally, it must have
seemed to the admiral that authority and responsibility for execution of the quarantine had just been publicly delegated to him and the Navy by the secretary’s
just-concluded press conference.
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In light of those differing beliefs about the operational chain of command
and the fact that both men felt personally responsible for ensuring a favorable
outcome to the operation, it is easy to understand how any discussion could
have become contentious.29 Both were tense and tired, awaiting a confrontation between a Soviet merchant ship and an American warship in just twelve
hours—a confrontation that, given the presence of Soviet submarines, could
spark an exchange of weapons leading to war. In such an event, the two men had
different ultimate goals: the secretary wanted to ensure that when an interception occurred, armed confrontation was avoided, whereas the admiral wanted to
be sure that if one occurred, the forces were adequately deployed and ready to
handle it. Thus the secretary would have been angered by what he considered the
admiral’s evasive, unsatisfactory, and, some say, belligerent answers as he tried
to carry out the president’s directive to “review all . . . instructions to the Fleet
Commanders” and to ensure caution. On the other hand, the admiral would have
been angered at the secretary’s apparent attempt to revise deployment plans and
exercise operational control from Washington just twelve hours before the arrival
of the merchant ships at the quarantine line and possible armed encounters with
submarines. Understandably, tempers flared on both sides.
Admiral Anderson may have suspected that details of the meeting would
become the stuff of leaks, rumors, and gossip. IP was immediately instructed
by the CNO’s executive assistant, Captain Isaac C. “Ike” Kidd, Jr., to make sure
that no one except the secretary, deputy secretary, CNO, and senior flag officers
from CNO’s office were given admittance in the future. The CNO’s Office Log for
25 October shows that Rear Admiral John McCain, Jr., then the Navy Chief of
Information, discussed with Captain Kidd plans for Under Secretary Sylvester to
have coffee with CNO and be briefed in Flag Plot. Captain Kidd said, “Flag Plot
ok, but not IP.”
THE NIGHT OF 23–24 OCTOBER: WHAT DID THEY KNOW, AND
WHEN DID THEY KNOW IT?
Because of the purposeful arrival in IP of the admiral bringing the secretary from
Flag Plot to explain the position of the destroyer, followed by the secretary’s rapid
departure, the usual evening intelligence brief covering the positions and movements of the approaching Soviet merchant ships was not given. Unfortunately,
there are no notes of what that brief would have included.30 But at about the
scheduled time of that briefing, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) summarized the merchant-shipping situation: “Of the nine ships involved in the ‘very
urgent’ encrypted communications yesterday two have already arrived in Cuban
ports. We have not noted any unusual activity on the part of the seven other ships
involved in these communications that would reflect any instructions they may
have received.”31
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According to CIA, the latest “known position” for Kimovsk was roughly three
hundred nautical miles (nm) east of the planned quarantine line, as of 3 AM
Washington time. For Poltava the latest “known position” had been obtained
at 11 AM Washington time, roughly eight hundred nautical miles northeast of
the quarantine line. These reported known positions were based on the ships’
required daily position reports, rather than DF. Thus the most reliable positions
at the time of the evening briefing were eighteen and ten hours old, respectively.
Using those positions, a dead-reckoning (DR) plot in IP would have shown
that Kimovsk would arrive at the
Finally McNamara asked the CNO whether he quarantine line by about 1000 (or
knew what an order was, and the admiral re- 10 AM) on the 24th, as expected.
plied, “Yes, sir”; McNamara repeated his direc- But a DR plot would have shown
tions, saying, “This is an order,” and walked out. that Poltava could not arrive at
the quarantine line as had been
expected—indeed, not until sometime on the 26th. There was no “known position” available for Gagarin, the third ship of primary interest.
In addition to those known positions, however, a DF position had been obtained on Kimovsk at 4:23 PM Washington time showing it still about three hundred miles from the quarantine line, or just about where it had been sixteen hours
earlier.32 Clearly the ship had slowed or stopped for most of the day. But since
the position had been derived from DF, the true position, course, and speed of
Kimovsk could not be determined. Dead-reckoning Kimovsk westward at ten
knots from that position would have made it clear that the ship could not arrive
at the quarantine line by 1000 on the 24th, at that speed. However, if Kimovsk
increased speed westward after reaching that position it could arrive sometime
later in the day. Thus, on the evening of the 23rd the secretary would have been
briefed (by the author, who was the briefer that evening) that Kimovsk had slowed
or could have stopped during the day; that because information on the ship’s
course and speed was not available, it could not be determined whether, where,
or when the ship would arrive at the quarantine line; but that arrival sometime
on the 24th could not be ruled out. The secretary would have been told also that
Poltava had also stopped and could not arrive until the 26th, and that there was
no position available for Gagarin.
But the secretary did not take that brief. The author completed his twelvehour shift as briefer and retired, leaving his notes for the overnight crew.
On this the critical night before the quarantine was to be initiated, IP was
fully manned with highly qualified hands. In addition to the IP watch officer and
the ONI duty officer, Commander Howard W. “Howdy” Holschuh would have
been present. Early in the crisis he had been relieved of all his regular duties in
ONI and assigned to IP on a twenty-four-hour basis as the officer responsible for
plotting and analyzing merchant-shipping intelligence and briefing members of
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NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 29

33

10/31/12 1:44 PM

30

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 1, Art. 20

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

the CNO’s staff on it. His efforts provided the basis for the merchant-shipping
portions of the regular briefings to the CNO and secretary. Furthermore, Captain Maurice H. “Mike” Rindskopf, the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence
(DNI) for Production, was also present that night. Early in the crisis he had been
assigned to represent the DNI in overseeing ONI’s activities related to the missile
crisis. Finally, IP would have been in close touch via secure phone with the Naval
Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO) colocated with NSA in order to
receive speedy analysis of the Naval Security Group (NSG) reporting.
The official NSA history states, “Late the same day NSG direction finding indicated that some of the Soviet merchant vessels heading for Cuba had stopped
dead in the water, while others appeared to be turning around. At this point, the
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) felt that this information had to be verified before it was reported.”33 On the basis of the NSA account, it would appear that during the night of 23–24 October, aside from Kimovsk, NSG reported DF positions
on additional ships that showed them near their previous known positions.34
Then, the NSA history continues, citing the account of Dino Brugioni, “John
McCone [the Director of Central Intelligence] was awakened in the middle of the
night and informed that the Navy had unconfirmed information [presumably
that the ships had slowed or halted], but this was not passed to the White House
or the secretary of defense until noon [actually, as we will see, it was passed earlier, certainly by 1030] of the following day, once ONI had ‘confirmed’ the information. When he found out, McNamara was furious, and he subjected Admiral
Anderson, the Chief of Naval Operations, to an abusive tirade.” The NSA account
concludes that “so many years have passed that it is impossible to determine why
the Navy held up information that seemed critical to the president’s decisions.”
That brief account does not fully or accurately describe the activities of the
night and has led at least one historian of the crisis to conclude that it “illuminates a failure of intelligence cooperation” and negligence on the part of ONI.35
In his fuller account, Brugioni states, “The CIA Watch Officer, Harry Eisenbiess, checked with the Office of Naval Intelligence. They were also in receipt
of the NSA information but could not confirm change of course. On-the-spot
visual verification would have to wait until morning. The Navy thought it might
be a Soviet ploy.”36 To check with ONI, the CIA watch officer would have communicated with IP, where the new positions already would have been plotted by
the watch officer, analyzed by the duty officer and Commander Holschuh, and
discussed with NFOIO.37 That night, while of course interested in all the ships, IP
was mostly focused on supporting the CNO, Flag Plot, and the quarantine forces
with information on those of immediate high interest—Kimovsk, Poltava, and
Gagarin. The rationale for waiting for visual confirmation would likely have been
that it was already known that Kimovsk would not be arriving at the quarantine
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line on time and that Poltava had stopped and would not be arriving on the 24th
at all. Gagarin was unlocated but like the other ships was farther east and not
expected at the quarantine line the next morning. Visual surveillance of them all
by quarantine force aircraft at first light would leave plenty of time to confirm
their courses, speeds, and expected times and places of arrival at the quarantine
line and then for the on-scene commander to position forces for intercept. Thus,
for the IP watch, there was no need to alert decision makers in the middle of the
night to give them inconclusive information when good information for decision
making by the on-scene commander and Washington was not yet available but
could come early in the morning.
Despite the ONI view, according to Brugioni,
Eisenbiess was convinced of the validity of the NSA information and in the wee hours
of the morning of 24 October went to McCone’s home. McCone[,] aroused from a
sound sleep, was told that at least five of the Soviet ships had changed course and
were headed back to Russia but that the Navy could not verify the NSA information.
38
McCone said he would convey the information to the White House immediately.

Given McCone’s statement, he must have intended to call the White House himself or to have a senior agency official check with the CIA watch and then inform
the White House Situation Room. That would have been required, because during the early days of the Cuban missile crisis
the Situation Room began taking a more active hand in crisis alerting and in keeping the president informed. It was basically an arm of the CIA, however. All SIGINT
[signals intelligence] products of interest to the president and the National Security
Council staff passed through CIA, which forwarded key items after it had taken off
39
the NSA header. . . . [B]ut NSA was not directly involved.

McCone was not the only decision maker awake that night. As he had done the
night before, Secretary McNamara came to IP about 3 AM. There is no full record
of what ensued, but one of the officers present would have given him a briefing,
using the notes prepared for the earlier, aborted brief. Thus the secretary would
have certainly been told now what he could have learned at 9 PM—that Kimovsk
had slowed or stopped during the day but that lack of information on the ship’s
course and speed made any estimate of its arrival at the quarantine line on the
24th inconclusive, though arrival on that day could not be ruled out; that Poltava
had also stopped and could not arrive until the 26th; and that no position was
available for Gagarin. Other DF positions on additional ships having apparently
been obtained, they would also have been reported. Given that all these reports
were based on DF positions, which can indicate general location but not course
or speed, it is unlikely that without further confirmation a naval intelligence
briefer would conclude that the ships had reversed course.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 31

35

10/31/12 9:48 AM

32

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 1, Art. 20

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

But because of the secretary’s keen interest in the operational aspects of the
quarantine he would have asked questions, so that the possibility of a standstill or
turnaround must have been discussed. As a senior officer with considerable planning and operational experience, Rindskopf would have assured the secretary
that aerial surveillance from Essex was expected to provide firm visual updates on
most of the ships at first light. If the ships had turned, that could be confirmed
well in advance of their expected arrivals at the quarantine line. If the secretary
went next door to Flag Plot and expressed concern, he would have received a
similar assurance there. But while those assurances may have been given, Rindskopf has repeatedly recalled, “I found myself . . . reporting to SECDEF [Secretary
of Defense] McNamara . . . at 0300 [3 AM] . . . that the Soviet ships carrying missiles to . . . Cuba and the accompanying F-class submarines had actually reversed
course.”40 That would have been his personal “estimate” of the situation, and it is
unknown to what extent the secretary accepted it.
MORNING, 24 OCTOBER: THE DAY OF RECKONING
That morning the CNO Report indicates that at “about 0900, SECDEF received a
standard merchant ship briefing.” Deputy Secretary Gilpatric also attended that
briefing, and his handwritten notes show that the intelligence that the secretary
could have gotten on the evening of the 23rd and presumably did get in the
early morning hours of the 24th had not changed.41 With regard to Kimovsk, the
secretary was told of the DF position late on the 23rd and that the ship had not
been sighted. Given the anxiety that all must have felt as the time for implementation of the quarantine approached, the unexpectedly inconclusive position of
Kimovsk and the lack of a sighting report from the quarantine force must have
elicited some comment from the briefer, question from the secretary, or perhaps a
remark by Vice Admiral Charles D. Griffin, the Deputy CNO for Operations and
CNO representative that morning, about the uncertainty and probable delay of
the arrival time of the ship at the quarantine line. Nevertheless, for some reason
Gilpatric noted that the ship was “due 10:30 AM inside the barrier.” Gagarin had
not been sighted but was assumed to be behind Kimovsk. Apparently, a DF position had been obtained on Poltava that placed it within eighty miles of its last
known position and 850 miles from the quarantine line; thus the deputy secretary noted that its arrival time was estimated to be 4 AM on the 27th. The notes
also show that the secretary was informed that there was one submarine in the
vicinity of the barrier.
Thus, on the basis of what transpired during the night of 23–24 October in
CNO IP, the belief of historians that there was a “failure of intelligence cooperation” and their perplexity as to why ONI held up information critical to the president’s decisions appear to be unfounded. CIA and IP cooperated on the analysis
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of the incoming DF messages during the night. While ONI originally did not
intend to wake the CNO and secretary to report a possible turnaround based on
inconclusive and unconfirmed DF reports, once the secretary appeared in IP the
senior person present who agreed with the CIA view told him of the possibility.
Thus, two key decision makers—McCone and McNamara—had been informed
in some manner and to some degree of a changing situation with respect to the
merchant ships. CIA may have passed its views to the White House Situation
Room. Regardless of all that, it is unclear what the president’s decision could have
been until definitive information was received from the quarantine forces about
the positions and activities of the Soviet ships.
The CNO Report indicates, “At the same time [probably as the briefing was
going on, i.e., about 9:30], Flag Plot [actually, IP] received the first directional fix
report that some Soviet ships bound for Cuba had reversed course. This information was inconclusive and Mr. McNamara was not informed.”
Since DF reports had been coming in all night, this was likely the first report
confirming that a ship had actually turned back, by providing a new DF position
well to the east of both the last known and previous DF positions, which had
been considered inconclusive. Since that information apparently was received in
IP while the briefing to the secretary was going on, the watch officer, a lieutenant (junior grade), had to wait to gain access to the boards to plot the incoming
report and would have wanted a more senior officer to consider it and discuss
it with the NFOIO before informing the Secretary of Defense. The secretary
departed the briefing and went directly to the White House to await the implementation of the quarantine at 1000.
1000, 24 OCTOBER: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUARANTINE
The CNO Report indicates that the CNO was meeting with the JCS as
the moment of the quarantine’s beginning arrived and passed, and matters continued
without untoward incident until . . . [Commander Task Group] 44.3 in [the attack
transport] Cambria [APA 36] reported a disappearing radar contact and that he suspected he was being followed by a submarine. The information was passed immediately to CNO, who left the JCS meeting and returned to his office.
At about the same time, it became apparent from radio directional fixes that some of
the Soviet ships en route to Cuba had either slowed down or had altered or reversed
their courses. Initial indications of these facts were confirmed by separate plots
maintained in Flag Plot [IP] and in the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Section
[sic—Office, i.e., NFOIO] at Fort Meade. The duty officer set about to notify the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and CNO, through the Director of
Naval Intelligence, of the possibility that some of the Soviet ships were not going to
penetrate the quarantine line.
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The CNO’s Office Log also shows that
NSA [actually NFOIO, colocated with NSA] notified Flag Plot [IP] that the Russian
ships had turned back. The word was received by message and plotted. Flag Plot [IP]
notified SECDEF, JCS, and SECNAV [the Secretary of the Navy—likely their offices
by telephone]. RADM Lowrance [Rear Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, the Director of
Naval Intelligence] who was there decided to deliver the report in person to CNO and
left for the latter’s office. RADM Lowrance arrived before the CNO [who was walking
back to his office from the JCS spaces so as to be available, because of the submarine
contact report] and gave the report to VADM Griffin [the CNO representative] who
left immediately for Flag Plot [IP] with ADM Lowrance. Neither told anyone else of
42
the report.

Meanwhile, the members of the NSC were gathered at the White House, awaiting the implementation of the quarantine. According to the firsthand account of
the attorney general, Robert Kennedy:
It was now a few minutes after 10:00 o’clock. Secretary McNamara announced that
two Russian ships, Gagarin [consistently reported as unlocated, farther to the east,
and never briefed as possibly arriving by IP] and Komiles [sic—Kimovsk] were within
a few miles of our quarantine barrier. The interception of both ships would probably
be before noon Washington time. Indeed the expectation was that one of the vessels
would be stopped and boarded between 10:30 and 11:00 o’clock.
Then came the disturbing Navy report that a Russian submarine had moved into
position between the two ships. . . .
I think these few minutes were the time of gravest concern for the President. . . .
Then it was 10:25—a messenger brought a note to John McCone. “Mr. President, we
have a preliminary report which seems to indicate that some of the Russian ships
stopped dead in the water.”
Stopped dead in the water? Which ships? Are they checking the accuracy of the re43
port? Is it true? I looked at the clock. 10:32.

Kennedy says that McCone stepped out of the room to get more information
and that upon returning he reported, “The report is accurate, Mr. President. Six
ships previously on their way to Cuba at the edge of the quarantine line have
stopped or have turned back toward the Soviet Union. A representative from the
Office of Naval Intelligence is on his way over with the full report.”
The representatives arriving from ONI with the information were likely to
have been Commander George Stroud, the head of IP, and Lieutenant Thomas
Rodgers, who had just completed the briefing and was the person most current
on the information.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 34

38

10/31/12 9:48 AM

War College: Winter 2013 Review

MANTHORPE

35

Despite the tension in the White House concerning the imminence of a
confrontation at the quarantine line, as described by Robert Kennedy, it does
not seem that either McCone, McNamara, or the White House Situation Room
had told the president or the assembled group about the anomalous ship position reports received during the night, about which they all had been informed.
Although the information they had been given was not conclusive, it surely suggested that the situation with regard to ships approaching the quarantine line was
at least uncertain and that their arrivals were not imminent. For his part, McNamara, in his briefing, as reported
There is no doubt that on the evening of the by Kennedy, did not accurately
23rd McNamara and Anderson had a meeting, provide the information from the
one that Anderson termed an “incident” and briefing that he had just attended
Defense Department historians have called a and did not include any of the un“confrontation.”
certainty that had been conveyed
to him by ONI. For his part, McCone seems to have been surprised, despite allegedly having been awakened the
night before and been informed that some ships had stopped.44
It was at this meeting that, Abel and Allison report, the Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk, said, “We’re eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow just blinked.”45
That literal face-off, of course, never happened. While those in Washington were
awaiting information, out in the Atlantic, as expected by IP, the operational forces
had now visually sighted Kimovsk, Gagarin, and Poltava and determined that they
had turned back. At 0930, when it was expected to be nearing the quarantine line,
Kimovsk was already more than seven hundred miles northeast of the line, heading northeastward at sixteen knots.46
Secretary McNamara was undoubtedly unhappy about not having been the
bearer of the good news to the president, since it came from Defense Department
organizations—NSA and ONI. Having just come to the White House from an IP
briefing, certainly he would have liked to have brought the available news to the
White House.47 But as for Brugioni’s story of McNamara subjecting Anderson to
an “abusive tirade,” there is no record or independent confirmation that it happened. Seemingly, the appropriate time for it to have happened would have been
that day. But there is no record of the two men meeting on 24 October.48 If such
an incident had occurred, however, Admiral Anderson could have remarked that
the secretary had known about the turnaround before he did.49
{LINE-SPACE}
While Secretary McNamara may not have been satisfied with the performance of
IP, Admiral Anderson felt differently. The CNO’s Office Log indicates that on the
morning of 26 October “CAPT Kidd called ADM Lowrance to tell him the CNO
had taken note of the tremendous job his people were doing in coming up with
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info on merchant ships. He asked if there was an objection to kudos for the job
that particular section was doing.”
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real-time information. McNamara in particular, felt the Navy should have shared its
data hours earlier, even though some of it was
ambiguous. He had visited Flag Plot before
going to the White House for the ExComm
meeting, but intelligence officers had termed
the early reports of course changes ‘inconclusive’ and had not bothered to inform him”
(pp. 89–90). Dobbs adds, “Communications
intercepts started arriving direct from the National Security Agency following complaints
from Kennedy and McNamara about the
delay in reporting the turnaround of Soviet
ships” (p. 108).
48. According to the CNO Report, at “about
noon, Mr. McNamara returned to Flag Plot
for a briefing on the information received
concerning the Russian ships reversing
course.” But, according to the CNO Office
Log, at that time the CNO was in his office,
first with General Taylor and then with the
DNI waiting to receive a draft of an intelligence message, which he then took to the
Secretary of the Navy. At 1528, the Office Log
indicates, the secretary arrived in Flag Plot
and Vice Admiral Griffin went to meet him.
At the time Admiral Anderson was in a JCS
meeting. Later in the evening the Log shows
that the CNO left for home at 1818; the CNO
Report shows that Secretaries McNamara and
Gilpatric did not visit IP until 2124.
49. While the secretary learned of the turnaround
at the White House around 1030, the CNO
Office Log shows that the admiral heard of it,
by phone from General Taylor, only at 1043,
because he had been walking back to his
office from the JCS meeting in response to
the report of the submarine contact, to be on
hand in Flag Plot.
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GLOBALIZATION, SECURIT Y, AND ECONOMIC
WELL-BEING
Stephen M. Carmel

G

lobalization and interconnected economies are topics of keen interest to me,
both from my academic background and also from my position in international shipping. The container and advances in information technology, coevolving with advances in business organization, are perhaps more than any other
combination of factors responsible for trade as we know it today—characterized
by disaggregated supply chains and trade focused on tasks, not goods—a topic
explored in detail later. Before going in depth about globalization, security, and
economic well-being, a quote from one of my favorite authors will set the stage:
“Economies have become so interdependent due to advances in transportation
and communication technology that actions in one country produce nearly instantaneous effects in many others. Consequently conflict between states is futile
since damage to one economy necessarily translates
Mr. Carmel is Senior Vice President, Maritime Services at Maersk Line, Limited (MLL), responsible for
into damage to others, including that of the aggressor.”
all technical and operating activities. He previously
You might be tempted to ascribe this argument to
held positions in operations and finance for U.S. MaThomas Friedman in The World Is Flat (Farrar, Straus,
rine Management, Inc., and Maersk Line, Limited.
He began his career sailing as a deck officer and mas- Giroux, 2005) or another from the multitude of goster, primarily on tankers. Mr. Carmel graduated from
pels of globalization popular today, but in fact it is
the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in 1979. He also
the argument advanced by the Nobel Prize–winning
holds an MA in economics and an MBA from Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, and is cur- British economist Norman Angell in his famous The
rently a PhD candidate in international studies with
Great Illusion, published in 1910. At the time Angell
a concentration in international political economy.
Mr. Carmel is a member of several industry and aca- published his book, the world was hurtling toward the
demic associations and the Chief of Naval Operations
catastrophe of World War I, which brought the first
Executive Panel (N00K).
great age of globalization to a close. I study Angell’s
Naval War College Review, Winter 2013, Vol. 66, No. 1
work because he was a perpetual optimist, a brilliant
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thinker, and a skilled economist, and his story reminds us that even the best and
brightest can get something as complex as the global economy drastically wrong.
Today when people contemplate globalization and interconnected, interdependent economies, the outsourcing of jobs, trade displacing locally produced goods,
access to vital commercial pathways, and the other hallmarks we consider unique
to our age, it is important to remember we have been through this before and that
leaders of the day badly misunderstood the dynamics then in play.
The first great age of globalization is generally considered to have begun with
the repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain in 1846. This was also the height of the
Industrial Revolution, with discontinuous advances in methods of production.
The huge leaps in transport and communications technology Angell spoke about
were the steamship, the railroad, and the telegraph—all every bit as disruptive
then as disaggregated supply chains, containerization, and the Internet are today.
While today we worry about access to the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal,
then it was the Bosporus and Strait of Gibraltar. Then, as now, tensions arose as
developing economies were accused of using cheap local resources to invade the
distant markets of more advanced countries.
At that time, the roles were somewhat reversed, and it was the flood of cheap
agricultural products from a comparatively backward but rapidly developing
United States into the more mature and sophisticated markets of England and
Europe that was the issue. Among other effects, this trade released local newly
surplus labor from agricultural work and triggered rural-to-urban internal
labor migrations in those countries, England in particular, which in turn fed
the insatiable demand for cheap labor to keep the cogs in the machinery of the
Industrial Revolution turning. Social dynamics in those countries were permanently altered, as was the global distribution of power, launching the golden
age of the British Empire. Much as is the case today, advances in one facet of
economic activity produced unanticipated consequences both within and across
borders. Alexander Gerschenkron, in his seminal work Bread and Democracy in
Germany (Cornell Univ. Press, 1989), lays out how the ways in which countries
dealt with those consequences set in motion the train of events that culminated
in World War I, even while the most learned men of the day, such as Angell, failed
to comprehend the nature of globalization, what it meant, and the effect it was
having on society. Consequently the leaders of the day were incapable of correctly
responding to the policy and security challenges they faced.
There are those who counter that this time is different from the last in a
fundamental way. The last age of globalization was built entirely on advances in
technology. This time, the advances in technology are buttressed by a stabilizing
institutional structure such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) for trade,
a structure that is intended to institutionalize all aspects of global integration,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20
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including trade. Anyone placing stock in that view should be greatly concerned
over the spectacular failure that is the Doha Round and over the proliferation of
bilateral and regional trade agreements in place of broad multilateral advances.
Our trading system has become what Jagdish Bhagwati, one of the preeminent
trade economists of our time, calls a “spaghetti bowl” in his Termites in the
Trading System (Oxford Univ. Press, 2008)—a complex, increasingly opaque
mass of overlapping, sometimes contradictory, trade relationships that produce
consequence pathways difficult to anticipate. Such agreements are also called
“preferential trade agreements,” for the positive spin, but another view calls
them “discriminatory trade agreements,” as they are meant to exclude all but
the privileged few who are members, contrary to the intent of the WTO and the
multilateral trade process. So if the institutional structure of the WTO is what
makes some think this time is different, the foundation of that institution is in
an advanced state of decay, and every bilateral trade agreement knocks another
large chunk out of it.
The first great age of globalization lasted about two-thirds of a century. The
second great age of globalization, where we are now, began with the end of
World War II. It took a quarter-century to get back to where we had left off at the
close of the first in terms of overall economic integration, but in some areas the
loss was permanent. The United Kingdom, for example, is still not at the same
level of export intensity that it previously was. Since the beginning of this age of
globalization, we have witnessed discontinuous changes in the global political
economy, driven again by dramatic advances in communications and transport
technologies coevolving with advances in methods of production and business
organization. We are nearly at the point on the time line of globalization, about
two-thirds of a century, where the last age imploded, plunging the world into
three decades of darkness. Given that we are approaching the point at which the
last age of globalization failed, it is a useful exercise to examine the characteristics
of the current one. Given the events we are witnessing around the world, one
wonders whether there is some natural age limit for a globalization process after
which the strain on society gets to be too much and our ability to manage complexity is overtaken by the complexity we face. The system then demands some
sort of reset, and perhaps we are at that point now. Such resets are never graceful.
The U.S. Navy’s “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” notes
that today’s global economies are tightly interconnected but does not explain
the meaning of that phrase, something Angell and his contemporaries clearly
got wrong in their age.1 Many understand globalization as cheap sneakers on
Walmart shelves made by exploited labor in far-off places. This is a reflection
of the general understanding of interdependence, one promoted heavily by
some segments in society and all too readily accepted by the public in times of
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economic turmoil, as we see now. This view focuses on division of labor, some
level of exploiting comparative advantage, with all making what they make best
and trading what they have for what they need, and in the process becoming mutually and voluntarily dependent on each other, their well-being intertwined—
the Ricardian wine-and-cheese-trade relationship from Economics 101. Or, as a
just-released report from the Council on Foreign Relations describes it, “Globalization also allows each country to concentrate its scarce resources of people and
ideas in those activities with which it is well suited compared with the rest of the
world. It can then export these goods and services for imports of other products
that can be enjoyed in greater variety and at lower prices.”2
This is, however, a strikingly narrow view of globalization, and in truth it is a
definition more fitting of the last age of globalization than the current one. This
age is vastly more complicated than that. We no longer simply trade what we
make for what we do not make but need. We now trade in order to get what we
need to make what we make. Before, we were self-sufficient in some but not all of
what we needed, and we could trade the excess of what we made to fill the gaps.
Now, we are self-sufficient in nothing but make everything—the trade in tasks
mentioned earlier. I belabor the point because this is a major leap in complexity
as compared to the last age of globalization. It is apparently not as well appreciated as it should be, as evidenced by the definition the Council on Foreign Relations
uses, and it has profound implications across a number of policy areas. It might
be appropriate to make a pen-and-ink change to your copy of the new maritime
strategy and strike out words like “interdependent economies” and replace them
with “interdependent production process across economies.”
If the last age was too complex for policy makers to manage competently,
imagine how much more so this one is—the tremendous advances in global economic complexity have not been matched by corresponding advances in political
or policy skill, evidence of which you can see by simply picking up a newspaper
virtually anywhere in the world these days. The current age of globalization is
certainly showing signs of stress, buffeted by the same but magnified forces of
demographics, politics, change in the global political order, and international
instability that disrupted the last. As the last great age showed us, the forward
march of globalization is neither inevitable nor reversible: we cannot slide easily
backward into a better previous time when the pressure gets to be too much, and
when globalization breaks, it does so violently, permanently altering the trajectory of history.
The balance of my article will therefore be spent exploring a few pertinent
high-level economic aspects of globalization in an attempt to understand them.
(It is important to note that while I view globalization as an economic process,
owing to my academic and professional background, many in other disciplines
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view it as a different set of forces.) Along the way we will dispel some of the
common myths surrounding globalization that persist and sadly influence both
public opinion and policy. To paraphrase Norman Angell, policy is not driven by
facts but by the public’s opinion of facts.
The first myth we should address, and perhaps one of the most relevant to
readers of this quarterly, is that 90 percent of world trade moves by water. That is
simply not true. A more correct rendering of that phrase would be that 90 percent
of world trade in physical goods (merchandise trade) as measured by volume
moves by water. When measured by value, the number is closer to 65 percent.
The first key issue is that of trade in physical goods versus total trade. In 2010,
according to the WTO, there was $18.8 trillion in total world trade, of which $3.7
trillion, or about 19.5 percent, was in services. These services are considered very
high value and critical (e.g., transportation services, financial services, and communications). Much of this trade moves on fiber-optic backbones, not ships—
and in fact, as you will see further on, goods can no longer move on ships without
a robust and parallel flow in information. This means that cyber warriors are
doing every bit as much to ensure the smooth flow of trade as are those standing
watches on the bridges of ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
The second key issue associated with this myth is that given the difference
in trade as measured by value versus volume, it is clear that a lot of high-value
goods move by means other than water, principally air. The importance to the
global economy of aviation supply-chain networks cannot be overemphasized.
Such supply chains are responsible for the global movement of such critical
items as pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, electronics, automotive parts,
and computers. It is also clear that we must pay attention to global supply-chain
critical nodes other than the more commonly discussed port system in marine
supply chains. The largest air cargo terminal in the world is Nashville, Tennessee,
and the third largest is Anchorage, Alaska. These places do not register on the list
of critical nodes in the marine supply chain. Air supply chains are faster in cycle
times, meaning they fail faster in the event of disruption. They also carry goods
with more time sensitivity and lower tolerance for supply-chain disruption.
One example that certainly made the news is the Iceland volcano eruptions
of spring 2010. The airspace closure resulting from the ash cloud was hugely
disruptive for travel in Europe, but it was also devastating to farmers in Kenya.
Europe is the major market for fresh fruits, vegetables, and flowers from Kenyan
farms, and such products are delivered via an aviation supply chain that was shut
down—meaning rotting product on runways. It is not hard to extrapolate failed
farms to social unrest and to the outbreak of conflict in the Horn of Africa due to
a volcano in Iceland. I would guess that Kenyan farmers and peace in the Horn of
Africa were not high on the list of endangered stakeholders when the potential for
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 45

49

10/31/12 9:48 AM

46

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 1, Art. 20

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

an eruption was first contemplated in Iceland, but that is the way causality pathways work now. In the United States, 40 percent of all finished pharmaceuticals,
80 percent of all ingredients for drugs mixed here, and 100 percent of the most
common isotopes for nuclear-medicine procedures are imported and delivered
via an aviation supply chain and are dispensed within hours of landing. This
means that grounding all flights in response to an aviation security threat would
rapidly translate into a health-care crisis.
The aviation supply-chain business continues to innovate, as the pharmaceuticals industry shows. In response to soaring demand, drugs are currently
the biggest growth segment for air cargo, and service offerings are being refined
and specialized (“specialized” being a code word for an increasingly efficient
but rigid and unforgiving supply chain). A recent example is the innovation of
highly specialized containers with active temperature-control features allowing
the transport of pharmaceuticals in temperatures between two and eight degrees
Celsius. Clearly this type of cargo is highly perishable, hence time sensitive, and
completely intolerant of delays in the supply chain, however induced.
At this point readers in the maritime-security world may be asking themselves,
“Why is this guy writing about aviation supply chains? That’s not what we do.”
First, we keep seeing that 90-percent-by-water statistic, but also you can no longer meaningfully separate various supply-chain vectors; in practice these are not
stovepiped but are all interdependent processes. You cannot have international
trade in physical goods without a robust international trade in services. Aviation
supply chains depend on marine supply chains to function properly, and marine
supply chains are likewise dependent on aviation supply chains. Both depend on
robust truck and train connectors. A friend of mine in the cruise-ship industry
tells me of a cruise ship coming into Miami. As usual, a Coast Guard boarding
party met it outside the port. But the party decided to review paperwork more
extensively than usual, resulting in the ship’s being delayed. Airlines in Miami
orient their schedules around cruise-ship arrival times; consequently, flights were
held, and soon enough the disruption rippled across the entire U.S. air-passenger
network. This is just one example of how different transport vectors interact in
ways you might not expect.
A critical mistake made in supply-chain security thinking is that sometimes
you can break it apart and study individual components to understand the behavior of the overall system. You cannot make that assumption, and decisions
made that way will be flawed. Likewise, vulnerability is not about the physical
ease or difficulty of attack on any particular node or vector in the supply chain. It
is not—instead, vulnerability is a matter of how the system behaves, how it fails,
and how quickly it can be made to recover once a particular node or vector has
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been disrupted. That is a very different view. Some things we may view as tangential must be accommodated, because the system will fail if we do not.
The goods that move by water (to return to them) are no longer simply boxes
of manufactured goods made in competition with local labor, and that leads to
our next myth, by far the most important—the idea that the “made in” label has
any relevance at all in today’s version of trade. Unfortunately, much policy is driven by that meaningless anachronism from the first age of globalization. During
that age we actually traded goods, and the “made in” label had meaning. But now,
as mentioned, we trade in tasks: a specific widget is actually manufactured in a
variety of places, the “made in” label denoting only where it received final assembly. Here is the most dramatic effect of the combination of containerization and
the Internet. More than 50 percent of containerized trade is now in componentlevel goods, meaning parts or inputs into factories rather than ready-for-retail
goods heading for store shelves. Roughly 45 percent of a Boeing 767 aircraft with
a “Made in America” label plate is actually composed of imported parts. In the
787 Dreamliner that figure is more like 70 percent, including such crucial parts
as wings and engines; Boeing’s role in that airplane has been described as reduced
to little more than project management, design, assembly, and test operation.
In the U.S. air-tanker program that was recently in the news, for example, the
Boeing plane in question, billed as made in the United States, is actually made
in eight countries. The U.S. Congressional Research Service did a study for Congress on the key issues of that airplane program and provided a list of countries
where various components are made. The Czech Republic is listed as the source
of airframe parts; I am no airplane expert, but my understanding is the airplane
will not work well without an airframe. Likewise, the flaps, also critical parts, are
made in Indonesia. The avionics are not specifically listed, but of course, we know
that the “made in” label is not completely true anyway; they contain components
made from rare earths (all avionics do), which are virtually sole-sourced in China, which in turn is not on the list of contributing countries. My guess is that for
each of those eight countries listed, if you followed the trails of the components
with their respective “made in” labels, they would take you to a multitude of other
countries. Clearly, the notion that the production of the air tanker is not subject
to events in faraway places is false. A “Made in America” label plate does nothing
other than manage a perception.
The fact is, we frequently have no idea where something “made in America”—
or anywhere else—is really made. A loaf of bread sold in a local market can have
ingredients from up to fourteen different countries. Perhaps the only stage of its
production in the United States is the bakery, which puts the “Made in America”
label on it. Perhaps the only thing that the American business provides is the heat
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necessary to bake it—and there is a good chance that those BTUs came from oil
from Canada, so even the heat is imported. All we can say for sure is that the last
stop on the loaf ’s production path is in the United States, before being turned
over to the customer—and there is nothing wrong with that.
Another facet of trade in tasks is that in many areas positive economies of
scale exist, meaning there may be only one or a few plants globally that produce
low-value but critical components. The effects of disruption of a single plant in
one part of the world that produces some innocuous but critical component, like
an electronic power switch, can cascade to disrupt production processes all over
the world. It is important to note that the system does not distinguish among
disruptions owing to natural disasters, criminals, or bad policy. The system reacts
to them all the same way, and that reaction is not good. While criminals get the
press, a far greater danger to our collective freedom to leverage global pathways
of commerce are the twin “isms” of nationalism and protectionism, with unwarranted fear close behind.
Disruptions to supply chains no longer mean just not having your favorite
brand on the shelf; they now mean closed factories, unemployment, and social
stress in areas far removed from the initial disruption. The value-added of goods
with a “Made in China” label can be as low as 6 percent and usually does not
exceed 20 percent, meaning that most of what is in such products comes from
someplace other than China. Increasingly that is the United States; China is our
largest customer by a very wide margin in terms of containerized exports and a
major customer of our agricultural products. The now ubiquitous iPhone has
a “Made in China” label on it, but China is actually responsible for a relatively
small amount of the production effort for an iPhone—something on the order
of 5 percent. Japan is actually responsible for the majority of it, with Germany
and Korea as close runners-up.
The United States itself is also a major contributor to that production pattern.
A Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago study at the height of the “Great Recession”
showed that the proportion of the average value of a typical car sporting a “Made
in America” label actually generated in the United States is only about 75 percent.
But that figure is highly contentious, and U.S. domestic content ranges widely. A
Toyota Sequoia, a “Japanese” car, was noted to have 80 percent U.S. content (the
highest of any car); the Jeep Patriot, an “American” car, had only 66 percent (the
irony of its name is amusing).3 So if you want to buy an American car, you need
to buy it from a Japanese company. In addition, in terms of the actual assembly
process those cars, “made” in Detroit, probably cross the U.S.-Canadian border
five times, meaning not only that the parts are sourced globally but that actual
assembly is something of an international activity.
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As an indicator of how policy can affect trade, approximately one million dollars of trade crosses the U.S.-Canadian border every minute, twenty-four hours a
day, 365 days a year. The thickening of that border as a result of post-9/11 security
procedures has erased all cost advantages achieved through the North American
Free Trade Agreement, bringing a huge deadweight loss to both the American and
Canadian economies.
Overall, the WTO estimates that about 80 percent of the value of goods
exported by the United States represents U.S. domestic content, a statistic that
excludes such indirect-value components as energy. To compare that with the
roughly 20 percent of a typical Chinese export highlights the complexity of
today’s trade relationships and complicates finger-pointing over who are the offenders in what are perceived as unfair trade relationships.
One implication of all this is that economic sanctions affect not just targeted
countries but every country along a sanctioned good’s supply chain, often including the country invoking the sanctions to begin with. The fact is that the
targeted country is likely to feel directly relatively little of the actual overall effect
of the sanction. It also causes some level of discomfort to read articles and news
such as of a RAND report recently released offering as a potential cyber-warfare
tactic the disruption of a target country’s shipping system in order to inflict
economic pain—the implication being that such pain would be contained to the
target country.4 As the foregoing demonstrates, it could not be so contained but
would in fact amount to an attack on a multitude of countries, widely divergent
in economic-versus-security relationships. It is difficult to determine who would
be on what side in such circumstances.
The root of the issue is the way we measure things—our methods of accounting have not kept up with global business practices. Since we now trade in
tasks—involving a very fine level of supply-chain disaggregation to the activity
level, where the distinction between goods and services gets blurry—the old measure of production, gross domestic product (GDP) in real or nominal currency,
presents an inaccurate picture of actual economic activity.5 More importantly
from both a policy and public perception standpoint, it gives a distorted picture
of actual trade imbalances. This is critically important, because as Alejandro
Jara, deputy general of the WTO, puts it, “We know in times of crisis the pressure
from public opinion can push in the wrong direction. In the absence of objective
statistics demonstrating the interconnectivity of the modern production system,
it is to be feared that false and obsolete will remain the panoply of the most popular remedies.” Every complex problem has a simple solution, one that is easy to
understand, is easy to explain, and fits well in a sound bite but is totally wrong.
That is where we are today.
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The problem in a nutshell is that the old measure of GDP was based on gross
flows, hence double- or triple-counting some aspects of economic activity and
failing to take into account trade in intermediate goods. A more informative statistic is the value-added content of trade, whereby the flow of goods is recorded
by assigning to each country of origin the value it imbeds in final goods, rather
than just attributing all the value to the last places that touch them. The WTO
is working on such a system of measurement, but trade tension and poorly designed policy will be the order of the day until policy makers understand, adopt,
and communicate it to their respective constituencies.6 Adoption of such a measure of trade flows would also highlight something that few seem to appreciate
fully, because of the distortions induced by current accounting. That is, there
is a stark difference now between many countries’ security alliances and their
economic alliances. With whom a country is allied from a military perspective
and on whom its economy depends to function are now frequently completely at
odds. Security alliances and high politics are the province of the government elite,
but economic alliances are the province of the general population and are where
cultural and social, as well as economic, bonds are built. Thus, while virtually
all countries say that in a serious crisis the security alliance would prevail, in the
end we simply will not know which side a given country will take until that time
comes and the internal battle between elites and the populace is waged.
A related myth is the notion that the phrase “owned by” has any meaning
when applied to the owners of means of production these days. Frequently now
the owners of means both of production and of distribution are international,
with the location of “headquarters” being more an accident of history than
some current, overt business decision. The roots of ownership and economic
beneficiaries of productive activity are no longer easily identifiable. A fascinating
recent example of this sort of “globalized ownership” is what has been described
as “the battle for the future of copper” that played out in 2012 when Minmetals,
a Chinese state-owned mining company, launched a hostile takeover of Equinox
Minerals. In itself this was cause for great interest, as hostile takeovers are not the
typical strategy for Chinese firms. Equinox is an Australian company that has a
nominal office in Toronto and is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. One of
the world’s top twenty copper producers, Equinox has as its main asset a massive
copper mine in Zambia and is building a copper-gold mine in Saudi Arabia. At
the time Minmetals launched its hostile takeover bid, Equinox itself was in the
middle of attempting a hostile takeover of Lundin Mining, a Toronto-listed firm
whose primary mining activity is in Sweden and Portugal, with smaller interests
in Ireland and Spain.
It is clear how very complicated international ownership structures can get
these days and consequently how unpredictable can be the effects of policies like
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sanctions. In the Equinox example, nine countries were involved. From a security
perspective, there were some in Canada who called on the government to block
the Minmetal bid as contrary to national security—even though none of Equinox’s assets were actually in Canada and beneficial ownership was in Australia,
making the national security angle hard to comprehend. In reality, the only thing
Canadian about Equinox was a file at the Toronto Stock Exchange.
This is reminiscent of a Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)
attempt in 2005 to buy the U.S. oil producer Unocal, a company headquartered
in San Francisco, California, but whose assets were primarily in the Gulf of
Thailand. That proposed transaction generated huge amounts of anxiety in the
United States and eventually action in Congress to block it, born of a desire not
to surrender U.S. oil assets to a foreign company—though none of Unocal’s
oil assets were actually in the United States. CNOOC went on instead to buy
Calgary-based PetroKazakhstan, Inc., a Canadian company whose assets were, as
the name suggests, in Kazakhstan. It was in fact the largest private integrated oil
firm in that country, although it also owned a stake in Canada’s oil sands. So the
oil from Canada used to bake that bread mentioned earlier was probably bought
from a Chinese oil company.
The Dubai Ports World (DPW) fiasco is also an instructive case. Here a failure
to appreciate international linkages in the shipping industry and the political
reaction to the proposed takeover of a third-tier terminal in New York by Dubai
Ports World, as part of a large acquisition of P&O assets, turned what should
have been a nonevent into a potentially serious disruption to U.S. supply chains
connecting to the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. What everyone failed to
realize was that DPW controlled Salalah, in Oman, a critical transshipment node
in material flowing to Iraq; Port Qasim, Pakistan, a critical supply-chain node for
goods flowing to Afghanistan; and Djibouti, the port of entry for goods supporting U.S. activity in the Horn of Africa. So if DPW wanted to disrupt U.S. supply chains, it did not need to buy a third-rate port in the United States (already
owned by a foreign company, by the way) to do that—it could, and can, do it at
will in the many foreign ports it controls on which the U.S. military is dependent.
By focusing on the local rather than global picture, a serious potential disruption to military supply chains was manufactured where none should have
been. Fortunately, the DPW folks reacted with admirable restraint and defused
the situation, but that may not happen the next time, when circumstances and
actors may be different. As we think through complex ownership structures like
Minmetals/Equinox, it is important to remember these are firms engaged in the
normal course of business in full compliance with international and relevant
domestic laws. If this is what the ownership picture looks like for legitimate
firms trying to be transparent, imagine how it would look with illegitimate actors
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deliberately trying to conceal and deceive. One industry notorious for this is, of
course, my own, where ownership is frequently nested in multiple shell companies spanning several countries. The registry, or flag, of the ship is unrelated to
wherever ownership really sits, and the ship is operated by a management firm
headquartered in yet another country employing crew members from none of
the above—and that for a legitimate operation. The number of seams to be exploited for unsavory purposes is obvious, but so also is the potential to disrupt
legitimate shipping, acting in conformance with international law, in an effort to
close those seams.
The foregoing discussion was meant to point out that we no longer know
with any certainty where anything is truly made, hence where supply-chain disruptions might occur or how disruptions might propagate through the global
production system. Further, there is no way to know where the effect of deliberate
actions, sanctions, cyber attacks, or physical attacks will ultimately be felt, or who
will be on what side in the event of conflict. The world is a far more complicated
place than you would expect from looking at a “made in” label.
Another topic that needs to be explored is the nature of physical supply chains.
It is a fact that in global trade the most efficient method of moving goods from
A to B is rarely a straight line. Trade is moved in networks of networks that are
themselves interconnected and completely dependent on the smooth flow of
information across yet other networks. Disruptions in a rail network ripple out
and manifest themselves as disruptions to ship networks. Disruptions in one port
propagate out into disruptions into other ports. Ports themselves are not perfect
substitutes for each other, owing to advances in ship technology, with attendant
implications for resilience. Containers often move through relay ports, entering
on one ship and leaving on another, and yet never “leaving” the port—that is,
never going through the typical security apparatus found at the gates. The large
Asian ports process in excess of eighty thousand containers every day. Individual
ships carry fifteen to eighteen thousand containers, enough to fill a train 110
kilometers long if off-loaded at once, carrying cargo for thousands of customers
whose identities are just numbers or bar codes on the containers. Prince Rupert,
on the west coast of Canada, is a new containerport with enhanced rail infrastructure supported by upgraded roads and highways. Prince Rupert provides direct service to CentrePort, a state-of-the-art intermodal inland port in Winnipeg,
Manitoba. This advanced multimodal system is designed to off-load a container
directly from the ship in Prince Rupert to a train and have its contents in Chicago
within a hundred hours. Prince Rupert is also one of the very few containerports
in North America that can handle the largest post-Panamax ships (i.e., too big
for the Panama Canal) common in the Asia/Europe trade, a capability in which
the United States is woefully lacking.
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Container shipping is a step in the manufacturing process, an extension of
the factory itself, a conveyor belt between factories linking assembly lines. While
speed is important, the critical issues are consistency, reliability, and predictability. Uncertainty is to be avoided at all costs, as uncertainty requires buffer stocks
to compensate for it, stocks that are expensive and to be held to the absolute
minimum. That means when we say in my company that we will have your box to
you Tuesday, we mean Tuesday, because we know if we are late, you may have to
shut down a manufacturing line. As in any conveyor belt linking assembly lines,
a disruption to any part of the system becomes a disruption to the whole system.
The sheer volume of activity can overwhelm even the most robust physical detection system, unless it slows the process down to a crawl, presenting significant
disruptions to trade.
Another important issue to consider is that a significant component of the
total value imbedded in transportation is information. Today’s modern system
of trade is completely dependent on the uninterrupted flow of accurate information. Without it, trade simply will not happen. So while we have spent billions
hardening ports and thickening borders, the most vulnerable portion of the
global system of trade is the information component. Container yards are now
fully automated, largely run by robots. In the container yard I see through my
office window, if a human is detected inside the yard (by automatic sensors, of
course) everything is automatically shut down. This intricate dance is controlled
by incredible levels of information and computer technology. A container itself
has nothing on it other than a box number and a bar code, and without access
to computerized information systems you can have no idea where it came from
or where it is going. Consider those eighty thousand containers flowing through
a large Asian port every day, or the eighteen thousand on a ship you may be
boarding, identified only by numbers, and the critical importance of information
should be clear.
The other aspect of information that is increasingly important is the role,
hinted at above, of shipping as extensions of the manufacturing process. Like every part of the process, manufacturers need information about what is happening
at that particular step in order to control it properly, and that information is an
important component of the total value of a shipper’s service. You do not need a
complex plot, with a bomb on a pier, to disrupt trade; you need a three-hundreddollar computer and a connection to the Internet. One no longer needs to achieve
physical proximity to cause physical damage.
Ship, port, and connecting transportation technology continue to coevolve
with production methods and business management practices. The container
completely revolutionized world trade and altered balances of power in ways that
have not yet completely played out but that draw worrying parallels to the ways
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the steamship altered balances of power in the last globalization age. One area I
think about often is the technology that will make containers obsolete. I do not
know what that technology will be, and I doubt it will come from my industry, but
it is the technology that the ships you are building today will have to contend with.
To say that the world’s economies are interdependent does not adequately, or
even remotely, express the true nature of today’s global economic activity. Vulnerabilities exist everywhere, the most serious being those obscured by the very
complexity of the system. But it is imperative that those charged with regulating
and protecting the system of global trade have a good appreciation of what it is
they are regulating and protecting. The system will propagate disruptions, and
there will be failures as a result of actions taken by those that mean to do us or
the system harm, such as transnational actors or terrorist groups. But like any
complex, adaptive, self-organizing system, given time and latitude the system will
rewire itself and recover from such actions. The global system is far too large and
complex for such groups, on their own, to do lasting harm. There is, of course,
one set—and only one set—of international actors who really have the capacity
and wherewithal to do permanent damage or even destroy the trading system.
That group is the states themselves. I reject out of hand the notion that conflict
among major powers is no longer possible; I do not make the same mistake Angell did. States will always do what is in their best interest to do, and when they
calculate it is in their best interest to fight, they will do so. This means they will
calculate first the probability that in fighting they will be better off if they win,
and second, the probability that if they fight they will win.
Thirty years ago the information needed to make those calculations was relatively clean. That is no longer the case today. As we noted in the GDP discussion,
a significant measure of both economic prowess and trade imbalance used today
is badly distorted and does not provide accurate information on which to base
policies that in the past have led to conflict and in fact directly contributed to the
demise of the last age of globalization. The wide and growing gap between security and economic alliances for individual states no longer allows states to gauge
accurately which side their bread is truly buttered on or to estimate accurately
on which side a potential ally or adversary will judge his own to be buttered. The
demise of the meaning of the “made in” label means we can no longer gauge with
any accuracy where the incidence of a specific trade sanction will fall or where
failures in the global supply chain may manifest themselves. The continued use
of a “made in” label that does not convey accurate information may actually make
things worse, by giving a false sense of security that we know where critical things
we need are made, hence where we can afford to take risks in foreign policy. Trade
in tasks means we can no longer accurately predict where and what will be the
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effects of particular courses of action, an ambiguity that can, among other things,
influence the final choice between a security or economic relationship.
The spaghetti bowl of bilateral and regional trade agreements that have replaced multilateral advances has resulted in pathways for trade disruptions that
cannot be anticipated with any certainty. When we measure the wrong things and
measure them incorrectly, the potential for miscalculation is high. As the last age
of globalization showed us, globalization is not inevitable, and it is not reversible,
but it is breakable. It also showed us—and it is the one thing Norman Angell got
right—that when it breaks, the consequences are catastrophic.
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REPL ACING BAT TLESHIPS WITH AIRCR AFT
C ARRIERS IN THE PACIFIC IN WORLD WAR II
Thomas C. Hone

T

his is a case study of operational and tactical innovation in the U.S. Navy
during World War II. Its purpose is to erase a myth—the myth that Navy
tactical and operational doctrine existing at the time of Pearl Harbor facilitated
a straightforward substitution of carriers for the battleship force that had been
severely damaged by Japanese carrier aviation on 7 December 1941. That is not
what happened. What did happen is much more interesting than a simple substitution of one weapon for another. As Trent Hone put it in 2009, “By early 1943,
a new and more effective fleet organization had become available.” This more
effective fleet, “built around carrier task forces,” took the operational initiative
away from the Japanese and spearheaded the maritime assault against Japan. 1
This was clearly innovation—something new. But it was not an outright rejection of the past. Instead, it was a mixture of innovation and adaptation, drawing
on existing doctrine where that made sense and creating new doctrine where that
was called for. The end result was the foundation of the U.S. Navy that is familiar
to us today.2
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PRE–WORLD WAR II CARRIER CONCEPTS
In the fall of 1937, then-captain Richmond K. Turner,
a member of the faculty of the Naval War College, presented a lecture entitled “The Strategic Employment
of the Fleet.” His argument was straightforward: “The
chief strategic function of the fleet is the creation of situations that will bring about decisive battle, and under
conditions that will ensure the defeat of the enemy.”3
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Aircraft carriers had an important role to play, especially by raiding enemy forces
and bases. As Turner pointed out, raids could “inflict serious damage” on an
enemy and “gain important information.” At the same time, carrier raids could
“carry the threat of permanency or future repetition.” Turner argued that raids
were “a distinct type of operation” and that raiding “occupies a tremendously
important place in naval warfare.”4
In his 1937 pamphlet “The Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare,” Turner
recognized that the performance of carrier planes had improved and was still
improving, which meant that “nothing behind the enemy front is entirely secure
from observation and attack.” Improved performance also implied that carrier
aircraft could put air bases on land out of commission and achieve “command of
the air” in a region. War games and exercises that set one carrier against another
were misleading. “For us to attain command of the air around a hostile fleet in
its own home waters we must not only destroy its carrier decks, but also all the
airdromes or land-based aviation in its vicinity.”5
What aviation had brought to naval warfare, according to Turner, was not only
the ability to strike enemy ships and bases from the sea but, especially, the ability
to gain information about the enemy while preventing the enemy from doing the
same with regard to friendly forces. But gaining control of the air would not be
possible if a fleet’s air units were dispersed or spread among too many missions.
As he put it, “We should, as with other means of action, be sure to employ a concentration of enough airplanes to produce the desired effect.”6
But how was that concentration to be achieved? Turner admitted that there
“seems to be no one best place to locate our carriers to prevent the enemy from
destroying them,” and he acknowledged that exercises had demonstrated that
carriers were most valuable as offensive weapons.7 The fleet problems had shown
that the side that found and attacked the other side’s carrier or carriers had a
great advantage thereafter.8 But how could carriers best be protected? How could
they be supported logistically? It was well understood by combat aviators that
more fighter aircraft did not necessarily translate into an automatic advantage in
air-to-air combat. Numbers had to be translated into combat power through the
use of proper scouting, bombing, and air-to-air combat tactics. The same notion
applied to carriers. There were simply not enough carriers before World War II
to know how best to maneuver and employ clusters of them.9
Despite the unknowns associated with aircraft carrier operations, U.S. carrier
doctrine was relatively advanced by April 1939, when Vice Admiral Ernest J. King,
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, issued the guidance document “Operations
with Carriers.” For example, it defined the primary mission of carrier aircraft
as gaining and maintaining “control of the air in the theatre of naval operations. Missions of a defensive nature militate against the accomplishment of this
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mission.” If the limited number of carriers went off to conduct a major raid, the
battleship force would have to accept the risk.10
“Operations with Carriers,” which drew its inferences from the evidence provided by the Navy’s fleet problems, also noted that successful carrier raids against
land bases and targets were “practicable.” However, experience in exercises had
shown that carriers operating in close support of an amphibious operation “are
usually considered important objectives by the enemy and are usually destroyed
before the completion of the operations. This follows largely from a lack of strategical mobility” of the carriers.11 In addition, there was no certain way to know
how to position carriers once they were conducting flight operations. To handle
aircraft, carriers had to steam into the wind and maintain a constant course until
all were launched or taken aboard. That might make them particularly vulnerable
to attack by enemy aircraft, submarines, or even surface ships.
Despite the unknowns attached to carrier operations, several things were clear
from the prewar fleet problems. First, it was essential for any carrier to get in the
first strike against an enemy. That was because carriers under concerted air attack
were almost impossible to defend.12 Second, therefore, it was critical to conduct
effective scouting in order to find the enemy’s carriers first. Third, carriers did not
belong in night surface engagements. As Fleet Tactical Publication 143 (War Instructions) of 1934 put it, “Aircraft carriers should endeavor to avoid night action
with all types of enemy vessels and should employ every means, speed, guns, and
smoke, to assist them in this endeavor.”13 This meant that carriers would have to
operate separate from battleships at night if there were any possibility of a night
surface engagement. But how were the movements of these separate forces to be
coordinated? Fourth, tying the carriers to an amphibious operation involved very
high risk. Carriers were safest and most effective if they were allowed to roam and to
attack—to take, and then stay on, the offensive.
U.S. CARRIER OPERATIONS IN 1942
In 1942, U.S. carriers in the Pacific performed the missions foreseen before the
war:

• Raids. Strikes were flown on the Marshalls and Gilberts in February and
then attacks on Wake and Marcus Islands. Lae and Salamaua were struck
on 10 March, and Task Force (TF) 16 carried Army twin-engine bombers to
within striking range of Tokyo on 18 April.

• Ambushes. The battle of the Coral Sea (4–8 May) was an attempted U.S.
Navy carrier ambush of a Japanese carrier force covering an amphibious operation. Midway (3–6 June) was also an American ambush, but of the main
Japanese carrier force.14
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• Covering invasion forces. Around Guadalcanal, at the battles of the Eastern
Solomons (23–25 August) and Santa Cruz (26–27 October), U.S. and Japanese carrier forces fought with one another and with land-based air units to
gain and hold air superiority. U.S. forces sought to hold Henderson Field;
the Japanese land and sea forces struggled to take it or permanently close it.
Both sides used carrier aviation to cover amphibious operations and raid the
enemy’s carriers.
There was nothing doctrinally new in these critical battles. As the late Clark
Reynolds demonstrated in 1994, Admiral King’s strategy in the Pacific was to
maintain an aggressive and active “fleet in being” in order to hinder and harass
the Japanese.15 King’s direction to Admiral Chester Nimitz to take calculated
risks meant that Nimitz and his subordinates would use carrier task forces at
the operational level of war to raid critical Japanese targets and then retreat. For
their part, to forestall future raids, the more numerous Japanese carriers would
attempt to destroy the U.S. carriers. That could (and did) set the stage for U.S.
ambushes. The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway were tactical ambushes that
attained Admiral Nimitz’s operational-level goals. “By the middle of July 1942,
Admirals King and Nimitz therefore had four carriers . . . with which to defend
Hawaii and Australia against Japan’s two surviving heavies and three light carriers. The odds were even.”16
However, defending the U.S. force that had invaded Guadalcanal placed
American carrier commanders in the vulnerable position of staying near enough
to the amphibious assault to defend it. That was not what the 1939 “Operations
with Carriers” had recommended. It was essential for U.S. forces on Guadalcanal
to get land-based aviation up and running from Henderson Field so that carriers
could roam and raid. The Japanese knew that and therefore used their forces to
try to prevent it. So long as Guadalcanal was being contested, U.S. carriers would
have to stay near enough to the island to shield it from Japanese attacks; they
would have one foot nailed to Guadalcanal, while their opponents could maneuver freely. As a consequence, the U.S. Navy lost two carriers and saw Enterprise
put out of action for over three months.
Thinking about carrier operations continued even as the battles raged. As John
Lundstrom has discovered, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher put together a concept of optimal carrier tactics in September 1942, and Nimitz passed Fletcher’s
assessment on to Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, the area commander, who apparently “concurred with most of Fletcher’s positions.”17 Nimitz took Fletcher’s
comments, Halsey’s reaction, “and extracts from action reports of the 26 October
Santa Cruz battle” and sent them “to all Pacific Fleet aviation type commanders, task force commanders, carrier captains, and others . . . who led carriers in
battle.”18 Nimitz invited comments, and he got them.
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At about the same time, Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, who had captained Lexington at Coral Sea and was now Halsey’s subordinate, developed a
paper entitled “Principles of Handling Carriers.” When he took command of Task
Force 16—built around carrier Enterprise—on 24 November 1942, he gave his
subordinates copies of this paper “with elaboration.”19 By 1 December, according
to Sherman, he had a rough draft of a means of using fighters to defend carriers.20 On 16 December, Sherman learned that he would also get command of the
newly repaired Saratoga; he wrote, “Now is my chance to operate a two-carrier
task force which I have been advocating since the war started over a year ago.”21
On the 18th he noted that it was necessary “for two carrier task forces operating
together to shake down if they are to do it efficiently,” and on 28 December he told
his diary, “Have been drawing up a plan for operating a five-carrier task force. It
looks feasible and fine for defense. It is the only way the air groups of 5 carriers
can be conducted. I hope to get a chance to try it out.”22
Sherman would have an uphill struggle. Opinion about the optimal size of
carrier task forces was divided among the senior carrier and carrier task force
commanders. As the staff history of the fast carrier task force prepared in 1945
by the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) would point out,
Vice Admiral Fletcher disagreed with his subordinate, Captain Arthur C. Davis,
who had commanded Enterprise in the Eastern Solomons battle. Davis argued
that “the joint operation of more than two carrier task forces is too unwieldy.
This applies to both the inherent lags in visual communications and the lags and
complications in tactical handling.” Davis did not think that changes in doctrine
and training could eliminate these problems.23 Fletcher replied, “Our recent experience indicate[s] that three carrier task forces can be handled almost as easily
as two; and I feel certain that four could be operated together without too much
difficulty.”24
But Captain Davis, not so optimistic, was particularly concerned about keeping carriers separate when they were being attacked by enemy aircraft. As he said,
“it should unquestionably be the exception rather than the rule that carrier task
forces operating jointly be less than ten miles apart, and this distance should be
of the order of fifteen or twenty miles when action is thought to be imminent.”
Fletcher countered, “To an attacking air group, it makes little difference whether
the carriers are separated by 5 or 20 miles but to the defenders it makes a great
deal. By keeping the carriers separated 15–20 miles there is always the danger that
the full fighter force may not be brought to bear decisively against the enemy attack as happened at Midway.”25
After the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, the still-unresolved debate carried
on. Rear Admiral George D. Murray, who had lost Hornet, his flagship, to Japanese bomb and torpedo attacks, argued that two-carrier task forces were too slow
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to take the offensive when that was imperative. Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid,
who had commanded the Enterprise task force, did not agree. His position was
that “by having two carriers together one carrier can take care of all routine flying
while the other maintains her full striking group spotted and ready to launch on
short notice.”26 As Lundstrom finds, there was no consensus among the carrier
and task force commanders, “with opinion almost equally divided between concentration and dispersion.”27
1943: THINGS CHANGE
A number of ideas, technologies, and significant people came together in the
spring of 1943 in a way that would begin to change dramatically first carrier task
forces and eventually the Navy.
The people first. Admiral Nimitz was still looking for an assessment of carrier
doctrine and tactics based on the experiences of the previous year. Vice Admiral
John Towers, the Navy’s senior aviator, was committed to giving it to him. But
Towers was not the only senior aviator reviewing what had been learned during
carrier operations in 1942. In his diary entry for 20 January 1943, Rear Admiral
Sherman had noted that he and Vice Admiral Halsey “agreed perfectly” on carrier
tactics. By 15 March 1943, however, Sherman—the champion of maneuvering
multiple carriers together in coherent task forces—had received a letter from
Halsey “reversing himself on separation of carriers to receive attack.” Sherman
regarded Halsey’s revised views as “unsound.”28 The disagreement between them
shows how uncertain the matter was.
As historian Lundstrom notes, “The key problem was coordinating simultaneous flight operations from different carriers.” Sherman and his chief of
staff, Captain Herbert S. Duckworth, working with Commander Robert Dixon,
Enterprise’s air operations officer, organized exercises to show that this could be
done—that carriers steaming together could launch and recover aircraft without
their air groups interfering with one another.29 Sherman’s goal was clear—“to
create a standardized doctrine so that different carriers could swiftly integrate
into a powerful task force.”30
What Sherman and Duckworth had to modify were the “Standard Cruising
Instructions for Carrier Task Forces” of 1 January 1943. Those instructions assumed that there would usually be no more than two carriers in a task force. With
two carriers, one could send up inner air patrols, scouting flights, and—when
required—a combat air patrol, while the other carrier’s air group stood ready
to launch strikes. The two carriers could rotate between being the “duty carrier”
and the strike carrier. The ships in the task force would exercise with the carriers
until they could “turn with the duty carrier without signal.” The duty carrier, to
limit the time it deviated from the task force’s base course owing to turns into the
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wind, would “adjust her position . . . in order to reduce separation [from the rest
of the task force] to a minimum.”31
The instructions also required multiple carriers in a task force to separate
“during air attacks or immediately prior thereto,” each carrier taking with it
“those cruisers and destroyers that can form screens in the shortest possible
time.”32 This was prewar doctrine, with the addition of lessons learned during the
carrier operations of 1942—that is, adaptation. It was repeated in Rear Admiral
DeWitt C. Ramsey’s “Maneuvering and Fire Doctrine for Carrier Task Forces” of
22 April 1943: “In the event of a threatened attack on a disposition containing
two or more carriers it is imperative that carriers separate, each carrier being accompanied by its own screen of ships previously assigned.” Moreover, “each carrier group shall control its own air operations and fighter direction. . . . Distances
between carrier groups shall be maintained between five and ten miles insofar as
practicable.”33
But change—innovation—was coming. Events were forcing it. On 1 March
1943, Admiral King’s headquarters issued the second classified “Battle Experience” bulletin, Solomon Islands Actions, August and September 1942. It was critical
of how screening destroyers assigned to protect carriers from submarine attacks
were maneuvering. Once the carrier they were escorting had launched or recovered aircraft, the escorts had been experiencing difficulty taking up the optimal
positions for protecting the carrier from submarine torpedo attack, allowing
Japanese submarines to penetrate the destroyer screen.34
Two weeks later, on 15 March 1943, Admiral King’s staff issued Battle Experience Bulletin No. 3, Solomon Islands Actions, October 1942. This classified analysis, with its focus on the battle near the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942, did
not resolve the issue of how to best use the capabilities of multiple carriers in
battle. Vice Admiral Halsey, the senior carrier commander, believed that carriers
Enterprise and Hornet had been “too far apart for mutual cooperation and not far
enough apart for deception.”35 As Halsey observed, “due to the wide separation of
the carriers communications collapsed and fighter directing failed.”36 But Towers,
by 1943 the type commander for aircraft in the Pacific, argued that “the files of
the War College, the [Navy] Department, and the Fleet contain many thousands
of pages of discussion of the merits of separation of carriers vs their concentration. . . . I do not believe that an attempt to rehash this controversy can serve any
useful purpose here.” Towers favored the accepted tactic—keeping two carriers
together until the approach of an air attack and then dispersing them, bringing
them back together once the attack was over.37
Rear Admiral George Murray, who had commanded TF 17 (Hornet and its
escorts), supported Vice Admiral Towers: “It is too much to expect that a combat
air patrol of one task force can be controlled and coordinated with the same
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degree of efficiency by the fighter direction officer of another task force. The
teamwork between the fighter direction officer and his own combat air patrol is
such an intimate one, because of constantly working together, much of the efficiency of this combination is lost when the fighter direction is taken over by an
entirely separate organization.”38 However, Osborne B. Hardison, the captain of
Enterprise, took a different view, insisting that “what is urgently needed is a sound
doctrine.” At Santa Cruz, on 26 October, the fighter direction team on Enterprise
had done what they had been trained to do, but their best effort had been overcome by events: “With some 38 of our fighters in the air, and with enemy planes
in large numbers coming in from various directions and altitudes, and with
friendly planes complicating the situation, then the system breaks down.”39
Something had to be done to resolve this months-long debate. The “something” was an idea developed before World War II—“extensive trials and experiments.” Rear Admiral Sherman and Captain Duckworth arrived at Pearl Harbor
with Enterprise and found the new large carrier Essex (CV 9) there, soon to be
followed by sister ships Yorktown (CV 10) and Lexington (CV 16). At about the
same time, three new Independence-class light carriers reached Pearl Harbor.
Sherman and Duckworth, watched by Towers, at last had enough ships and
planes to run experiments. The ships themselves had some new technology:
four-channel very-high-frequency (VHF) radios for the fighter-direction teams,
position-plan-indicator radar scopes for the new SK (air search) radars, a methodology for using the newly developed combat information centers (CICs), and
an understanding of how to use the SG (surface search) radar to facilitate safe
maneuvering at night and in thick weather. There was also the new fighter, the
F6F Hellcat, and information: friend or foe (IFF) transponders for all aircraft.40
The results of their experiments were fed into a team of three officers that
had been created by Admiral Nimitz on 13 April 1943 to rewrite the “Standard
Cruising Instructions for Carrier Task Forces.” One of the three was Captain
Apollo Soucek, who had been executive officer of Hornet at Santa Cruz. With
his colleagues, Soucek decided that they would—as their letter of 18 May to
Admiral Nimitz put it—exceed their “instructions to the extent that all existing
Pacific Fleet Tactical Bulletins and numerous Fleet confidential letters” needed
to be overhauled. The result of their labors was Pacific Fleet Tactical Orders and
Doctrine, known as PAC-10.41
PAC-10 was a dramatic innovation. It combined existing tactical publications,
tactical bulletins, task force instructions, and battle organization doctrine into
one doctrinal publication that applied to the whole fleet. Its goal was to make it
“possible for forces composed of diverse types, and indoctrinated under different
task force commanders, to join at sea on short notice for concerted action against
the enemy without interchanging a mass of special instructions.” 42 PAC-10’s
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instructions covered one-carrier and multicarrier task forces, and escort- or
light-carrier support operations of amphibious assaults. It established the basic
framework for the four-carrier task forces—with two Essex-class ships and two
of the Independence class—that would form the primary mobile striking arm of
the Pacific Fleet.43 However, it did this within the structure of a combined naval
force, a force composed of surface ships—including battleships and carriers.44
PAC-10 dealt with the issue of whether to concentrate or separate carriers
under air attack by redefining the problem: “Whether a task force containing two
or more carriers should separate into distinct groups . . . or remain tactically concentrated . . . may be largely dependent on circumstances peculiar to the immediate situation. No single rule can be formulated to fit all contingencies.”45 That is,
it basically said that the problem was not to develop hard and fast doctrine that
would cover all situations but to create guidance that could be tailored to the
situation at hand. PAC-10 also took advantage of the fact that fighter-direction
technology and techniques had matured. It was now possible for a fighter director to maintain a continuous plot of all detected aircraft, evaluate plots and warn
friendly ships of “impending air attack,” control “the number and disposition of
combat patrols,” take best advantage of the radar technology then being installed
on all the large carriers, and direct “the interception of enemy aircraft.” All new
air units were to be trained for participation in air defense of a carrier under the
direction of fighter directors. As PAC-10 put it, “with the composition of Task
Forces rapidly changing, it is essential that a new air unit be able to join a force
and assume its duties without receiving a mass of new instructions which are
inconsistent with prescribed practice.”46
PAC-10 solved two problems. First, “the creation of a single, common doctrine
allowed ships to be interchanged between task groups.” Second, “shifting the development of small-unit tactical doctrine to the fleet level and out of the hands
of individual commanders increased the effectiveness of all units, particularly the
fast-moving carrier task forces.”47 Put another way, PAC-10 was what Admiral
Nimitz had wanted for almost a year. It allowed him to hand to Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance a force that the latter could wield as he wished—with “lightning
speed,” speed that he could use to take the Japanese by surprise and keep them
off balance operationally as well as tactically.48
1943: PUTTING THE CHANGE TO WORK
The title of Battle Experience Bulletin No. 13, the description and analysis of
the attack on Wake Island on 5–6 October 1943, gives the game away: Dress
Rehearsal for Future Operations.49 That was it—the initiation in combat of the
new combined (and carrier-led) task force based on PAC-10. The new force had
been given its first test in the 31 August 1943 raid on Marcus Island, when Essex,
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Yorktown, and light carrier Independence combined their air groups, but the
sustained attack on Wake was proof that the transformed force could take the
offensive against Japanese land-based naval aviation and its torpedo-carrying
night-attack aircraft.
Why Marcus and Wake? Neither raid would telegraph the coming amphibious operation against the Gilberts, and Marcus was far enough away from the
Marianas to give the new carriers the chance to strike and withdraw to assess their
“lessons learned” without having a major Japanese carrier force to contend with.
The surviving planning documents give great credit to the ability of Japanese
sea-based and land-based aviation to initiate and respond to attack. Wake was
therefore the critical test, because it was in range of Japanese land-based naval
aviation. Wake was only 537 miles from Eniwetok, 594 miles from Kwajalein, and
640 miles from Wotje, all of which were thought to hold major land-based (and
long-range) air components. Wake was also just over two thousand miles from
Pearl Harbor. Once committed to attack Wake, the U.S. carrier force could not
easily or quickly withdraw to safer waters.
The carrier commander for the Wake raid was Rear Admiral Alfred E. Montgomery. There were three carrier elements of his task group: one built around
Essex and Yorktown, a second based on Lexington and light carrier Cowpens, and
a third based on light carriers Independence and Belleau Wood. There were also
two bombardment groups, composed of cruisers and destroyers, and a task unit
composed of fleet oilers. Montgomery had at his disposal a combined force of
surface, aviation, and logistics task units, as well as the support of patrol planes
based on Midway Island.50 The aircraft from the carriers began their air assault
by gaining air superiority over Wake. As Rear Admiral Montgomery put it in his
report, “Well before noon 27 fighters had been shot down and all air opposition
appeared to be ended.”51 Moreover, the fighters flying from Independence and
Belleau Wood successfully protected both the carriers and the surface ships bombarding Wake from long-range bomber attacks. The patrols from these carriers
were so successful that Montgomery could claim that “no ship of this force was
ever attacked by enemy air.”52
Though the raid was a complete success, not everything worked well. Charts of
the area around Wake were not adequate, for example. The VHF circuits became
saturated because of inadequate radio discipline, and there were problems coordinating the movement of surface ships and the stationing of fighters to protect
them. But carrier night fighters had turned out to be a success, as had the use of
flight deck catapults on all the carriers.53 The utility of PAC-10 was affirmed. So
was the value of having combat information centers on all ships, including surface
ships covered by patrolling aircraft.54
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Lundstrom quotes Captain Duckworth as saying that the essential tactical
lessons for using multiple carriers had been demonstrated in 1942 and that “all
we did was apply them in the summer & fall of 1943.”55 But two other oftenunmentioned developments were essential if multicarrier U.S. task forces were
to raid far and wide across the Central Pacific. The first was the growing size and
sophistication of Vice Admiral William L. Calhoun’s Hawaii-based Service Force,
which kept the carriers and their escorts supplied with fuel and ordnance and
provided maintenance at forward anchorages. The second was the growing industrial capacity of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. The yard’s ability to repair ships
damaged in battle is well documented, but the yard was also able to make sure
that new ships could get their defects corrected before they went to combat. For
example, between 21 and 30 October 1943, Yorktown was docked so that its SC-2
radar antenna could be repaired. The flight deck catapults on the light carriers
also needed to be inspected and repaired, and there were other “fixes” required
for equipment problems on the big carriers Bunker Hill and Lexington.56
The basic issue was whether and how the whole carrier force could successfully
support the planned offensive in the Central Pacific. Could the fast carriers raid
widely, keeping the Japanese on the defensive, while the escort carriers supported
the amphibious forces? Or would the new carriers have to do what Vice Admiral
Fletcher had been compelled to do in the Guadalcanal campaign—stay tied to the
amphibious assaults? To make matters even more uncertain, it was not clear how,
when, and in what manner the enemy would respond to the initial American
moves. If the Pacific Fleet went after the Gilberts, would the Imperial Japanese
Navy’s carrier and battleship forces sortie from Truk to engage it? Admirals Spruance and Towers both considered that a realistic option for the Japanese, though
they disagreed about how best to deal with it. Towers apparently wanted to take
the initiative and use the fast carrier force to strike the Japanese at Truk before
they could gather their forces for a fleet engagement.57
More generally, was Spruance’s Central Pacific Force (later the Fifth Fleet)
ready for its mission? Could the amphibious force, the land-based air arm, the
fast carriers, and the surface ships acting as fire support for the assault troops
work together effectively? Where the raids on Marcus and Wake had tested the
fast carriers, the assault on the Gilberts would test the whole force. The memory
of the Guadalcanal campaign influenced planning for the Gilberts invasion, but
as John Lundstrom points out, the offensive power of U.S. forces—especially the
carrier forces—had improved dramatically in one year. Rear Admiral Charles A.
Pownall’s six Essex-class carriers and five Independence-class light carriers fielded
almost seven hundred aircraft, and eight new escort carriers had among them just
over two hundred planes. Vice Admiral Fletcher, by contrast, had commanded
only 234 carrier aircraft while defending Guadalcanal in 1942.58
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 66

70

10/31/12 9:48 AM

War College: Winter 2013 Review

HONE

67

The assault on the Gilbert Islands was a success. Even the weather cooperated.
An “eastsoutheasterly wind of 12–15 knots . . . greatly facilitated our carrier air
operations; reduced by one half the fuel expenditure of the carrier task groups . . .
and so permitted us to build up a fuel reserve that removed any concern over
shortage of fuel.”59 Though the “forces destined for the operation were widely dispersed at the beginning of the assembly and training period,” they were trained
and brought together in time to conduct the operation.60 The commander of the
force that assaulted Tarawa, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, complimented the performance of the carrier striking groups and especially praised the performance
of the escort carriers, which had supported the ground forces.61 Vice Admiral
Towers echoed this praise, adding that “for the first time in history Carrier Night
Fighters, operating from a Carrier at sea, were successfully employed against our
enemy.”62
Towers, Rear Admiral Arthur W. Radford, and others had argued long and
hard against the plan to use the carriers as a shield against Japanese attacks from
the Marshalls directed against the amphibious units attacking and occupying the
Gilberts. Towers wanted to strike by surprise the Japanese airfields in the Marshalls before the invasion and then continue to strike them. As it happened, the
carrier task forces were surprisingly good at combining antiaircraft fire and radical maneuvers to blunt the Japanese night attacks by torpedo-carrying aircraft.63
These measures, combined with night-fighter defense, meant that the fast carriers
could protect themselves from the tactic that was the basis of Japanese night anticarrier doctrine. Put another way, the weaknesses in carrier defensive measures
revealed initially during the raid on Wake were being steadily overcome.
The fast carrier task force had largely proved itself by the end of 1943. The
elements of the force, which included powerful surface escorts, could disperse
to raid Japanese bases and then concentrate to shield the amphibious units that
were taking away the land bases that the Japanese needed to maintain an effective defense. For example, on 5 November, before the amphibious assault on the
Gilberts (to begin on 20 November 1943), Rear Admiral Sherman’s two-carrier
task force struck the Japanese base at Rabaul, in the Bismarck Archipelago. Then
Sherman’s force was joined by Rear Admiral Montgomery’s three carriers from
Spruance’s Central Pacific Force to strike Rabaul yet again, on 11 November.
After that mission, both task forces hightailed it for the Gilberts, arriving in time
to support the amphibious assaults as scheduled. Once the Gilberts had been
secured, the carriers of Rear Admiral Pownall’s Task Force 50 attacked Wotje and
Kwajalein, in the Marshalls, and then Nauru, west of the Gilberts. The improved
defenses of carrier task forces and the ability of different carrier air groups to coordinate their strikes meant that “it was possible to disperse [carrier task forces]
and strike multiple targets simultaneously.”64
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MORE PROGRESS IN 1944
The successful campaign against the Marshalls showed that the new fleet design,
centered arovund carrier task forces but including battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, was a success. The mobility of the carrier task forces, coupled with the
ability of the amphibious forces to make landings “over widely scattered areas,”
kept the Japanese from “mounting a successful defense at any one place” and
prevented effective coordination of their land-based defenses and their seaborne
forces.65 As the U.S. Navy moved forward, it created bases for many squadrons
of land-based long-range Army and Navy bombers, and those aircraft mounted
further and frequent attacks on Japanese installations.
The U.S. Navy’s carrier task forces increased the tempo of their raids after
the conquest of the Gilberts. The fast carrier task force (TF 50), composed of
six Essex-class and six Independence-class carriers and commanded by Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, gained control of the air over Kwajalein and Majuro on
29 January 1944, bombarded Wotje and Taroa, and covered the assaults on Roi
and Namur on 1 February. On 16–17 February, TF 50 raided the main Japanese
base at Truk, thereafter covering the U.S. amphibious assault on Eniwetok. On 21
February, as part of an effort to squelch Japanese air attacks staged from bases in
the Marianas, the newly designated Task Force 58, under Rear Admiral Mitscher,
began attacking Japanese air bases on Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and Guam. 66
Task Force 58 was created to concentrate “the main combatant strength of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet in fast carriers, fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers,” in order to “guard against any attempt by the Japanese Fleet” to disrupt U.S. amphibious operations.67 At the same time, the elements of this task force, in cooperation
with land-based aircraft flying from the Gilberts, were used to neutralize enemy
bases. According to Admiral King’s staff, “This program was actually carried out
to the letter, and was completely successful.”68 Put another way, Task Force 58 was
both sword and shield.
The planning for the Marshalls campaign also accounted for the possibility of
a major fleet action. In case the Japanese battleships appeared, “the plan called for
all battleships and cruisers (except some [antiaircraft cruisers] and some of the
destroyers) from both the Carrier Force and from the Joint Expeditionary Force
to form the battle line directly under Admiral Spruance.”69 The adoption of PAC10 had made this possible, and the plan for the Marshalls campaign shows the
effects of PAC-10’s implementation. Task Force 58, for instance, “comprised actually all the new battleship strength of the Pacific Fleet, plus a considerable part
of the cruiser and destroyer strength.”70 Yet the plan assumed that the battleships
and cruisers could be pulled out of TF 58 in short order and used as a coherent
surface force against a similar force of Japanese ships. Such a dramatic tactical
change had not been possible in 1942.
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The new Pacific Fleet matured in the Marshalls campaign for a number of
reasons. First, the doctrine in PAC-10 facilitated effective tactical cooperation
among combatants and task forces. Second, Admiral Nimitz had restructured
his headquarters in the fall of 1943 to provide his subordinate commanders with
accurate and useful intelligence on the Japanese. The creation of the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) had “ended the dispute between
[Washington] D.C.–based intelligence activities and those at Pearl Harbor.” 71
Nimitz’s staff also revised the way that intelligence (including signals intelligence) would flow to the operations planners. By the time that planning for the
Marshalls operation was under way, Vice Admiral Spruance’s staff could request
and expect to receive accurate and detailed information about Japanese forces
and their bases.72
Third, Vice Admiral Calhoun’s Service Force had gained the ships and the
skills necessary to sustain the rapid offensive in the Central Pacific. Calhoun’s
command had created and deployed Service Squadron 10, which anchored in the
lagoon at Majuro after Admiral Turner’s amphibious force had captured Kwajalein in January. Service Squadron 10 was at the end of a long logistics “pipeline”
that delivered ammunition, food, and replacement aircraft from the continental
United States to Hawaii and other bases and then to the carrier task forces at sea.73
Service Squadron 8 was the mobile source of oil and aviation gasoline. Together,
the mobile service squadrons gave the fast carrier task force an extraordinary
mobility—a mobility that in 1944 allowed the Pacific Fleet to combine its Central
Pacific offensive with General Douglas MacArthur’s South Pacific drive toward
the Philippines from New Guinea.
The records of operations in the winter of 1943–44 also indicate a growing sophistication in air operations planning. For example, plans for strikes against carriers in 1942 had stressed coordinating the attacks of torpedo and dive-bomber
squadrons so that a “pulse” of combat power arrived over the target, dividing and
saturating the enemy carrier’s defenses. This was difficult to do; U.S. carrier aircraft did not do it at Midway, for example. However, by the time that Task Force
58 task groups attacked Jaluit and Truk in February 1944, the emphasis was on
“a continuous flow of striking groups into the target area, preceded by an initial
fighter strike each morning.”74 Given the mission, which was raiding defended
Japanese bases, this stress on the effective flow of aircraft delivering ordnance
was sound. So too was the concern for night torpedo attacks by Japanese aircraft.
Night fighters were available to counter these Japanese night attacks, but the
decision to use these aircraft was left to the task group commanders. As annex
C of the operations plan for these raids noted, it was hazardous to recover the
fighters at night and dangerous to steam steadily into the wind with Japanese
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night-fighting forces (which included submarines and surface ships, as well as
twin-engine bombers) in the vicinity.75
In May 1944, Vice Admiral Mitscher issued special task force instructions
(known as FastCar TFI-1), noting that they followed but did not replace the direction provided by the instruction USF-10(A), which was the U.S. Fleet version
of PAC-10.76 FastCar TFI-1 was based on the assumption that for the immediate
future, multicarrier operations would consist of “heavy carrier raids on major
enemy bases . . . and heavy raids on enemy bases and areas followed immediately
by assault and occupation by Amphibious forces.”77 The pattern for these raids
had been tested and found reliable: “After complete control of the air is attained,
then strike aircraft are used to support the actual assault operations. . . . In either
of the above cases, the Task Force Air Plan provides for the coordination of the
many attacking groups in order to obtain a maximum delivery of strikes on the
primary objectives in an orderly and continuous flow. This can best be accomplished by roughly dividing the air groups in half and launching ‘deck loads’ at a
time, each ‘deck load’ a complete striking group.”78
TFI-1 also dealt with the risk taken by task groups (which together made up
the task force) when they separated in order to launch and recover strikes. Because they would often lose direct communication with each other when they
separated, doctrine did not have the task force commander always act as the Force
Fighter Director, and therefore it was essential that each task group have an effective fighter-director staff. As TFI-1 put it, “Unless otherwise directed by the Task
Force Commander, each Task Group will assume independent control for fighter
direction purposes.” This doctrine would not work, however, unless each fighterdirection team maintained a continuous plot of all friendly aircraft. Otherwise,
friendly fighters from one task group would likely engage friendly fighters from
other task groups.79
With the Marshalls secured, the Marianas were next, and Admiral Spruance,
the commander of the attacking U.S. forces, had to assume that the Japanese
might seek a decisive fleet engagement after first wearing down his carrier aviation. At the same time, Spruance’s carrier forces had to shield the amphibious
assault from any Japanese “end run” against it. In what came to be called the
battle of the Philippine Sea, Admiral Spruance therefore chose to shield the
amphibious force—despite the argument by Vice Admiral Mitscher that U.S.
carriers could destroy the Japanese carrier force and, in so doing, best shield the
amphibious units assaulting Saipan. Spruance was to be criticized for not doing
what Mitscher advised, but his decision was consistent with his concept of the
Central Pacific campaign as a series of amphibious assaults that would move U.S.
land-based aviation close enough to the Japanese home islands to begin longrange bombing.
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What is more interesting is Operation Plan 14-44 of 1 August 1944, Admiral
Halsey’s scheme to assault Peleliu, in the Palau Islands. The immediate objective
was to begin the process of isolating the Philippines in anticipation of their eventual conquest. But the operations plan made it clear that Halsey’s planners hoped
that the Japanese fleet would come out to fight: “In case opportunity for the
destruction of a major portion of the enemy fleet offers or can be created, such
destruction will become the primary task.”80 Annex A (“Battle Concepts”) to 1444 assumed that the Japanese would in fact attack, that Japanese “carrier strikes
in force may be expected but the enemy is not likely to close for decisive surface
action unless he has been successful in inflicting heavy damage by air strikes
on our forces.” Annex A also assumed that “our fast carrier forces will have had
time to complete their initial bombardment missions and are substantially intact
prior to an enemy threat developing but may not have had time for completion
of refueling and replenishment.”81
The plan outlined in annex A had Mitscher’s fast carrier task force (TF 38)
“seek out the enemy and launch a concentrated air strike against his major units.”
For this to be most effective, the carriers were to “be maneuvered in such a manner as to permit the simultaneous launching by all groups present of the maximum air strike against the enemy at the earliest daylight period to insure completion prior dark.” Mitscher would command this operation if it took place.82 If
there were a major daylight surface engagement, Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee’s Task
Force 34, the “Heavy Surface Striking Force,” would attack the Japanese.83 If the
Japanese chose to attack at night, as their surface forces had done at Guadalcanal,
Lee’s TF 34 would engage them. If they tried to reinforce Peleliu with “Tokyo
Express” runs by destroyers and light cruisers, then TF 35, a force of cruisers and
destroyers under Rear Admiral Walden L. Ainsworth, would intercept them.84
What is important about this operation plan is that it was a whole-force plan. It
followed the injunction of PAC-10 to bring all available combat power to bear on
the enemy, using forces that shared a common tactical doctrine.
Halsey’s focus on bringing the Japanese fleet to a dramatic engagement was
just as clear in Battle Plan No. 1-44 of 9 September 1944—the plan in place for
the battle of Leyte Gulf. That plan assumed that the Japanese fleet “or a major
portion thereof is at sea and there is possibility of creating an opportunity to
engage it decisively.” As Halsey directed, the Third Fleet “will seek the enemy
and attempt to bring about a decisive engagement if he undertakes operations
beyond close support of superior land based air forces.”85 The “optimum plan,”
for Halsey, was to strike the Japanese with both his aviation and surface forces,
and he was willing to withdraw the amphibious units in order to fight his desired
decisive engagement.86 As annex A to Third Fleet’s plan 1-44 put it, “The plan for
coordinated use of forces does not discourage use of carrier strikes if enemy is
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found within range of aircraft. Particular effort, however, will be made to gain a
position from which a predawn carrier strike may be launched concurrently with
release [sic] of fast heavy striking force from a favorable attack position.”87
The image of Admiral Halsey’s fleet that is contained in his September 1944
battle plan is that of a combined force—not a carrier force but a combined force.
The mission of that combined force was the same in 1944 as it had been in the
many operational-level war games conducted at the Naval War College in the two
decades before World War II—to bring the Japanese fleet to decisive battle and
defeat it. Though the “long-awaited clash of battle lines never occurred,” the fast
battleships “were an essential element of the Navy’s plan for decisive battle and
therefore collectively an essential part of the campaign.”88 Put another way, what
took place during the war was not a simple substitution of carriers for battleships
but the creation of a modern, combined-arms fleet, one that included submarines and land-based aviation. That was the innovation.
INTEGRATION TO FORM A NEW ORGANIZATION
The first argument of this article—the one to which most of the article has been
dedicated—is that what Navy officers developed in the Pacific in World War II
was not a carrier force but a combined force. Indeed, all the elements of this force
grew in sophistication during the war and because of the war. Before the war,
for example, carriers were hit-and-run weapons—raiders. This was not a trivial
role, as Navy officers recognized, and it remained a central mission of carriers all
through the war. But before 1944 there were hardly enough carrier aircraft for
naval officers to become adept at planning and staging mass air attacks, especially
against land targets. Shielding amphibious forces was perceived before World
War II as a dangerous mission for carriers. But by 1944—certainly by the time
Admiral Halsey’s planners were preparing the assault on Peleliu—the Pacific
Fleet’s air forces were prepared both for a carrier battle and for protecting an
amphibious assault.
By 1944, the Navy’s fast carrier task forces were a major operational-level
weapon. Combined with surface escorts and sustained by mobile service and supply
units, carrier task forces could roam widely and gain air superiority over large areas. The carrier task forces were therefore put to work sustaining the amphibious
offensive against Japan in the Central Pacific. The purpose of the Central Pacific
campaign was to put land-based, long-range bombers in range of Japanese cities
and simultaneously to force the Japanese fleet to devote its resources to defending
against the wide-ranging U.S. carrier task forces—instead of defending against
the effective submarine offensive against Japanese shipping. In the process, the
Pacific Fleet’s air and surface striking units destroyed or immobilized the striking
power of the Japanese fleet.
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The second argument of this article is that the total force created under Admiral Nimitz was the basis of the modern Navy. Under Nimitz, the total, combined
fleet was created and successfully used. But also under Nimitz, the Pacific Fleet
created a modern support “infrastructure”—the intelligence, logistics, maintenance, and planning organizations so essential to the operation of a highly mobile and powerful forward-deployed striking force. The two developments went
hand in hand. Halsey’s Battle Plan No. 1-44, for example, could not have been
feasible without the intelligence, planning, communications, and logistics support developed under Nimitz’s leadership. Similarly, all of Nimitz’s efforts to create a fleet-support infrastructure would have been of little use if the Navy had not
had the talents of several superb (though not faultless) operational commanders.
Fleet officers also created PAC-10, a doctrine that pulled together the fleet as it
had never been united before. Yet PAC-10 did not freeze tactical and operationallevel thinking—quite the reverse. PAC-10 did what doctrine should do, which is
to give a force tactical cohesion so that it has energy to spare for dealing with the
inevitable unexpected challenges. One such challenge emerged in late 1944—the
kamikaze, which was in effect a manned missile.
I do not believe that the historians of the changes in the Pacific Fleet during
World War II have captured this insight. There are good biographies of Nimitz,
Mitscher, Spruance, Towers, and Fletcher. But often the biographers have been
participants in the inevitable disputes that preoccupied and sometimes divided
the top commanders themselves. Thomas Buell, for example, defended Spruance; Clark Reynolds defended Towers; E. B. Potter (and Samuel Eliot Morison)
admired Nimitz; and Lundstrom carefully investigated Fletcher’s actions during
the war to amend what Lundstrom thought had been unfair criticisms. Though
interesting, useful, and sometimes extraordinary research efforts, their biographies have distracted students of naval warfare from what really mattered, which
was the creation of a modern combined-arms navy with operational reach. This
article is an effort to shift the focus from particular “champions” to the process
that the senior officers went through, which was one of integrating technology,
tactics, and human beings to form a new organization.
This process was messy, and those engaged in it were often critical of one another’s views (and sometimes bitterly so of each other’s motives). But they kept
at it, and the growing maturity of the fleet that they were creating is evident from
its written records. But the story of that growing maturity has, in my opinion,
been obscured by a mythology that portrays the rise of the combined force as in
fact the rise of a carrier force. Today’s officers do not really know where the Navy
they command came from. The evidence of where that Navy came from exists, it
is true, but it is obscured by a mythology continued in books, articles, and films.
This is unfortunate, to say the least, and this article has been an attempt to move
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away from that mythology and toward useful insights into the development of
the modern U.S. Navy.
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T

his article suggests a new perspective on the old problem of protecting ships
at sea, for two reasons. First, although screen tactics and other defensive
measures have been developed and used for many years, this new perspective
will be useful in addressing two developments since the late nineteenth century: attackers are no longer just other ships but also aircraft, submarines, and,
recently, missiles with very long ranges launched from the land; also, torpedo
boats, coastal submarines, and mines have complicated operations in congested
and archipelagic waters. The second reason for a new approach is that in order
to support commanders in the problems of sea control we need to study the issues they encounter while solving them. This requires a description of each task
that commanders have to do; without such a description it becomes difficult to
determine which actions lead to increased control and which to loss of control,
which in turn makes it harder to identify whether commanders are running into
trouble and if so, why. The new analytical method introduced here represents an
attempt at such a description. As such, it may enrich
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To handle aircraft and missiles, defenses are organized
in several layers, with an outer layer of combat air
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patrols to take out enemy aircraft before they can launch their weapons. Next is a
zone where long- and short-range surface-to-air missiles take down missiles that
the enemy manages to fire. Any “leakers” are to be handled by soft-kill and hardkill point defenses—for example, jammers, chaff, and close-in weapon systems.
For submarines and surface vessels the logic is similar, but here maneuver is also
an option. Since the attacking surface ship or submarine moves at about the same
speed as the formation, it is possible to stay out of reach of the enemy. Maneuver
seeks to deny detection and targeting and to force attacking surface ships and
submarines to operate in ways in which they cannot muster enough strength to
carry out their mission or are more easily detected.1
A prerequisite of a successful layered defense is detection of the enemy far
enough out that all the layers get a chance to work. The restricted space of congested and archipelagic waters, however, may prevent the outer “strainers” from
acting on the enemy. This gives small, heavily armed combatants opportunities
to hide, perhaps among islands, and fire their weapons from cover, leaving only
point defenses to deal with the oncoming missiles and torpedoes, with little room
for maneuver.2 This increases the risk of saturation of defense systems and may
allow weapons to penetrate.
The problems associated with archipelagic and coastal environments have
been recognized since the introduction of the mobile torpedo.3 The torpedo gave
small units the firepower to destroy ships much larger than themselves and made
it possible for a small fleet to challenge a larger one, at least if it did not have to
do so on the open ocean. To deal with such an inshore threat, the British naval
historian and strategist Sir Julian Corbett suggested in 1911 that a “flotilla” of
small combatants had to be introduced to deal with this type of warfare, because
capital ships could no longer approach defended coasts, as they had when ships
of the line dueled with forts.4 Today, the introduction of long-range missiles,
mines, stealth design, and the ability to coordinate the efforts of land-, sea-, and
air-based systems have further intensified this threat.5
Littoral environments seem to change the problem of sea control, at least in
some aspects.6 Sensors, weapons, and tactics developed to handle threats on the
open ocean may be less appropriate in congested and archipelagic waters. Radar
and sonar returns are cluttered, missile seekers are confused, and targeting is
complicated by the existence of islands and coastlines close to the ships to be
protected. The land-sea environment introduces variables that make the seacontrol problem hard to solve using methods developed for an open ocean. As
the uncertainties and intangibles mount up, quantitative approaches become less
feasible, and we can only rely on human judgment.7 That is why it is important
to study what commanders find difficult when executing sea-control missions in
littoral environments.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20
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It has been shown to be fruitful, when studying the problems people face
when trying to solve a task, to have a model of the task that describes what the
decision maker is required to do.8 Whether that task description takes the form
of a document—a formal description or formula—or an expert, the approach
is similar—you compare people’s behavior to the description and try to identify
where and why they differ. Since experts differ, formal descriptions are preferable,
if feasible. For the sea-control task, the description can either list the problems
that the commander must solve in order to get ships safely to their destinations
or define the variables of interest and the states they must be in for sea control to
be considered established.
To get a description of what is required to establish sea control one can study
what doctrine has to say. A major U.S. Navy doctrinal publication, Naval Warfare,
characterizes sea control as one of the service’s core capabilities and states that it
“requires control of the surface, subsurface, and airspace and relies upon naval
forces’ maintaining superior capabilities and capacities in all sea-control operations. It is established through naval, joint, or combined operations designed to
secure the use of ocean and littoral areas by one’s own forces and to prevent their
use by the enemy.”9 British Maritime Doctrine has a similar description of sea
control: “Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action to use
the sea for one’s own purposes in specified areas and for specified periods of time
and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. . . . Sea control includes
the airspace above the surface and the water volume and seabed below.” 10 A North
Atlantic Treaty Organization publication, Allied Joint Maritime Operations, relates the level of control to the level of risk: “The level of sea control required will
be a balance between the desired degree of freedom of action and the degree of
acceptable risk.”11 Two academic analysts offer a more minimalistic view, arguing that tying the definition of sea control to specific military objectives creates
contrasts between the challenges posed by, for example, littoral environments
and blue-water environments.12 To accommodate these contrasts and allow for
the full range of operations, they put forward “the use of the sea as a maneuver
space to achieve military objectives” as a definition of sea control.
However, two issues make it hard to use these descriptions for studying the
problems commanders face in sea-control tasks. To say so is not to criticize their
doctrinal utility but rather to point out that for the purposes of this article, their
meanings need to be expressed in a somewhat more formal way. The first issue
is related to how the definitions describe when sea control has been established.
All these definitions describe sea control from a general perspective, as a state,
implying a line between when that state has been reached and when it has not.
As result, it would be possible to use such a description to determine whether sea
control has been established, at least in theory. A necessary precondition of such
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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a description, however, is that it contain concepts—or to be more specific, a set
of variables—that can be observed from the outside. For each variable there must
be specified the value it must have, or the condition it must be in, in order to say
that the overall state has been reached. Only then are we able to use the definition to measure whether a commander has succeeded in establishing sea control.
The second issue regards the “general,” “outside” perspective that characterizes all these descriptions—a conceptual view, detached from the environment,
the task, and the decision maker. In a sea-control task, however, several factors,
variables, need to be considered in order to determine the degree to which the
commander has managed to solve it: geography, type and duration of the operation, the enemy’s units and weapons, own resources, and the size of the region are
just a few examples. A description covering all possible aspects of sea control and
all possible situations would probably be quite complicated, containing many
variables and many states; new variables not considered at the beginning might
even have to be added as they arise.13 This is not an attractive situation for a scientific concept. Another approach would go in the other direction, stripping the
definition of variables and formulating it on a very general level (the academic
definition cited above is such an attempt).14 Such a definition covers a wide range
of situations, but it is not very specific and provides no guidance as to when sea
control has been established.
It would seem, then, that defining sea control from a general perspective is
not helpful for present purposes. The point is to not separate the definition
of sea control from the person trying to achieve it, or from the environment,
or from the task. Such a definition would assume the perspective of the commander, describe sea control as a task that the commander has to accomplish,
and lay out what is required to accomplish that task.15 Such a definition could,
as we have postulated about the analytical definition we need, either describe the
problems that the commander must solve in order to protect the ships or be a
representation of the sea-control task. Such a description would allow systematic
investigation of the effects of different tasks and different environments on the
commander’s ability to establish sea control.
In fact, I argue, to investigate the concept empirically, sea control is best described from the inside. Taking the perspective of commanders trying to achieve
control makes it possible to investigate systematically the problems they face
and in turn, perhaps, to derive guidance for the design of training and support
systems. The point of departure for such a description is the idea that securing
control at sea is analogous to establishing a “field of safe travel,” a concept that has
been proposed to describe the behavior of automobile drivers.16 This approach
can be useful for investigating the problems commanders at sea face, and it may
enrich and extend traditional thinking about sea control and how to achieve it,
especially in littoral waters.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20
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THE FIELD OF SAFE TRAVEL
Driving a car has been described analytically as locomotion through a terrain or
a field of space. The primitive function of locomotion is to move an individual
from one point of space to another, the “destination.” In the process obstacles
are met, and locomotion must be adapted to avoid them—collision may lead to
bodily injury. Locomotion by some device, such as a vehicle, is, at this level of
abstraction, no different from walking, and accordingly it is chiefly guided by vision. This guidance is given in terms of a path within the visual field of the individual, such that obstacles are avoided and the destination is ultimately reached.
The visual field of a driver is selective, in that the elements of the field that are
pertinent to locomotion stand out and are attended to, while irrelevant elements
recede into the background. The most important part of this pertinent field is the
road. It is within the boundaries of the road that the “field of safe travel” exists. 17
The field of safe travel is indefinitely bounded and at any given moment comprises all the possible paths that the car may take unimpeded (see figure 1). The
field of safe travel can be viewed as a “tongue” that sticks out along the road in
front of the car. Its boundaries are determined by objects that should be avoided.
An object has valence, positive or negative, in the sense that we want to move
toward some (positive valence) and away from others (negative valence). Objects
of negative valence have a sort of halo of avoidance, which can be represented by
“lines of clearance” surrounding it. The closer to the object the line is, the greater
the intensity of avoidance it represents. The field of safe travel itself has positive
valence, the more so along its midline.18
The field of safe travel is a spatial field. It is, however, not fixed in physical
space but moves with the car through space. The field is not merely a subjective
experience of the driver but exists objectively as an actual field in which the car
can operate safely, whether or not the driver is aware of it. During locomotion it
changes constantly as the road turns and twists. It elongates and contracts, widens and narrows, as objects encroach on its boundaries.
It is now possible to investigate how the concept of a “field of safe travel”
applies to naval warfare. As stated above, the purpose of sea control is to take
control of maritime communications, whether for commercial shipping or naval
forces. The practical problem for a commander is consequently to protect commercial vessels and warships as they move toward their destinations. These ships
will be referred to as “high-value units.”
The analogy is straightforward: to make sure that the high-value units get
safely to their destinations the commander must create a “field of safe travel”
where they can move without risk of being sunk. At the simplest level, without
the complication of hostile opposition, the problem of maneuvering a high-value
unit is exactly the same as that of driving a car: make sure that it gets to its destination without running into something (that is, for a vessel, colliding or running
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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FIGURE 1
THE FIELD OF SAFE TRAVEL AND THE MINIMUM STOPPING ZONE OF A DRIVER IN TRAFFIC

Original figure caption: “If, in this and the following figures, the page is turned around and the figure is viewed from what is now right, the reader may the better
be able to empathize the situation, since he will then have the point of view of the driver of the car whose field of safe travel is under discussion.” From American
Journal of Psychology. Copyright 1938 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Used with permission of the authors and the University of Illinois Press.

aground). As such, there is no difference between a high-value unit’s field of safe
travel and an automobile’s.
The fields of individual ships are, however, not of interest here and will
not be further discussed; our focus is the field of the commander of the naval
operation. In that field, the most pertinent element of the environment is not
the terrain (though coasts and islands delimit how the ships can move) but the
enemy. Consequently, the boundaries of the commander’s field of safe travel are
determined most importantly by enemy units that threaten to sink the commander’s high-value units (see figure 2). In contrast to fixed objects in a driver’s
field of safe travel, islands and coastlines may actually have positive valences for a
commander, as they can offer protection. Nevertheless, the definition of the field
remains the same: the commander’s field of safe travel comprises all the possible
paths that the high-value units can take unimpeded.
Though the analogy is straightforward, there are several differences between
the driver’s field of safe travel and that of the commander. First, the driver of a
car has limited ability to influence the shape of the field of safe travel and can
only see and react to obstacles that encroach on the field. Commanders, on the
other hand, can actively shape the field of safe travel and have powerful means
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20
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FIGURE 2

For the commander of a naval operation, the field of safe travel is delimited not only by the terrain but also by, most importantly, threatening enemy units.

to do so: they can scout threatening areas to determine whether enemy units are
present, and if they detect a threat they can eliminate it by applying deadly force.
Second, the commander is up against an enemy who means to do harm. An opponent who uses cover and deception can make it more difficult to establish the
requisite field.
Third, the commander’s field of safe travel cannot, like the field of a driver of
an automobile, be directly perceived; it is too vast. Instead, the commander must
derive the field, using data provided by sensors carried by the units in the force.
As will be seen later, this difference complicates matters for the commander. Nevertheless, it is important at this point to notice that the field of safe travel is not
merely a subjective experience of the commander but exists as an objective field
where the commander’s ships can move safely.
THE MINIMUM SAFETY ZONE
In driving, collisions are avoided by one of two methods—changing the direction
or stopping the locomotion.19 Changing direction is done by steering. Sometimes, however, the field of safe travel is cut off, for example, when another car
turns onto the road from a side street. In these situations steering is not enough,
and the driver has to slow down to avoid a collision. Another field concept describes how drivers decelerate—the “minimum stopping zone,” which denotes
the minimum spatial field a driver needs to bring the vehicle to a stop (see figure
1).20 Deceleration (or the degree of braking) is proportional to the speed at which
the forward boundary of the field of safe travel approaches the edge of the minimum stopping zone.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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The commander uses a related field concept to determine whether action is
needed to prevent the high-value units from being sunk—the “minimum safety
zone” (see figure 3). The minimum safety zone is a field the size of which is determined by the range of a specific enemy weapon; there exists one minimum
safety zone for each type of enemy weapon. The field denotes how close to the
high-value units an enemy unit carrying that weapon can be allowed before the
enemy unit can sink the high-value units using that specific weapon.21 For example, suppose an enemy ship has an antiship gun with a range of ten thousand
meters. In this case, the minimum safety zone for that gun would be a circle with
a radius of ten thousand meters around each high-value unit.
From this it follows that there exist as many fields of safe travel as there are
minimum safety zones; minimum safety zones and fields of safe travel always
come in pairs. For example, the enemy may have a long-range antiship missile
that can be fired from surface ships and a medium-range torpedo that can be
fired from submarines. This creates two separate pairs of fields of safe travel and
minimum safety zones—one for the antiship missile and one for the torpedo.
Consequently, to make sure that the high-value unit is not sunk, each minimum
safety zone must be completely contained within its corresponding field of safe travel
for the duration of the voyage.
Also, the shape of the minimum safety zone varies according to the type of
weapon it represents (see figure 3). The shape is determined by the relative speeds
of the weapon and the target and their relative headings when the weapon is fired.
Suppose a high-speed antiship missile is fired toward a slow-moving high-value
unit (see figure 3a). It will take the missile about five minutes to reach its target
if the speed of the missile and the range to the target are, respectively, 645 knots
and about fifty-four nautical miles. The distance the high-value unit can move
during this time at twenty-five knots is about four thousand meters. Thus, the
FIGURE 3

(a)

(b)

The dotted line denotes the minimum safety zone. Its size is determined by the range of an enemy weapon. The minimum safety zone must be completely
contained within its corresponding field of safe travel for the duration of the transit, or there will be a risk of loss. In (b) the shape of the minimum safety zone
depends on the relative velocities (speed and firing angle) of the weapon and high-value units. To fire a torpedo when the target is moving away, the submarine
must come much closer than must a submarine firing at a target moving toward it.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 84

88

10/31/12 9:48 AM

War College: Winter 2013 Review

WA L D E N S T R Ö M

85

difference in time between when the missile is fired with the high-value unit
heading toward it or moving away is negligible; the minimum safety zone can be
considered circular. Now consider firing a medium-range torpedo at the same
high-value unit. The torpedo has a speed of, say, fifty knots and a range of twentyfive nautical miles. If the enemy unit fires this torpedo when the high-value unit
is heading toward it the theoretical range becomes about thirty-seven nautical
miles (it takes thirty minutes for the torpedo to travel its maximum distance, in
which time the high-value unit can move 12.5 nautical miles closer). On the other
hand, if it fires when the high-value unit is moving away, the range drops to only
12.5 nautical miles. Thus, the shape of the minimum safety zone for the torpedo
will be more or less elliptical, with the high-value unit positioned toward its far
end (see figure 3b).
What minimum safety zone the commander uses when encountering a new
contact depends on how well the contact is classified. If the commander knows
what type of enemy unit is approaching, the proper, specific minimum safety
zone is applied. If there is uncertainty, the commander must assume the largest
minimum safety zone for that class of contacts. For example, if the commander
knows that only surface ships can carry long-range antiship missiles, the minimum safety zone for those missiles must be assumed for an unidentified radar
contact—that is, of the class of surface contacts. For the submarine screen, however, the minimum safety zone can be based on the medium-range torpedo—the
class of underwater contacts.
For the driver of an automobile, braking is a reaction to the threat of crashing
into an object and it is initiated when the forward boundary of the field of safe
travel recedes toward the minimum stopping zone. In a similar way, the commander of a naval operation reacts when the field of safe travel recedes toward
the minimum safety zone—that is, when a threat develops toward the high-value
units. In contrast to the automobile driver, however, the commander has three
ways of handling a threat: move the high-value units away from the threat, order subordinate units to take action against the threat, or receive the attack and
defend. Either way, to establish whether a threat is developing, the commander
must be able to determine whether the field of safe travel is receding toward the
minimum safety zone.
THE FIELD OF SENSORS
To determine whether the field of safe travel is receding toward the minimum
safety zone, the commander must be able to observe the objects present in the
naval battlefield. Today, the naval battlefield comprises more than just the surface
of the sea. Threats of all sorts can come from either beneath the surface or above
it. The driver of a car determines from the pertinent visual field whether the field
of safe travel is receding toward the minimum stopping zone.22 For a commander,
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however, it is not possible to perceive directly the elements of the operations
area—the naval battlefields are far too vast. Instead, as noted above, the objects
present have to be inferred, on the basis of sensor data.23
Thus, there exists a “field of sensors” that the commander uses to establish
whether the field of safe travel approaches the edge of the minimum safety zone.
The field of sensors is an objective spatial field the boundaries of which are
determined by the union of the coverage of all sensors that provide data to the
commander. The importance of the sensor field is also emphasized in one theory
of perception-based tactics that has been advanced (though without discussion
of its spatial dimensions).24 As the sensors that build up the field have different
capabilities to detect and classify objects, the field of sensors will consequently
consist of regions in which objects can be, variously, detected and classified with
varying reliability. (These regions could be seen as fields in their own right, but
for now we will leave them as is.) Nevertheless, to establish the boundary of the
field of safe travel and determine whether it is receding toward the minimum
safety zone, the commander must organize the field of sensors in such way that it
is possible both to detect contacts and to classify them as nonhostile before they get
inside the minimum safety zone.
Factors Limiting Detection
Several factors limit the detection of enemy units. First, terrain features can provide cover. Units that hide close to islands are difficult to detect with radar. In a
similar way, a submarine that lies quietly on the bottom is difficult to distinguish
from a rock formation with sonar. The weather is another factor: high waves
make small targets difficult to detect; fog and rain reduce visibility for several
sensors, such as visual, infrared, and radar; and temperature differences between
layers in the atmosphere and in the water column influence how far sensors can
see or hear. Yet another factor is stealth, or camouflage, whereby units are purposely designed to be difficult to detect with sensors. Sharp edges on a ship’s hull
reflect radar waves in such ways that they do not return to the transmitting radar
in detectable strength. Units are painted to blend into the background, propulsion systems are made silent, ships’ magnetic fields are neutralized, and exhaust
gases are cooled—all to reduce the risk of detection. Being aware of these factors
makes it possible for commanders to use them to advantage. Units might be positioned close to islands while protecting the field of safe travel, or the high-value
units might select a route that will force the enemy units to move out at sea, thus
making themselves possible to detect.
Factors Limiting Classification
To avoid being classified, the basic rule is to not emit signals that allow the enemy
to distinguish a unit from other contacts around it. Often naval operations are
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 86

90

10/31/12 9:48 AM

War College: Winter 2013 Review

WA L D E N S T R Ö M

87

conducted in areas where neutral or civilian vessels are present, and this makes
it difficult to tell which contacts are hostile. To complicate matters, the enemy
can take advantage of this. For example, an enemy unit can move in radar silence
in normal shipping lanes and mimic the behavior of merchants, so as to be difficult to detect using radar and electronic support measures. Suppressing emissions, however, only works until the unit comes inside the range where the force
commander would expect electronic support measures to classify its radar—no
merchant ever travels radar silent. To detect potential threats the commander establishes a “picture” of the normal activities in the operations area. Behavior that
deviates from the normal picture is suspect and will be monitored more closely.
Thus, contacts that behave as other contacts do will be more difficult to classify.
THE FIELD OF WEAPONS
As mentioned above, the commander has three choices for handling a detected
threat: move the high-value units away from the threat, take action to eliminate
the threat, or receive the attack and defend. In the two latter cases the threat can
be eliminated either by disabling it or by forcing it to retreat. Either way, the
commander must have a weapon that can reach the target with the capability to
harm it sufficiently. It is immaterial what type of weapon it is or from where it
is launched, as long as it reaches the target and harms it sufficiently. Thus, the
weapons carried by the commander’s subordinate units, or any other unit from
which the commander can request fire support, create a “field of weapons” in
which targets can be engaged. Like the field of sensors, the field of weapons is a
spatial field, bounded by the union of the maximum weapon ranges carried by
all units at the commander’s disposal. The field of weapons is further built up by
the variety of weapons, which means that the field consists of different regions
capable of handling different targets. For example, there will be regions capable
of engaging large surface ships, regions capable of destroying antiship missiles,
and other regions capable of handling submarines. Nevertheless, to prevent the
high-value units from being sunk, the field of weapons must be organized in such
way that it is possible to take action against hostile units and missiles before they get
inside their corresponding minimum safety zones. For example, the threat posed
by air-to-surface missiles can be dealt with by protecting two minimum safety
zones. The commander can take out the enemy aircraft before they get a chance
to launch the missile—that is, shoot down the aircraft before they enter the minimum safety zone created by the range of the missile they carry. If this fails the
commander can take down the missiles before they hit the high-value units—that
is, shoot down the missiles before they get inside the minimum safety zone created by the distance at which the missile can do damage to the high-value units.
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It is now possible to specify how the fields of sensors and weapons work together: the field of sensors and the field of weapons must be organized in such
a way that for each field of safe travel hostile units can be detected, classified,
and neutralized before they enter the corresponding minimum safety zone. One
scholar of naval tactics and scouting touches on what can serve as an illustration. Closest to the ships that should be protected is a zone of control where all
enemies must be destroyed; outside the zone of control is a zone of influence or
competition, something like a no-man’s-land.25 Outside the zone of influence is
a zone of interest where one must be prepared against a detected enemy. Scouting in the first region seeks to target; in the second, to track; and in the third, to
detect. Important to notice is that the field of sensors and the field of weapons
are carried by, tied to, the commander’s units, which simultaneously bring the
fields to bear with respect to all pairs of fields of safe travel and minimum safety
zones. This complicates matters for the commander. As the fields of safe travel
and minimum safety zones are stacked, actions taken to tackle a threat to one
minimum safety zone may create problems for another. The competition of units
between the pairs of minimum safety zones and fields of safe travel may lead to
a situation where a managed air-warfare problem creates a subsurface problem.
This bedevilment is not unknown to the naval warfare community: “The tactical
commander is not playing three games of simultaneous chess; he is playing one
game on three boards with pieces that may jump from one board to another.” 26
To illustrate the problem, suppose that the situations in figure 3 occur simultaneously; there is both a surface and a subsurface threat to the high-value unit. In
this case the field of sensors has to be organized so that contacts can be detected
and classified in a circular field with a radius of a hundred kilometers (for the
antiship missile, figure 3a) and also within a smaller and elliptical field (figure 3b,
in the torpedo case). For example, radars and electronic support measures have
to be deployed to detect and identify surface contacts, while sonar and magneticanomaly detection have to be used to secure the subsurface field. Accordingly,
the field of weapons has to be organized so that contacts can be engaged before
entering the respective minimum safety zones—antisubmarine weapons for subsurface threats and antiship weapons for surface threats.
Not only weapons can be used to shape the field of safe travel; another means
to influence it is deception. Deception takes advantage of the inertia inherent in
naval warfare. First, there is the physical inertia whereby a successful deception
draws enemy forces away from an area, giving an opportunity to act in that area
before the enemy can move back. Second, there is the cognitive inertia of the
enemy commander. It takes some time before the deception is detected, which
gives further time. Deception can, thus, be seen as a deliberate action within the
enemy’s field of sensors to shape the field of safe travel to one’s own advantage.
For successful deception it is necessary that commanders understand how their
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own actions will be picked up by the enemy’s field of sensors and that they be
aware of both the enemy’s cognitive and physical inertia. The commander has to
“play up” a plausible scenario in the enemy’s field of sensors and then give the
enemy commander time to decide that action is needed to counter that scenario
(cognitive inertia) and then further time to allow the enemy units to move in
the wrong direction (physical inertia). The central role of inertia will be further
discussed later.
Having defined the fundamental fields it is now possible to formulate what is
required from commanders to establish sea control. The skill of securing control
at sea consists largely in organizing a requisite set of pairs of correctly bounded
minimum safety zones and corresponding fields of safe travel shaped to counter actual and potential threats, and in organizing the field of sensors and field of weapons
in such way that that for each field of safe travel, hostile contacts can be detected,
classified, and neutralized before they enter the corresponding minimum safety zone.
FACTORS LIMITING THE FIELD OF SAFE TRAVEL
So far it has been said that it is the enemy that limits and shapes the field of safe
travel. This is, however, not the whole truth. The field of safe travel is also shaped
by other physical and psychological factors.

Terrain Features That Reduce Capability to Detect and Engage Targets. To be
able to sink the high-value unit the enemy must detect, classify, and fire a weapon against it. All this must happen in rapid succession, or the high-value unit
may slip out of the weapon’s kill zone. This means that to fire a weapon against
the high-value unit the enemy must organize its field of sensors and its field
of weapons so that they overlap the high-value unit at the time of weapon release. In this way the field of safe travel is built up by all the paths that take the
high-value unit outside the intersection of the enemy’s field of sensors and the
enemy’s field of weapons. This further means that the boundaries of the field
of safe travel are determined in part by terrain regions where high-value units
can go but enemy weapons cannot engage them—for example, an archipelago
that provides protection against radar-guided missiles. The boundaries are also
determined by the enemy’s capability to detect the high-value units, and thus
terrain features can also delimit the field of safe travel in that they protect the
high-value units from detection. For example, the archipelago mentioned above
also provides protection against detection by helicopter-borne radar, as long as
the ships move slowly. (If they start to move quickly, however, they will stand out
from the clutter of islands.) It is also important to notice that a minimum safety
zone is resized in the same way as the corresponding field of safe travel—if the
enemy cannot see the high-value unit or has no weapon that can engage it, the
enemy unit can be allowed closer in.
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Terrain Regions Where Enemy Units Can Hide. Like enemy units, potential
threats also throw out lines of clearance. One such potential threat is a terrain
feature where the enemy might have concealed units and from which attacks can
be launched (see figure 4a). Such regions—for example, islands where enemy
units can hide close to land—contain potential threats. There may or may not be
actual threats there, the objective field of safe travel may or may not be clear, but
since commanders can only react to their subjective fields, the latter are properly
shaped and limited by these barriers.
Enemy Units That Are Spotted and Then Lost. Another potential threat that will
radiate clearance lines arises from the movement of enemy units. It is possible for
a contact that has been detected and classified to slip out of the field of sensors
—for instance, by turning off its radar after being tracked by electronic support measures. The potential movement of such a unit shapes the field of safe
travel. Suppose an enemy unit was detected at position p at time t (see figure
4b). As the enemy is outside the field of safe travel, it does not pose a threat to
the commander at this time. Now, the contact slips out of the field of sensors,
and contact with it is lost. As time passes and the commander fails to reestablish
contact, the region where the unit can be is a circle that grows proportionally to
the maximum speed of the enemy unit. Eventually the region grows to such a
size that it is not possible for the force to pass without the minimum safety zone
intersecting with it. In figure 4b the subjective field of safe travel is correctly
shaped by the potential threat, but the objective field of safe travel is clear—the
enemy unit has turned around and is heading away.
Legal Obstacles and Taboos. The field of safe travel is also limited by international law. One such legal obstacle is the sea territory of neutral states. A neutral
state has declared itself outside the conflict the commander is involved in, and
FIGURE 4

(a)

(b)

Terrain features that serve as good attack points for the enemy also radiate lines of clearance, and they shape the field of safe travel (a); enemy units may or may
not be present. In (b) the field of safe travel is impinged by the potential location of enemy units. When an enemy unit slips out of the field of sensors, it creates
an area of potential threat that grows as time passes. These potential threat areas also determine the boundaries of the commander’s subjective field, although
here the enemy never encroached on the objective field and is now well clear of it.
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this prohibits the parties of the conflict from using its sea territory for purposes
of warfare. Such regions delimit the fields of safe travel and thus restrict where
the commander’s units can move. On the other hand, they do not pose a threat
to the high-value units and can safely be allowed to encroach on the minimum
safety zone.
Neutral Units in the Operations Area. Today, as noted, naval operations take
place in areas where neutral shipping is present. Like the sea territory of neutral states, neutral shipping is protected by international law. A consequence of
this is that neutral shipping in the area also influences the shape of the field of
safe travel. The commander is of course prohibited from attacking neutral merchants. This is not a problem in itself—if a certain contact is classified as neutral,
we cannot engage it. Nevertheless, it has implications for where high-value units
are allowed to move. As neutral shipping cannot be engaged, we are forbidden to
use it for cover—for instance, to move so close to a merchant vessel as to make it
difficult for the opponent to engage without risk of sinking the merchant. This
means that neutral shipping creates “holes” in the field, where combatants are
not allowed to move. If the commander does not track the merchant vessels continuously, these holes grow proportionally to the merchants’ maximum speed, as
they do for enemy units spotted and then lost.
Mines. Mines shape the field in the same way that ships do. They can be seen
as stationary ships with limited weapon ranges; the minimum safety zone for a
mine would be the range at which a ship could pass it without being damaged if
the mine detonated. Laying mines shapes the commander’s field, and the commander must react, either by taking another route or by actively reshaping the
field—that is, by clearing the mines. Clearing mines has the same effect as taking out enemy ships; the field of safe travel expands into the area that has been
cleared. Of course, the enemy can use this for purposes of deception, pretending
to lay mines, sending a unit zigzagging through a strait, and making sure that
the commander’s field of sensors picks this up. If the deception is successful, the
commander’s subjective field is shaped incorrectly.
THE COGNITIVE PROBLEMS FACING THE COMMANDER
There are two important aspects that make the commander’s situation different
from the automobile driver’s. First, as we have seen, the commander does not
have direct perceptual access to the fields in the same way as a driver has. Second,
it takes the commander longer to react to changes in the fields and to influence
their shapes. Together these properties create a significant cognitive problem.
As mentioned earlier, the commander must access the objects and the environment indirectly. This defines the first problem that has to be solved: How does
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one create a representation of the environment, based on information provided
by the fleet’s sensors, that allows the commander to see the field of safe travel?
The basic building blocks are already in place in the navies of today. To provide
the commander with a view of the battlefield, information provided by the fleet’s
sensors is merged and displayed on screens in the warships’ combat information centers. The idea is that all ships should share the same merged view of the
battlefield—the common operational picture (COP)—to allow unambiguous coordination, tracking, and targeting. At any moment, the COP is the best possible
view of the battlefield that the force can produce; it contains all contacts that are
tracked by the force, together with information about their types (such as cruisers,
destroyers) and identities (unidentified, friendly, or suspect). It is the information provided by COP that the commander uses to see the field of safe travel. The
problem, of course, is how best to display the fields. That is an empirical question
that remains to be solved elsewhere; nevertheless, we can suggest a beginning.
The second problem with which the commander has to cope is the time it
takes to influence the shapes of the fields—they all have some inherent inertia.
In principle there is no difference between the tasks the commander must solve
and those of a driver of a car. Both must react to changes in the field of safe
travel. The major difference lies in the speed with which the shape of the fields
changes—the commander’s field changes much more slowly. Its greater inertia
arises from the fact that the naval battlefield is large compared to how fast the
units in it can move. This is in stark contrast to the situation facing an automobile
driver, for whom the field changes quickly but who can react quickly, adapting
speed or heading to accommodate the changes. Most of the time this is no problem, because the field does not change faster than the driver can react; if it does,
driving becomes dangerous.
The commander faces exactly the same problem. To get the high-value units
safely to their destinations, the commander must adapt to changes in the field or
take action to shape it appropriately. If the commander does not react in time,
enemy units may get to positions where they can engage the high-value units. In
that situation, the operation becomes dangerous.
To illustrate the differences, however, consider a driver who in a fraction of
a second sees a car pull out at a corner and encroach on the field of safe travel.
The driver reacts immediately and starts turning the steering wheel. Instantly
the driver’s car starts turning, and after a few moments the new heading brings
the car to the middle of the field. Everything is over in a matter of seconds. For a
commander the time scale is completely different. A subordinate unit must first
detect an approaching enemy. The contact must be checked to make sure it is not
the same as an old one, and a new track has to be created at its position. The new
track must be sent to the fleet’s information-merge point, where it is integrated in
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the COP. The updated COP has to be transmitted to the rest of the fleet, at which
point it is possible for the commander to see the change in the field. Now the
commander must decide what to do (move away or attack), formulate an order,
transmit the order, and make sure that the recipient understands the order. The
recipient now has to execute the order. This may include moving to an appropriate position, obtaining targeting information, preparing an appropriate weapon,
and then engaging the target. The effects of the action have to be evaluated. Did
we hit the target, or did we miss? Scouting the effects of a weapon engagement
takes time, and it is only some time thereafter that the effects can be determined.
The effects are reported back to the commander, who can then decide whether the
actions taken have shaped the field appropriately. It is evident that the time delays
facing a commander are on a completely different scale from those of a car driver.
To handle the time delays and make it possible to react in time, the commander must create extra space between the boundary of the field and the edge of the
minimum safety zone. How deep this buffer zone must be depends on how fast
the commander can react and counter an emerging threat. If units are in position to cover a flank, the readiness on that flank is high, and the buffer zone may
be shallow. On an unprotected flank, to which it would take time to move units
in case of a threat, the buffer zone has to be deeper. Inertia can, however, also be
used to the commander’s advantage. It is possible to concentrate forces in one
section of the field, push the enemy back, and make the field bulge out. The bulge
creates time for the high-value units to sneak by, while escorting forces regroup
and put pressure on another part of the field.
On a superficial level this might seem a simple task. It is, however, well established that time delays are one of the most difficult things for humans to cope
with when facing a dynamic decision-making problem.27 This gives reason to
believe that time delays in the sea-control task will create problems for the commander. To cope with them the commander must plan ahead. As illustrated, it is
sometimes necessary to initiate action hours before it is expected that the effects
will be needed. This means that the commander must anticipate potential threats
long before they materialize. Areas where the enemy may threaten the high-value
units have to be identified beforehand, and offensive action has to be taken to
clear that area. Deceptive missions must be conducted to draw the enemy away
from critical regions so as to buy time. It is the inertia of naval warfare that forces
the commander to shape the field actively. Simply reacting to changes works only
if the commander has abundant resources compared to those of the enemy.
STUDYING THE PROBLEMS COMMANDERS FACE IN SEA CONTROL
An early argument of this article was that researchers need a description of the
sea-control task to be able to investigate systematically commanders’ performance
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in solving it. What does this new approach actually contribute? First, it may guide
thinking about sea control, as it explicitly states what variables are of interest and
so offers a tool for structured investigation. The variables—the field of safe travel,
the minimum safety zone, the field of sensors, and the field of weapons—can
be varied systematically to determine the effects of these variations on the commander’s ability to solve the sea-control task. Second, because the variables can be
measured from the outside, researchers can observe whether commanders have
established sea control without asking them. By this, it is possible to determine
whether a commander—who may not be able to see the field of safe travel properly
—has failed to establish control. Commanders may believe they have control
but do not—that is, their subjective fields cover all minimum safety zones, but
the objective fields do not. By backtracking from this event the researcher can
analyze and understand why this happened. If several commanders run into the
same problem, that problem may be a candidate for training or support. Third,
a shared description allows several researchers to approach a problem from the
same perspective. This may lead to cumulative growth of knowledge.
As an example of what explicit models can bring to a discipline, consider
decision-making research. Here, the behavior of decision makers has been compared to models of rational decision making, such as predicate logic, statistical
models, and expected utility. The models all clearly identify the variables that
should be considered and specify the values that produce optimal decisions. Of
course, it can be debated to what extent such models (or the one suggested here)
actually constitute the golden rule for human task behavior.28 Nonetheless, a large
body of research has been produced thanks to models that explicitly describe
what researchers should focus on when investigating a given problem.
As an example of how the model proposed here could be used to investigate
the sea-control task, we will consider a situation where participants solve versions
of the task in simple war games—“microworlds.”29 The opponents in the games
can be humans or algorithms. Human opponents are good for realism, as they
may use deception and surprise, while algorithms are good for research reasons,
as they allow all participants to face exactly the same opponent.30 That said, to
identify which specific subtasks to address in the experiments we must study
what the model puts forward as points of interest. The model suggested here
specified that the skill of securing control at sea consists largely in organizing
a requisite set of pairs of correctly bounded minimum safety zones and corresponding fields of safe travel shaped to counter actual and potential threats, and
in organizing the field of sensors and field of weapons in such a way that for each
field of safe travel, hostile contacts can be detected, classified, and neutralized
before they enter the corresponding minimum safety zone. From this proposition
a set of questions can be derived.
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The first question regards the commander’s ability to determine the boundaries of the field of safe travel and the minimum safety zone. We have to consider
the features that shape the boundaries of the field and create a scenario where the
commander must track changes in the field; poor performance here could lead
to worse performance in the game overall, perhaps to loss of the ships that are
to be protected. An initial scenario could be set on open water, across which the
participant has to move a ship from one port to another. During the game enemy
ships and aircraft are detected and then lost, and the participant must track how
their potential movements influence the field. Failure to stay clear of areas where
enemy units could be means a risk of being sunk. The same participant might be
given units that could be used to scout these danger areas. This would complicate
matters, as the participant now must keep track of both the potential movements
of the enemy and how the progress of the scouting reduces the regions where the
enemy can be found. To further complicate the task, islands can be added. Islands
influence how enemy units can move, which leads to irregular expansion of the
regions where they can go.
The second area to investigate would be the commander’s ability to organize
the field of sensors to determine the boundaries of the field of safe travel. Consider the same game scenario as above, a movement task, but in an archipelagic
region and with a more complex sensor setup. The participant’s surface radars
can detect ships on open sea, but to detect them when they move slowly close to
islands the player must move in close enough to see them. As the participant’s
units move around, the islands obstruct the radars’ lines of sight, and as a result
enemy units are tracked and lost intermittently. Further, an enemy may slowly
move close to islands in order to slip out of radar coverage. Now, the participant
must identify the enemy’s potential points of attack and either scout those areas
more closely or select a route around the threat, if that is possible. The player also
can, like the enemy, move “tactically”—slip into cover when threatened, or move
slowly close to land, and then “rush” over open patches of water.
Next would be the ability to use the field of sensors to detect and identify enemies. Here the task is complicated by the fact that not every contact is an enemy.
The scenario could envision an area where neutrals are present, though in all
other respects the same as above. The participant would get a chance to establish
a “normal picture” of the area; then enemies would be introduced. Now the focus
is the player’s ability to determine the boundaries of the field of safe travel when
there is uncertainty as to which contacts actually shape it. The neutral units slipping into and out of the different zones—detection and identification—of the
field of sensors presumably complicates the task.
The above are just a few simple examples of how the model could be used to
guide investigations of sea control. Still to be considered is of course the ability
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to use the field of weapons to shape the field of safe travel. More complex investigations could focus on how the sensor and weapon fields are used together. For
example, to get a radar-silent contact that moves among merchants to reveal its
identity, the participant may illuminate it with a fire-control radar to see whether
the threat of being targeted triggers defenses. Of interest is also the potential
competition between different fields of safe travel. Because the participant’s units
“carry” the fields, the existence of two simultaneous threats against different
fields creates problems if the same unit must handle both. How does the player
handle dual threats with limited resources? Still, and despite their simplicity,
these examples give some idea of how the model could be used to derive hypotheses that can be investigated in the laboratory. By pointing out the variables of
interest and stating what is required of a commander to solve the task, the model
may extend our understanding of how to establish sea control.
COGNITION, TRAINING, AND PRACTICE
Changing the perspective to the commander makes clear what a commander can
actually achieve, practically. Earlier descriptions of sea control were silent on the
amount of resources needed to establish it even to a very limited degree. Looking
at the problem through the eyes of the commander makes obvious the magnitude
of resources required to defend only one field.
It further makes clear what the commander is required to accomplish cognitively. Today there is considerable agreement on the characteristics that distinguish the two types of cognitive processes—intuition and reasoning.31 Intuition
is difficult to control and is typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and
governed by habit. Reasoning, on the other hand, is deliberately controlled but
slower, serial, and effortful. From a cognitive perspective, the purpose of training is to turn reasoning tasks into intuitive tasks—an expert knows immediately
what to do where a beginner may require an hour to figure out a course of action. Keeping track of all relevant fields is a complex matter, and the time even
the most experienced commanders need to perform it implies that establishing
sea control is largely a reasoning task. This means that commanders have to create some form of cognitive representation of the task, which in turn makes them
potential victims of the limitations of human reasoning.32
To support commanders with tactical decision aids, one can either assist their
cognitive processes in dealing with the actual problem or transform it into a
perceptual-motor task that does not require mental representations. Recent
research suggests that the latter approach is promising.33 However, transforming the task only moves the problem: now the question is not cognitive load but
how good the representation is and how much the commander trusts it. Consequently, there is no “free lunch,” whatever approach we choose. Nevertheless,
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transforming the task into something that does not require mental representations relieves commanders of that much and gives them time to concentrate on
other aspects of the job.
There is also another issue regarding tactical decision aids: it may be possible
to determine what variables to include in the field representations, but there is always uncertainty regarding their values. These uncertainties can be handled only
by introducing safety margins, as drivers might handle uncertainties about their
reaction times. Still, it is probably worthwhile to devise training and support systems for the sea-control task, especially for situations in which the commander
has less time to react, as may be the case in littoral waters.
There has been some effort to assess how field representations could be useful as tactical decision aids. Following the line of research mentioned above, this
author has investigated whether visualizing the field of safe travel would help a
commander in tactical situations where enemy units were first spotted and then
lost.34 The studies were designed as experiments and used two different tasks that
the participants had to solve in a microworld. Two experiments used a search
task in which the participant had to locate submarines that were trying to escape
the player’s destroyers in an area with islands. Two more involved a transportation task, where the participants had to guide a transport ship from one port to
another while staying clear of several submarines that would try to sink it. The
decision-aid visualization that was being evaluated displayed the area where the
enemies could be and expanded that area as time passed. The results suggested
that the visualization was effective in both tasks and that university students and
naval officers alike gained from using it. These studies are by no means a complete demonstration of a support system for the sea control task, but they give
some ideas of what a tactical decision aid could look like.
The field of safe travel, it has been suggested, is applicable to all kinds of locomotion.35 Researchers have stated that the task facing an infant learning to walk
is in principle the same as the one facing an open-field runner in football or the
operator of an automobile—the basic concepts of terrain, destination, obstacle,
collision, and path apply to all. A similar claim can be made when it comes to
the task of establishing control over a region of space. The concepts of enemy,
sensors, and weapons should be applicable, whether a convoy of trucks is to be
protected against ambush or a squadron of attack aircraft is to be escorted to
a target. The problem of establishing a requisite set of fields of safe travel and
minimum safety zones would be the same in all those tasks. The analysis also applies to situations where the high-value units are stationary; whether they move
or stand still does not influence the fields. Accordingly, it would be relevant for
protecting a naval base, an archipelagic region, or a nuclear power plant.
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Nevertheless, before saying anything conclusive about the generalizability of
the model, it must be put to practical use. Only then can we determine its utility
when it comes to extending our understanding of sea control in littoral waters.
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FOR WANT OF A TIMELY CALL

...

Captain John F. O’Connell, U.S. Navy (Retired)

This essay describes an incident of some thirty years ago that involved relations
between the United States and Japan. It stemmed from a chance encounter at sea
in international waters, between a U.S. warship and a Japanese commercial vessel.
If there are lessons to be learned from this event, it is that small things matter;
they are like grains of sand that gum up the machinery of smooth international
relations. At the time, I was defense and naval attaché to the American embassy at
Tokyo, where I became involved in the situation after the fact. To my knowledge,
this is how the story unfolded.
On Thursday, 8 April 1981, the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
USS George Washington (SSBN 598) was cruising at periscope depth in bad
weather south of Sasebo, Japan, en route to a port visit in South Korea when it collided with a small Japanese commercial cargo ship. The time was about noon. The
collision rolled the submarine to port and damaged its sail. Fatal damage had been
inflicted on the hull of the 2,850-ton Nissho Maru, although no one in George
Washington was aware of it. Thus the clock began to
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tick on a scenario that would seriously damage U.S.was the commander of USS Spinax (SS 489). He later
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Japanese political-military relations for nearly a year.
and became a member of the staff at the National
George Washington, carrying sixteen Polaris A-3
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manding, but dull, routine. During the transit George
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track of the sub and were tasked to detect and localize it, while George Washington
attempted to remain undetected. The submerged George Washington’s officer of
the deck (OOD) was well aware of the presence of P-3s. When noon approached
on 8 April, he prepared to go shallow, rising to periscope depth, to get a navigational satellite system fix and to allow the radiomen to receive any message traffic
that had been sent to the ship. He ordered the sonarmen to make a careful passive
search for any audible contacts. When Sonar reported none, he eased up to periscope depth. After taking a careful look around and seeing nothing but waves and
low overcast, the OOD ordered the appropriate mast raised for the navigational
fix. The weather was poor, with choppy seas, low visibility, and intermittent rain.
Knowing that the periscope and mast might provide an opportunity for a searching P-3 to detect them, the OOD limited the periscope height above the waves.
Ascending to periscope depth, George Washington went through an acoustic
thermal layer that had hidden the engine and propeller noise of Nissho Maru. The
cargo ship was on its way to a port in the People’s Republic of China. Once the
passive sonar was above the layer, Sonar detected an acoustic contact. He reported
it to the OOD, giving its true bearing. Normally, the officer of the deck would
immediately have swung his periscope to that bearing to identify the contact.
He might then have used the radar in his periscope to get a range on the contact
and taken action to avoid it, and then informed the commanding officer. But the
OOD did not hear the vital report, although several other watch standers in the
control room did. Communications discipline now broke down. The sonarman,
not having received an acknowledgment from the OOD, was required to repeat
his report until it was acknowledged. He did not. The OOD remained unaware
of a surface contact in the vicinity of the submarine.
A few minutes later, at periscope depth, George Washington’s sail ran into the
port side of Nissho Maru and ripped a hole in it. The violent impact was the first
indication to anyone on board the submarine (except the delinquent sonar watch
stander) that a ship was in the immediate area. George Washington rolled heavily
to port. The sub’s executive officer came running into the control room assuming
that the boat had run aground and ordered the OOD to blow the main ballast.
The OOD gave the order, and the blow started. George Washington’s sail and hull
lifted above the waves; at this point the commanding officer (CO) arrived in the
control room, took charge, and quickly ascertained from the OOD that they had
collided with a ship. He immediately ordered that the main-ballast-tank blow
be stopped. The CO took the periscope and read off the ship’s stern the name,
“Nissha Maru.” For a quick observation by a man with a lot on his mind, it was
remarkably accurate—off only by one vowel. The commanding officer then ordered Radio to check for any transmissions on international distress frequencies,
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while he carefully searched for any visual signs of distress, such as rockets from
the other ship. He observed no signals, and none were heard by Radio. Nissho
Maru was seen steaming away, apparently unharmed. The commanding officer
then ordered the main ballast tanks flooded to resubmerge.2
This proved to be a critical mistake, and it cost the CO his command. 3 Navy
Regulations require that the commanding officer of a ship involved in a collision
at sea identify his ship and determine whether assistance is needed by the other
ship. He did not. Instead, the CO of George Washington ordered his boat back
deep and ran to another area, where they had gone earlier to periscope depth and
where the weather was better. It was from there that he reported the collision to
his operational commander and national command structure.
When George Washington had partially surfaced, crew members aboard
Nissho Maru had clearly seen it, although they had had no means of identifying
its nationality; it was merely a “black submarine” that had run them down.
As a ship gets farther away from a periscope it appears to get lower in the water, until it finally disappears below the periscope horizon. A sinking ship looks
exactly the same, so although Nissho Maru had appeared to be moving slowly
away, it had really been sinking, its engine room, where the electrical generator
was located, quickly flooding. No radio distress calls could be made. If the commanding officer of George Washington had stayed at the scene as required, he
would have realized that Nissho Maru was sinking and would have taken steps to
rescue its crew. Perhaps none of its crew would have been lost. Instead, by staying submerged and moving away, he compounded the problem.4 Two principal
crew members of the cargo ship, the master and first mate, drowned when it went
down.5 Thirteen survivors were rescued early the next morning.
As the submarine moved away underwater, the crew of Nissho Maru abandoned ship in two life rafts. While they were struggling to understand what had
happened to them, George Washington was proceeding, deeply submerged, to a
point miles away, totally unaware that the cargo ship had sunk.
When at 1300 the submarine began reporting the collision, its message stated
that the other ship appeared undamaged and had continued its voyage.6 The addressees included the following commands and organizations: Commander, Task
Force (CTF) 74 (Commander, Submarine Group 7) at Yokosuka, Japan—the immediate operational commander of USS George Washington; Commander, Seventh Fleet (CTF 74’s next-immediate superior); Commander, U.S. Naval Forces
Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN), at Yokosuka; Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, at
Yokota Air Base (the senior U.S. area commander in Japan); Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC), at Pearl Harbor; Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), at Pearl Harbor; Commander in Chief,
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Pacific, at Honolulu; the American embassy in Tokyo; and, in Washington, D.C.,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the State Department, and the White House.
What should have happened next was a quick call from the American embassy
in Tokyo to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, reporting the collision. It was not
made. That call would have relayed the known information about the reported
collision, including its location, and requested that the Foreign Ministry seek
information from the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, now known as the Japan
Coast Guard, about the status of Nissho Maru. It might have been paralleled
by a request to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force liaison officer attached
to COMNAVFORJAPAN staff to pass the word to the Maritime Safety Agency.
That call never happened either. Why? If either call had been made, the sinking
of Nissho Maru would probably have been revealed Thursday afternoon or evening, when the ship failed to respond to a radio query from the Maritime Safety
Agency. An aircraft search would have ensued, in all probability involving U.S.
Navy aircraft. Either Japanese or American aircraft might have detected the two
life rafts in the general location of the collision.
Early the following morning, Friday, 9 April, at about 0400, two Japanese destroyers steaming northward toward Sasebo encountered the life rafts of the surviving crew of Nissho Maru. The rescued survivors reported that Nissho Maru had
been sunk in a collision with an unidentified “black submarine.” That information was radioed immediately to the Japanese Fleet Headquarters at Taura. Fleet
Headquarters contacted its liaison officer at COMNAVFORJAPAN staff and had
him relay a query as follows: “An unidentified black submarine collided with and
sank Japanese merchant ship Nissho Maru at location X about time Y. We know it
was not a Japanese submarine. It could have been Chinese or Soviet or American.
Was it American?” This was the first information available to anyone in the United
States that Nissho Maru had sunk as a result of the collision. The transmission also
carried the unwelcome news that two men, the master and first mate of Nissho
Maru, were missing. This was about seven o’clock on Friday morning.
Why did it take the United States so long to notify the Japanese? The collision
took place about 1200 on Thursday, and the submarine reported it around 1300.
The survivors were rescued about 0400 Friday, nearly fifteen hours after U.S. authorities received word that a collision had occurred. Why was no immediate attempt made to notify the Japanese authorities? To the best of my knowledge, that
question has never been answered. Undoubtedly the reasons were complicated,
and they probably involve the following factors:

• A collision had occurred between a Japanese-registry merchant ship and a
U.S. SSBN carrying ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.
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• The SSBN had reported that the other ship appeared unharmed and to be
moving away.

• Matters involving nuclear-powered submarines operating in and around
Japan were considered sensitive by Japan and the United States.

• Nuclear weapons were an especially sensitive subject to the Japanese, who
had been the target of the only two nuclear weapons used in wartime.

• The key American players were in three locations (Tokyo, Honolulu, and
Washington, D.C.), in three different time zones, and their work hours did
not coincide.

• The nationality and identity of the submarine was unknown to the Nissho
Maru crew, since George Washington had no identity markings on its sail.
Perhaps it was not so obvious to an untrained observer that it was a nuclear
submarine.

• The Americans had to consider carefully how it would inform the Japanese
that the Nissho Maru had been struck by a U.S. nuclear submarine.
The sensitivity of these matters is proven by the fact that from shortly after
1300 on Thursday (when the first report was sent) to 0700 Friday (when word
was first received from the Maritime Self-Defense Force that Nissho Maru had
sunk), more than twenty top-secret and sensitive-compartmented-intelligence
messages and secure telephone calls were exchanged among American authorities.7 None of the messages to which I later had access addressed the reasons for
the delay in notifying the Japanese. Perhaps the secure telephone calls included
that information.
The following table laying out the time factors may help the reader better
understand why distance, time, and working hours complicated U.S. decision
making.8 The times are all approximate but are roughly correct.
I was at my desk in the Tokyo embassy about 0730 Friday morning, preparing for a busy day. Around 0800 a call came in from the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Operations at COMNAVFORJAPAN. He said that although it wasn’t urgent,
he needed to talk about a classified matter on a secure phone. I replied that I
couldn’t get back to him before 0900 (there were only two secure phones in the
embassy, and one was in the ambassador’s office). When I rang him back, he told
me that a U.S. nuclear submarine had collided with and sunk a Japanese cargo
ship the previous day and that two of the cargo ship crew were missing. I told him
I would notify the ambassador immediately. He replied that for the present the
matter was in “Navy channels only” and that I should not inform the ambassador.
I told him that the moment that submarine hit and sank a Japanese-registered
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Japan Time
(GMT–9)

Key Events

Washington Time
(GMT+5)

Honolulu Time
(GMT+10)

SSBN–Nissho Maru
collision

1200 Thursday, 8 April

2200 Wednesday, 7 April

1700 Wednesday, 7 April

SSBN reports by radio
(first notification to U.S.
side about the collision)

1300 Thursday, 8 April

2300 Wednesday, 7 April

1800 Wednesday, 7 April

Workday starts in
Washington

2200 Thursday, 8 April

0800 Thursday, 8 April

0300 Thursday, 8 April

Workday starts in
Honolulu

0300 Friday, 9 April

1300 Thursday, 8 April

0800 Thursday, 8 April

JMSDF destroyers rescue
Nissho Maru survivors

0400 Friday, 9 April

1400 Thursday, 8 April

0900 Thursday, 8 April

JMSDF queries CNFJ, U.S.
first learns of sinking and
crew loss

0700 Friday, 9 April

1700 Thursday, 8 April

1200 Thursday, 8 April

merchant ship, the matter had gone outside Navy channels and that I was on my
way to see the ambassador.
Several minutes later, telling the ambassador, Michael J. Mansfield, and the deputy chief of mission about the collision, I realized by their reaction that my “news”
was not quite as startling as I had believed. Digging into things later, I got access
to certain messages from which I learned that a very few key personnel in the embassy and elsewhere had known about the collision since the previous afternoon.
On Saturday, I accompanied Ambassador Mansfield to the Foreign Ministry.
The ambassador offered his apologies on behalf of President Ronald Reagan, and
I offered my own apologies on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief
of Naval Operations. The meeting was heavily covered by the Japanese media,
and my children back in the United States were startled to see their father on
television and in the newspapers.
In the succeeding weeks some of the Japanese press coverage would be lurid,
focusing on erroneous reports from some of the survivors that the “black submarine” had circled their rafts before departing. The failure of the United States
to notify Japanese authorities promptly of the collision would remain a sticking
point in U.S.-Japanese political-military relations for nearly a year. In 1980, the
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force had participated in the multinational RIMPAC
exercise held in Hawaiian waters, a major step forward for the Japan Self-Defense
Forces. Because of public anger over the Nissho Maru incident, military cooperation was to slow appreciably during 1981.
On the Monday following the incident, the ambassador’s press officer asked
me to be at the ambassador’s residence that afternoon at 1700, because the
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ambassador was meeting with the press. I exploded and told him what a bad idea
I thought that was, but he told me it was a long-standing arrangement to meet
with the U.S. press only, to discuss matters of interest “on background.” I showed
up as directed and sat in.
The first question was, “Who is responsible for the collision between USS
George Washington and Nissho Maru?” Ambassador Mansfield looked sagely toward me and said, “Jack, will you take that one?” At that moment my entire naval
career of almost twenty-nine years passed before my eyes. I took a deep breath
and explained that though I was not an authorized spokesman for the Navy
Department in this matter and there were at least two investigations under way,
I would give my personal opinion, on the basis of my working knowledge of international maritime law. I explained that a submerged submarine was obligated
to stay clear of surface shipping, which had no way to determine the submarine’s
presence. It was accordingly presumed that a collision between a surface ship and
a submarine was the fault of the submarine. Therefore, I expected that the U.S.
government would take responsibility and pay damages for the loss of the ship
and cargo, and for any personnel injuries or deaths.9
I held my breath for a few days, but the American press handled the matter
fairly, and there was no backlash. I also became involved in setting up a meeting between the Nissho Maru survivors and a U.S. Navy captain sent out by
COMSUBPAC to conduct a Judge Advocate General Manual investigation. The
captain was the assistant chief of staff at COMSUBPAC for ballistic missile submarine operations, and a professional acquaintance of mine.
When we met, nearly all the Nissho Maru survivors were markedly hostile.
They were extremely unhappy with the U.S. Navy and with anyone wearing its
uniform. Only one older man, the engineer, did not seem angry. I presumed it
was because of his experience at sea and the knowledge that unpleasant things
happen without malice or forethought.
Later I attended a memorial service on the island of Shikoku for the master of
Nissho Maru. His wife was the same age as mine, and his children were roughly
the same ages as my children. The local American consul’s representative and I
entered their home, bowed deeply, and offered our apologies for the loss of her
husband and their father. We waited outside during the service while a loud
Japanese Communist Party sound truck hurled invectives against the Americans.
A good friend and fellow submariner, Captain Eugene Lindsey, in command of
U.S. naval facilities at Sasebo, performed the same function at services for the first
mate in Kyushu. Neither of us enjoyed a moment of it.
One afternoon after the services, Ed Featherstone, who headed the politicalmilitary branch of the embassy political section, visited my office. He seemed
bothered by some matter. It turned out that Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki was
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scheduled to go to Washington to meet with President Reagan in the near future.
Japanese political realities would require that he receive an “interim report” of
the ongoing U.S. Navy investigation into the collision. Ed wanted to know when
the embassy could expect to see one. I told him that Navy JAG Manual investigations did not ordinarily produce interim reports; the investigating officer
would finish his investigation in due time and send it to the convening authority
(COMSUBPAC), who in turn who would forward it to CINCPACFLT for endorsement, after which it would go to the Chief of Naval Operations—a lengthy
process that had no particular time limit.
Ed found my reply unsatisfactory. We then proceeded to the deputy chief of
mission’s office, where I repeated the likely progress of the Navy investigation.
That meeting sent me back to my office to draft a message to various Washington headquarters asking for an “interim report” and outlining the political
need. Subsequently, a carefully targeted “Personal For” back-channel message
went from the ambassador to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,
and the national security adviser to the president outlining the requirement for
an “interim report.” Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan met on 5 May
1981, and an “interim report” was duly handed over.10 Later, on 15 August 1981,
Ambassador Mansfield delivered the final report of the collision investigation to
the Japanese government.11
My tour of duty as defense and naval attaché ended later in the year, and I
returned home for a final year of active duty on the staff of the president of the
National Defense University. This tour afforded me the opportunity to go over
events in my mind and wonder about all the what-ifs.
What if the embassy had made that telephone call to the Foreign Ministry on
the afternoon of the collision? Would that have precluded the cloud of suspicion
that arose about the delay in notification? What were the concerns that prevented
that call from being made in a timely fashion?
Timely notification was clearly a delicate political matter. The considerations
noted earlier and the submarine’s erroneous report that Nissho Maru had
steamed away undamaged presumably led the key figures in the U.S. government
to dawdle longer than they should have in authorizing the embassy in Tokyo
to notify the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Yet it was reasonable to have expected
Nissho Maru to report the collision by radio, presumably to Japan’s Maritime
Safety Agency, as well as to its owner. A query might then have been expected.
Logically, it was expedient to make notification as soon as possible.
In Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanac, the “want of a nail” cost a
horseshoe, a mount, a rider, and eventually a battle—all for want of care about
a horseshoe nail. It is a reminder of the importance of little things. In this case,
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the want of a timely communication cost the U.S. government a long period of
unnecessary suspicion and distrust on the part of its principal ally in the Far East
during the Cold War.

NOTES

1. It was common practice to assign transiting
submarines as targets of opportunity. The
policy allowed antisubmarine warfare forces,
surface and air, to practice their craft, and
it helped the submarine gain evasion
experience.
2. I obtained this information from a review of
the message traffic and from discussions with
the COMSUBPAC investigating officer in the
days following the collision.
3. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin of 27 February
2001 reported that the commanding officer
of George Washington had been relieved of his
command, effectively ending his Navy career.
His officer of the deck received a punitive letter of reprimand, thus severely damaging any
opportunity for promotion.
4. Under international maritime law, a submarine is required to maintain its distance
from surface ships, which have no means of
determining the submarine’s presence. When
a collision occurs between a surface ship and
a submerged submarine, the submarine is
automatically assumed to be at fault.

attaché in Tokyo. I could not locate any “general service” message traffic on the incident.
8. This is not to suggest that decision making
is absent during non–staff working hours.
There are duty officers at all locations. But
sensitive matters take more time, and not all
key figures are at their desks with adequate
communications available.
9. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin of 27 February
2001 reported that in the Nissho Maru case
the master’s family was paid $374,000, as
was the family of the first mate. The thirteen
survivors were paid an average of $27,000
each. A two-million-dollar claim was filed
by the owner of the freighter. The story goes
on to state (erroneously) that USS George
Washington did not report the collision with
Nissho Maru until the following day. The
Christian Science Monitor of 6 May 1981
reported that the Navy had accepted liability
for the 9 April sinking of Nissho Maru on 21
April. The Japan Times (online) of 15 February 2001 reported that the U.S. government
had paid 255 million yen in compensation to
the owners of Nissho Maru.

5. New York Times, 22 April 1981. Their bodies
were reported recovered on 21 April.

10. Observer Reporter, 15 May 1981.

6. Military time is used from here on—1 PM is
1300, and so on.

11. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 27 February
2001.

7. I was able to dig into the matter after the
fact, while serving as U.S. defense and naval
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RESEARCH & DEBATE

PARSHALL’S “WHOPPERS” EXAMINED FACT-CHECKING THE VARIOUS
CLAIMS AND CONCLUSIONS OF JONATHAN PARSHALL

Martin Bennett

This was written in response to an article by Jon Parshall that appeared in the
Spring 2010 Naval War College Review.1 When I first came across Parshall’s article
I was interested and even intrigued, but the more I read, the more apparent it
became that his work was not sound.
One element, I believe, that may have colored what otherwise might have been
an objective analysis was Parshall’s clearly stated goal to “bury Fuchida.” Generally, a biased, set conclusion is not a good starting point for a historical analysis.
Good research begins with questions and ends with conclusions, when facts
permit. Parshall attempts to make the facts fit his conclusions, and when he cannot, he uses conjecture and assumptions to try to bridge the gap. Throughout his
article, Parshall employs a wide variety of euphemisms accusing Fuchida of “lies.”
One would expect a less snarky, cynical analysis from a historian.
On my first reading I knew that Parshall had made some mistakes, but I never
realized just how many until I actually started checkAfter serving eight years as vice president of a noning. There is no doubt that Jon Parshall is a smart and
profit company and cofounding a manufacturing
company (which won the 2003 award for Small Busiknowledgeable historian who has done some great
ness Administration Entrepreneur of the Year), Marwork. Yet instead of overturning the record on Fuchida,
tin Bennett now devotes his time to historical research
he has instead turned a light onto his own methods and
and scriptwriting. His second script is for a feature
film about the lives of Mitsuo Fuchida, Jacob “Jake”
thereby called into question the trustworthiness of the
DeShazer, and the Covell family, entitled Wounded
entire body of research underpinning his coauthored
Tiger: The True Story of the Pilot Who Led the
book, Shattered Sword.
Attack on Pearl Harbor. While developing the film
project, Bennett converted the script into a historical
Since most of the arguments come down to the
novel, to be published under the same title in 2013.
credibility of four individuals, here is a look at who
they are.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2013, Vol. 66, No. 1
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Jon Parshall’s biographical note for his article in the Review describes him as
the “coauthor of Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway and
the owner of a website on the Imperial Japanese Navy, www.combinedfleet.com.
Mr. Parshall has been published in such periodicals as the U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, World War II, and this journal, and he has made frequent television
and guest lecture appearances on the topic of the Imperial Navy in World War II.
He is also an adjunct lecturer for the Naval War College. Mr. Parshall is currently
in the software industry.”
Gordon W. Prange received his PhD in history in 1937 from the University of
Iowa and began his teaching career the same year as a professor of history at the
University of Maryland. In 1942 he was granted a leave of absence to embark on
a wartime career as an officer in the U.S. Navy. Sent to Japan in 1945 as a member
of the American Occupation Forces, Prange completed his naval service soon
thereafter, continuing in Japan as a civilian from 1946 to 1951, as the chief of
General Douglas MacArthur’s hundred-person historical staff. Shortly after the
war, he began a series of interviews with Mitsuo Fuchida that extended for hundreds of hours over a period of years. He was the author of six books, some prepared for publication after his death in 1980 by Katherine V. Dillon and Donald
Goldstein. Among the most prominent is At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of
Pearl Harbor, the culmination of thirty-seven years of research. He was arguably
the most knowledgeable person on Pearl Harbor.
Donald Goldstein is professor emeritus at the Graduate School of Public and
International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. In addition to his contributions
to Prange’s At Dawn We Slept, Miracle at Midway, and God’s Samurai, he also
collaborated with historian J. Michael Wenger on several books, including The
Way It Was: Pearl Harbor—the Original Photographs (1995); Rain of Ruin: A Photographic History of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1995); and The Pearl Harbor Papers:
Inside the Japanese Plans (1993). He is today the most prominent living historian
on Pearl Harbor and Mitsuo Fuchida.
Mitsuo Fuchida was the senior flight commander of the First Air Fleet, First
Carrier Division. He led the attack on Pearl Harbor, ending the war as a captain.
After the war, Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya coauthored Midway: The Battle
That Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy’s Story.2 Regarding the overall credibility
of their book, the historian Thomas B. Buell explains in the introduction to its
1992 edition:
[Midway] is a story written by two Japanese naval officers who were in a position to
know about the details of that battle, but much of what they have to say is personal
opinion, which may not necessarily have been shared by colleagues. Although the
book does not have a bibliography, the editors’ preface states that they researched
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and authenticated the data to the extent possible using both Japanese and American
records. As one of the editors was Roger Pineau, the premier American expert on the
Japanese navy in the war, there is good reason to believe that the data as to events is
accurate. I am not aware of any challenges to its assertions since this book was first
published in 1955.3

Fuchida also wrote his memoirs, which were published posthumously in Japanese, later in English under the title For That One Day: The Memoirs of Mitsuo
Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor.4
So let’s break it down.

Naval History & Heritage Command (NHHC) Photo no. NH 50930

PARSHALL’S FIRST SET OF ASSERTIONS IS
THREEFOLD
Parshall states that Fuchida would never have mentally earmarked fuel tank farms for destruction,
that Fuchida never entered into a heated argument
on the bridge of Akagi demanding a third-wave attack, and that a “mere air group commander” like
Fuchida would never have been privy to such information regarding the details of a possible land invasion. Let’s look at each of Parshall’s charges.

Fuchida Never Made a Mental Earmark to Target the Tank Farms
Parshall believes he knows what was in Fuchida’s mind as he circled Pearl Harbor and looked down at massive fuel storage tanks. He finds it unbelievable that
Fuchida thought they would make opportune targets. Parshall believes that
Fuchida added this statement only in 1963 to make himself appear more clever.
What would be truly remarkable is if the Imperial Japanese Navy’s top pilot
had not had such thoughts. Of course, Fuchida knew the list of target priorities,
carefully outlined during the meetings in Yokosuka and on board Akagi, but he
had also spent the morning circling Pearl Harbor with binoculars in one hand,
a map in the other, and a notepad strapped to his leg, assessing the scene. The
Japanese had been spurred to war in part by the precious commodity of oil, and
they knew its strategic value to the Americans. Parshall’s argument is that no independent confirmation exists of Fuchida’s mental notes. This is an absurd claim.
Parshall also believes that no one thought of bombing the tank farms until the
Americans later pointed them out, and he refers to an interrogation in 1945 by
the Americans who asked Fuchida why there had not been a follow-up attack on
Pearl Harbor. Fuchida answered but made no comment about possible targets
in the event of such an attack (which was not germane to the question). This is
Parshall’s smoking gun.
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There are two problems with this argument. First, postwar military inquiries
are not free-flowing conversations but more like legal depositions—question
and answer. Also, Fuchida did in fact mention the tank farms to Gordon Prange
on 4 March 1948.5 Was Fuchida making himself out to be some kind of genius
(supposedly in retrospect) by saying he thought about bombing the fuel tanks?
Not at all—a Japanese captain on another fleet carrier had exactly the same idea:
On board the carrier Soryu, Adm. Tamon Yamaguchi reported that his ship and the
carrier Hiryu and their aircraft were ready to launch the third wave attack. Capt.
Jisaku Okada of the carrier Kaga, the second carrier accompanying the Akagi, recommended that the fuel tanks and dock facilities be included in the list of targets, even
if the attack sorties were flown the next day. The remaining two carriers—Shokaku
and Zuikaku—reported that they were ready to return for another attack on Pearl
Harbor.6

Also, from interviews with Fuchida found in God’s Samurai and in his Memoirs, it is clear that he vigorously disagreed with the recommendation of Kusaka
(rear admiral and chief of staff of the First Air Fleet during the attacks, whom
Fuchida did not care for as an officer) to retreat after the successful attack on
Pearl Harbor. He refers to Kusaka’s philosophy as “lions retreat once they have
accomplished their attack.” Yet at the same time he quotes Kusaka as saying, “We
have now accomplished the purpose of our operation by attacking Pearl Harbor
and annihilating the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Any further attempt to attack oil tanks or
repair facilities at the naval shipyard is nothing but the hindsight of fools.”7 If
Fuchida was supposedly trying to make himself appear clever, in retrospect,
would it be logical for him to want Kusaka to appear equally clever?
There Was No Heated Argument on the Bridge of Akagi Following the Successful
Two Waves against Pearl Harbor
Parshall is arguing with himself here. First he alleges that Fuchida “pressed
vigorously for a follow-up attack,” saying that the scene of an argument on
the bridge was mirrored in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! (a Hollywood film
really should not be used as evidence of historical accuracy), and then shows
how it never happened. This section would be better named “Parshall’s Tale
of the Missing Argument,” as neither Fuchida, Commander Minoru Genda,
nor anyone else testified that Fuchida had “pressed vigorously” or argued
for a follow-up attack. However, for this Parshall relies primarily on Haruo
Tohmatsu, who repeatedly states that Fuchida “demanded” a third wave.
Twentieth Century Fox publicity photo
Interestingly, Tohmatsu referred to the incident in his book A Gathering Darkness
by citing another of his books, Pearl Harbor, which does not contain notes—a
strange method for a serious nonfiction writer.8 Therefore, Parshall depends on
a secondary, undocumented source for his historical data.
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Two points—one, there was no argument, and two, no proposal was put forth.
I agree that no argument took place, but Fuchida never said it did. Regarding the
second point, the best that Genda could possibly have said was that he did not
hear the proposal, which would easily have been missed by Genda if he simply
was not there at the time.
Neither Fuchida nor Genda argued for the proposal, and, ironically, Genda
affirmed that in Parshall’s own article, so again, we find Parshall mistaken. In his
book Midway, Fuchida said that he “strongly recommended” to Nagumo a further attack on Oahu.9 He did, along with many others, want a further strike; as
did Lieutenant Jinichi Goto, commander of the Japanese torpedo bombers, who
said, “Most of the young flying officers were eager to attack Pearl Harbor again
because they wished to inflict as much damage as possible.”10 Parshall seems to
want it both ways: on one hand, he admits that Fuchida adamantly wanted another strike, while on the other he proposes that Fuchida never mentioned a word
of this to any of his leaders.
Prior to this, Fuchida had been debriefed by Nagumo and Kusaka in Genda’s
presence on the bridge, where they carefully assessed the total situation.11 Having
imagined losing up to half their ships and half their aircraft, all were contemplating some way to exploit the overwhelmingly favorable circumstances, but
in the end Nagumo went with Kusaka’s advice to cash in their chips and head
home. There is no indication throughout this section of any heated argument,
fist pounding, or histrionics. Anyone with even a cursory knowledge of Japanese
culture and protocol within the Imperial Japanese Navy would immediately
know that it would never occur to a subordinate officer to demand anything of
a superior officer.
A careful reading of Tohmatsu and Willmott’s Pearl Harbor shows that they
were primarily upset about Nagumo and Kusaka’s being ostracized or scapegoated, made to look like cowards, for turning back after the Pearl Harbor attack
and missing what appeared to be an opportune time to finish off the Americans.12
They make a good case—and I tend to agree with them—that Nagumo made the
best choice possible. Still, neither he nor Kusaka ever lived it down. The fictional
scene from Tora! Tora! Tora! certainly does not help.
A Mere Air Group Commander like Fuchida Would Never Be Privy to Such
Information
This is Parshall’s last attempt to try to “bury” Fuchida. He states regarding a
plan to invade Oahu: “Finally, of course, even if there had been such plans on
the grand strategic level, a mere air group commander like Fuchida almost certainly would not have been privy to their details on 7 December. Yet Fuchida’s
‘privileged’ statements to this retired American captain played nicely to the whole
American psychology relating to this battle.”
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Gordon Prange wrote the following in At Dawn We Slept, regarding the
highest-ranking Japanese officers in this attack and their conversations on the
way to Pearl Harbor:
Immediately after lunch Nagumo held another meeting in Akagi’s ward-room. His
own staff attended, as did Yamaguchi and Hara, with their staffs, and all the flying
officers, headed by Fuchida. Nagumo opened this meeting by reading the instructions
which Genda and Fuchida had prepared for him en route to Hitokappu Bay. When
the young flying officers discovered that they would attack Pearl Harbor, “their joy
was beyond description.”
Then the airmen took over. Genda spoke for almost an hour. For the benefit of those
who had not attended the first session, he repeated what he had said that morning.
Then he analyzed the five major attack plans which he and Fuchida had prepared.
They had worked out the plans with their flight commanders in Kyushu during
September and October, so they were not pulling any major surprise. But they took
full advantage of this last chance to rehearse, to coordinate group thinking, and to
improve upon the design.13

Fuchida would have definitely known about a follow-up invasion, because he
and Genda would have been instructed what not to strike. First, Fuchida had been
personally appointed by Rear Admiral Nagumo as the senior flight commander,
First Air Fleet, First Carrier Division. He had trained and commanded the Kidô
Butai’s combined air forces for the six aircraft carriers, roughly four hundred
aircraft and eight hundred fliers—hardly a “mere” commander. Second, Fuchida
and Genda were best friends from the Eta Jima Naval Academy and continued
so throughout the war. They worked closely together in the months leading up
to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Fuchida easily knew more details about this attack
than did Nagumo and Yamamoto combined, and he proved it in his many interviews. Had there been any serious plans to invade Oahu, Fuchida would certainly
have been among the first to know. Parshall’s speculation has no foundation here.
PARSHALL’S SECOND ARGUMENT: A FIVE-MINUTE DISPARITY IN
THE FOG OF WAR
Parshall’s second indictment against Fuchida concerns his claim that at Midway
the Japanese were five minutes away from launching a counterattack. He states
that “Fuchida’s entire rendition of the climax of the most important naval battle
in American history was a lie. The Japanese were nowhere near ready to counterattack at this time.”
Let us begin with a fact I expect everyone will agree on, especially the bestinformed experts—that there is a tremendous amount of conflicting information, records, and testimonies on all sides about the events leading up to and
including the turning point of the battle of Midway. Every book on Midway that
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U.S. Navy Photoprint no. W-MI-7-11957

I have studied (including Parshall’s book) says the same thing—it was an incredibly chaotic day, when looking at your watch or making log entries was the last
order of business for men on both sides. Nagumo’s communications log in his
battle report was compiled from the records of escort vessels, not from the actual
Akagi log, which, understandably, was lost when the carrier went down.14
Here is a taste from Dallas Isom’s Midway Inquest: “Senshi Sōsho fudges this . . . ,”
and “the entries in Nagumo’s battle report showing that the rearming operation was ordered at 0715 and countermanded at 0745 were fabrications to put
Nagumo in a better light.”15 Isom notes that the Senshi Sōsho is fragmentary, often
inconsistent, and inaccurate. Shortly after its release, the Senshi Sōsho came under
fire for being an “overall explanation” of events with missing or vague details, for
being too military friendly, for being written by staff members who had not been
involved in the operations, and for many other shortcomings.16 That is just the
Japanese side. Parshall’s book is loaded with American reports of contradictions
of every kind, from records to accounts of pilots (page 231 of his book is full of
them), but he rejects accounts that do not agree with his conclusions and accepts
those that do. Also, keep in mind that the Japanese lost four carriers in the battle
and many logbooks. Much of their information had to be re-created after the
events.
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Parshall says, “During the course of the morning’s operations the Japanese
carriers came under attack no fewer than five times by nine separate groups of
American aircraft. Not surprisingly, Japanese flight decks were quite busy with
combat air patrol (CAP) requirements. These activities, as well as the interspersed
American attacks, made it nearly impossible for the reserve strike force to be
readied on the Japanese flight decks.”
Did he say “nearly impossible”? So, then, it was possible. He goes on to say that
according to air group records, planes were landing on Akagi just fifteen minutes
before the attack, which would require that the after deck be totally clear. Were
these records accurate? No one knows. Parshall then states, “The official Japanese
war history on the battle, Senshi Sōsho, explicitly states that at the time of the
American attack there were no attack aircraft on the Japanese flight decks, only
combat air patrol fighters.” Isom clearly states that the Senshi Sōsho “fudged”
entries, and even Japanese historians admit that these compiled records are not
reliable. Primary sources are best—that is, eyewitnesses (preferably ones who
were not shooting or being shot at), not postbattle writers who were not there, as
is often the case in the Senshi Sōsho.
Parshall also says in his book that the idea that there were only a few fighters
on the deck of Akagi “stands in apparent conflict with certain eyewitness accounts made by American pilots, which often painted lurid portraits of bombs
exploding among packed enemy squadrons, and Japanese planes being catapulted around the flight decks or enveloped in sheets of flame.”17 These “eyewitness
accounts” match exactly with Fuchida’s statements.
Yet there is another eyewitness source I have never seen referenced, that of
Minoru Genda. Parshall quotes Genda in his article and obviously considers him
a credible source. So do I. His testimony in 1948 was that Akagi was fifteen minutes away from launching its attack.18 Was he telling “whoppers” too? Fuchida’s
book had yet to be published, so he had no idea what Fuchida was going to write,
and certainly Genda had no idea that someone was going to compare his obscure
answers to Fuchida’s book seventy years later.
So let me make clear what is being compared. On one side we have the calculations of a historian who has never seen a Japanese carrier, let alone been on
one—calculations seventy years after the fact based on records that are frequently
contradictory, often made by unknown third parties, incomplete, and sometimes
clearly altered. On the other hand, we have two eyewitnesses, career officers who
lived on Japanese carriers for years, knew Akagi from stem to stern, trained and
instructed its crews, witnessed the daily routines of mechanics attaching and
detaching torpedoes, had personally taken off and landed aircraft on carriers
hundreds of times, and thoroughly understood the operations for preparing an
attack on a firsthand basis—and who were actually there!
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 117

121

10/31/12 9:48 AM

118

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 1, Art. 20

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Parshall says it was “nearly impossible” for them to have been prepared for a
counterattack. Fuchida’s estimate of five minutes and Genda’s of fifteen are the
most reliable sources of information on the timing of their counterattack. Historians like Parshall have made estimates based on information as to how long
it might normally take engineers to switch from land bombs to torpedoes, raise
aircraft to the flight deck, etc., and factoring in how attacks by Americans might
have slowed down the operation. This is fine and makes good sense, but at the
end of the day it has nothing to do with what took place. Fuchida and Genda were
actually there and knew what took place, like dozens of other witnesses. Fuchida
and Genda’s testimonies are consistent, and when Fuchida’s record was published
no one in Japan approached him or his publishers to contest the record. Now,
seventy years later, Parshall calls him a liar, on the basis of unreliable and clearly
contradictory information. Parshall has no case.
PARSHALL’S THIRD ARGUMENT: FUCHIDA WAS NEVER ON USS
MISSOURI DURING THE SURRENDER CEREMONIES
In God’s Samurai, Fuchida recounts the events leading up to and including the surrender ceremonies on
the deck of USS Missouri on 2 September 1945, how
he was called on to help ferry Japanese personnel
that day and remained on board during the ceremonies. Parshall considers this an “egregious” claim and
does his best to discredit Fuchida with disparaging
remarks and insults, but with no backup evidence
whatsoever.
Here are the exact references. The first is from
NHHC Photo no. SC 213700
God’s Samurai:
These preliminaries led up to the climax on the morning of 2 September, the formal
surrender aboard the Missouri. Fuchida prepared transportation for the Japanese
delegation, but the launches he secured proved unnecessary. An American destroyer
carried the official party to the battleship. Several liaison officers, army and navy,
went out in a “big, beautiful launch” assigned to the Yokosuka commander. Fuchida
was among them. These men ranked too far down the echelon to rate a position on
the surrender deck, but he could see the ceremony clearly from an upper deck.19

A second reference comes from the translated For That One Day: “In my role
as Staff of General Navy Headquarters, I was assigned miscellaneous tasks to help
the Japanese side’s preparations. Since I was not an official attaché, I was watching the signing ceremony from the upper deck along with the crews of the USS
Missouri.”20
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Fuchida on Board Missouri
When I first heard Parshall’s charges, they seemed a little far-fetched. Fuchida
had nothing to gain by mysteriously placing himself there, and he did not make
himself look good while he was there. The more I examined the facts, the more
the idea of Fuchida on board Missouri had the ring of authenticity.
Here is a breakdown of Parshall’s last set of questions and charges.

Why Would Fuchida Have Been on Board Missouri? What Possible Business
Did He Have There? There were many liaisons and delegates from many nations
on board that day besides Fuchida. It would be foolish to think that all the Japanese dignitaries made their own arrangements for transportation. Fuchida’s
simple statements are completely reasonable. If anything, they were a bit humiliating for him, as he was relegated to the role of taxi driver.
Parshall assumes that Fuchida said he was there to make himself look more
important than he was, when in fact Fuchida’s account of the story does quite
the opposite. He had despised MacArthur and considered him arrogant, but after
watching the ceremony he changed his opinion and admitted that MacArthur
was actually quite gracious to the Japanese, far more gracious than the Japanese
would have been to the Americans. This does not elevate Fuchida; it humbles
him.
Why Would an American Sailor Give Up His Place at This Historic Event to an
Unknown Japanese Officer? The war was over in every sense; in addition to an
end of physical hostilities, there was also an end to social hostilities. In Genda’s
Blade: Japan’s Squadron of Aces; 343 Kokutai, Henry Sakaida and Koji Takaki
show how after the war American pilots wanted a closer look at the modified
Shiden-Kai, while the Japanese wanted to see how American high-octane fuel
would give them the boost they had always dreamed of. After a Japanese pilot put
his fighter through its paces, dozens of American airmen surrounded the plane
and pilot taking photos and seeking autographs.21 Parshall knows full well when
the emperor gave his surrender speech, by and large the Japanese became shockingly submissive and compliant to the American occupation, despite the extreme
bitterness of that pill. They had submitted to their emperor in war, and they did
likewise in peace. It therefore is not surprising that this camaraderie existed on
board USS Missouri.
Why Would Fuchida Be Allowed to Wander into the Command Spaces of the
Flagship of the U.S. Fleet? There was certainly concern among top Navy brass
that extreme nationalists might try to sabotage the ceremony, especially with
a kamikaze plane, and they took many precautions. All air bases in the greater
Tokyo and Yokohama area were evacuated, the planes disarmed and disabled.
The man entrusted with this high-security detail was Mitsuo Fuchida, Group
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Commander, Aviation Staff of the General Navy Headquarters, Aviation Staff of
the Southern Naval Headquarters.
Fuchida also helped head off a coup, personally brought in Japanese officers
holding out against surrender, and authored a widely distributed pamphlet, entitled We Believe This!, to encourage those in the Japanese military to submit to
the emperor in peace, as they had in war, and fully comply and cooperate with all
the terms of surrender to the United States and allied powers.
If any Japanese officer was to be trusted for security reasons on Missouri that
day, it would have been Mitsuo Fuchida. There is no indication that he wandered
all over the ship, as Parshall implies. He certainly knew better. As for the unknown
photographers who were a part of the press corps, yes, they were closely watched,
as the record shows.
Why Were There No Photographs of Him, When We Have Photos of the Surrender Delegation? This sounds like a reasonable question at first, but on consideration, it is a weak argument. Fuchida was not a part of the surrender delegation,
nor did he ever claim to be. Also, this was the most humiliating day in the history
of the Japanese people. No self-respecting Japanese officer would be leaning into
any photos that day. This is something Fuchida would more likely avoid.
Photographers took pictures of all the key people, and as Parshall correctly
points out, Fuchida simply was not one of them. Even the commanding officer
of USS Missouri, Stuart S. Murray, stated that apart from a few formal shots in
which he was in the background, “I’m not generally visible anywhere.”22 If that
is how the commander of USS Missouri was photographed that day, why would
Fuchida be treated differently?
On the affirmative side, there are some pretty clear photos of those on the
decks of the ship that day, like the one reproduced here, which can be found on
the World War II database.23
Here also is a high-resolution photograph that allows the reader to zoom into
the third level, to the upper left of the Japanese flags, where there is an Asian man
without a hat with a short mustache.
Inset is a photo of Fuchida taken during the war.24 It looks very similar to the
man in the close-up of the larger image.
Although I am not an expert on the U.S. Navy of World War II, I do not believe
that “Hitler-style” mustaches were popular then, but we know that Fuchida kept
his mustache after the war—he was photographed giving testimony at the war
crimes trials.25 So, just as Fuchida described, here on board USS Missouri, right
before the surrender ceremonies, on an upper deck, we find a round-headed,
Asian-looking man with a Hitler-style mustache among the American sailors. Is
this Fuchida? It certainly could be.
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Michael Weidenbach Verified Fuchida’s Absence from Missouri
Parshall correctly credits me with obtaining information from Michael Weidenbach, curator and archivist of the collections department for the Battleship
Missouri Memorial, Pearl Harbor. Parshall states it this way when he quotes
Weidenbach:
If Fuchida had been aboard the Missouri in any capacity whatsoever, “his presence
would have been noted, and his placement would have been noted in the official
records . . . and would have been strictly monitored and recorded.”
[This] is yet another reminder (if any were needed) that proving a negative is
oftentimes a lot harder than proving a positive. However, it is the historian’s job to
produce positive evidence to support the claims that are made by the participants in
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our narratives. In this case, the onus was on Fuchida to support his rather incredible
claims. His story, while superficially plausible, failed when subjected to the weight of
the other positive evidence we have on this highly documented ceremony.

Weidenbach “verified Fuchida’s absence”? That is actually quite difficult to do.
Yes, he verified that Fuchida was not a part of the official boarding party, but then
Fuchida never said he was, and he also stated that there is no record of him being
on board that day—so case closed, right? No. I contacted Michael Weidenbach
again and asked for a full roster of personnel on board USS Missouri that day,
and this is what he said:
There is no single roster of all the individuals that were aboard that day. There are
records scattered around in various records depositories that we are still seeking out
and gradually gathering. There are rosters of the dignitaries and key officers that
were invited to participate or witness the ceremony, but there appears to be no record
made of their accompanying staff members or others who may also have arrived
aboard.
We’ve tracked down a listing of war correspondents, but it may or may not be
complete or entirely accurate. We have a copy of the Missouri crew roster from the
National Archives, but it is dated July, 1945; so it is very likely not accurate for September. In short, we have records and we are continuing to search and gather, but we
don’t yet have a complete or clear record of all those who were aboard that day.26

No single roster? No official records of accompanying staff? No complete or
clear records? Then there certainly is no way to verify that Fuchida was not on
board. In this entire section, Parshall provides nothing to show that Fuchida was
not on board USS Missouri that day.
Some Final Notes on the Missouri Surrender Ceremony
Over time, as I have thought about this event, more and more things have always
pointed in the same direction, bearing out the idea that Fuchida’s consistent testimony was true from the beginning. Here is more information that supports him.
I noticed this section in God’s Samurai regarding the signing ceremony:
“Umezu, who had fought surrender to the last ditch, signed for both the Japanese
armed forces. As he did so one of the Chinese delegates hissed loudly and triumphantly. ‘The U.S. delegates didn’t like this impolite gesture, from the expression
on their faces,’ Fuchida recalled.”27
No one would have cared about such a minor footnote of the ceremony or
noted it—no one, that is, but a Japanese national. Fuchida did. Gordon Prange
and Donald Goldstein, experts on the Pacific War and military protocol, had no
issue with Fuchida’s description of his being at the ceremonies. Prange was a
naval officer who had worked with MacArthur and would have understood U.S.
Navy protocol at the time extremely well.
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The following information only reached me recently, from the journals of
Glen Wagner: On 7 December 1949, General Douglas MacArthur met with Glenn
Wagner, foreign secretary for the Pocket Testament League, who asked about the
general’s thoughts on bringing one million copies of the New Testament into Japan. MacArthur said, “Make it 10 million.” Fuchida was one of the many Japanese
who received a copy of the over eleven million scriptures eventually distributed
by the Pocket Testament League. On 14 April 1950, Fuchida met with Glenn
Wagner and several others and recounted many of his experiences during the
war. That evening, Wagner noted in his personal journal that Fuchida said, “First
to step on Battleship Missouri—Lit cigarette and was grabbed by a US Marine.”28
This was among a long list of other details Fuchida communicated, none of
which are disputed.
Parshall also states that “there were literally thousands of potential American
witnesses to this particular story, who might have come forward to debunk it.”
Maybe no one did because no one could.
If one connects all the dots, they point to one thing—that Fuchida was indeed
on USS Missouri, just as he has always maintained, and there is no evidence of
any kind to contradict it.
Why Would Fuchida Make This Up? What Would Be His Motive?
Perhaps this is where the roots of Parshall’s judgment of Fuchida come to light.
After making a host of sweeping judgments based on speculation and conjecture,
he paints Fuchida as a cocky, religious phony. Here is how Parshall begins his final
section:
A glimpse into the inner character of the man is revealed in the movie Tora! Tora!
Tora! for which both Prange and Fuchida were technical advisers. During one scene,
near the beginning of the movie, Fuchida lands his plane on the carrier Akagi. Dismounting, he is immediately surrounded by other aviators. Fuchida tells them they’d
better treat him well, because he is their new air group commander. Surprised by this
news, one of the pilots asks how he rated another promotion. Fuchida responds, to
the general hilarity of all assembled, “Well, exceptional people get exceptional treatment!” I believe this illustrates something central about the man.

Is Parshall going back to Hollywood again? In fact, Fuchida was not a consultant for the film; Genda and Prange were, but even as consultants they did not
have any control over the script. This scene is totally fictional. Fuchida never said
such a thing. Was Fuchida a cocky pilot? I think the record shows that he was.
Most attack pilots on the front line of battle are. They have to have an element of
confidence far above that of the rank and file to take the risks they do and make
it back alive. However, that is not the person Fuchida was after the war.
Parshall goes on to state—erroneously—that Fuchida was ordained and
that he loved the accolades and attention it brought him. Where are the facts to
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support any of this? He was never ordained, so Parshall’s ideas surrounding that
notion are false. I traveled to meet a man who after the war had worked beside
Fuchida for many months, and he described Fuchida as a humble, gentle man
who never bragged about his part in the war but rather profusely apologized at
every opportunity—the exact opposite of Parshall’s picture.29 Over my years of
research on Fuchida I have come into contact with many who knew him, worked
with him, or met with him, and all say the same thing. I have never known or
heard of anyone who painted the kind of picture of Fuchida that Parshall does.
Parshall has told me directly that he never actually read Fuchida’s full story,
either in his biography or his published memoirs, and that he has had no interest
in them. Had he done so, he may have had a clearer and more accurate picture of
who Fuchida really was. Half of Fuchida’s story found in God’s Samurai is about
his postwar years and who he became—a man once filled with hatred toward
Americans, with an inflated pride in his country and in himself, who in the end
was humble and loved his former enemies. Some people can and do change.
Fuchida did.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY’S FOREIGN POLICY
SINCE THE VIETNAM WAR
Mann, James. The Obamians: The Struggle inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New
York: Viking, 2012. 416pp. $26.95

James Mann walks the reader through
the key foreign-policy challenges
faced by the Barack Obama administration and outlines the evolution
that has taken place in the president’s approach to these issues.
He traces the post-Vietnam history of the Democratic Party’s foreign
policy and describes the three different
generations that come together in the
present administration: the Vietnam
War generation, the post–Vietnam
War generation, and the Obamians,
who are identified by Mann as mostly
campaign staffers, plus National Security Council officials Ben Rhodes
and Denis McDonough. The third
group’s foreign-policy experience is
limited to the Congress, and its political reference points are September
11th, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the
2008–2009 financial crisis. The Vietnam War is ancient history to them.
Mann believes this third group most
closely reflects President Obama’s
own worldview. He notes that foreignpolicy “veterans were to discover that
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Obama relied to an unusual extent
on his own informal network, the
Obamians he had come to trust in the
presidential campaign.” In fact, while
Defense Secretary Bob Gates, National
Security Adviser General Jim Jones,
Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, and others have moved on, the
core of officials that Mann describes
as Obamians are largely still in place.
Mann describes “two distinctive aspects
of Obama’s foreign policy.” The first is
that Obama is not “squeamish about
employing American military power,”
as the surge in Afghanistan, the war in
Libya, and his campaign expression “to
track down, capture, or kill” all show.
The second is the concern on the part
of both the president and the Obamians
that America’s financial resources no
longer allow the United States to exercise its traditional postwar hegemony.
Instead, they believe that on entering office they were faced with a “continuing
effort to recast the United States’ role
in the world in a way that fit America’s
more limited resources.” Mann notes the
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biggest change for the William Clinton
administration alumni was grasping
this new reality of declining resources.
The author also chronicles some important missteps made by the Obama
administration, arguing that the president’s fixation on not repeating what
the Obamians viewed as mistakes of
the George W. Bush administration led
them to downplay democracy early in
their tenure. This led, in part, to being
overly reticent during Iran’s Green Revolution. Mann also describes how their
initial approach to China was based
on lessons learned during the Clinton
administration. Unfortunately, they did
not recognize that China had become
much more confident during the eight
years of the Bush administration, thereby making their approach ineffective.
Mann spends a significant amount of
the book dealing with Afghanistan and
describing President Obama’s increasing disillusionment with the war.
Afghanistan, for candidate Obama,
was the good war that had to be won.
During the first policy review this
remained the main theme, and the
president, at least implicitly, endorsed
a counterinsurgency strategy. However,
when General Stanley McChrystal’s
appointment as top commander in
Afghanistan set in motion another
review later that same year, President
Obama was “forced to confront the
implications of the counterinsurgency
strategy: How many troops would be
required, and how long would it take?”
President Obama comes into his own,
according to Mann, with the 2011 war
in Libya. Mann states that while Obama
acknowledged the United States has
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little strategic interest in Libya, he also
recognized that our “only . . . strategic
interests on this issue lay in maintaining
strong relationships with close allies.”
Nonetheless, President Obama did not
approve the initial plan for a humanitarian intervention, because his advisers
admitted it was unlikely to work, but
rather pressed for options that would
accomplish the mission. The president then personally worked out the
division of labor among allied forces,
in order to limit U.S. involvement.
Mann, looking back at his book Rise
of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s
War Cabinet (2004), concludes he
was right when he described the
2003 invasion of Iraq as “the outer
limits of the expansion of American
power and ideals.” Mann concludes
that the Obama administration has
been centrist, marking a new era in
America’s relations with the world,
“one in which primacy is not assured.”
The Obamians follows in the path of
such books as Bob Woodward’s Obama’s
Wars, in that it uses background interviews to provide a picture of the Obama
administration’s foreign-policy decision making. While Woodward focuses
on the Afghan-surge decision making,
Mann looks at the evolution of the
Democratic Party’s foreign policy since
Vietnam and then places the Obama
administration within that context. By
doing so, James Mann has produced a
book of value to both specialists and the
general reader, contributing to a better
understanding of the Obama administration’s foreign-policy decision making.
AMBASSADOR JOHN A. CLOUD, RET.

Naval War College
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Cimbala, Stephen J., ed. The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy & War. Dulles, Va.:
Potomac Books, 2010. 243pp. $60

There is no lack of analysis and opinions when it comes to the presidency
of George W. Bush, particularly now,
during an election year. However, the
concise and competent analysis found
in this work provides an objective
review of that pivotal period in history,
one that helps the modern reader draw
valuable insights applicable to America’s
defense acquisition process and to
the foreign policy and global strategy
of the United States going forward.
Stephen Cimbala, distinguished professor of political science at Penn State
Brandywine, has assembled a series of
eleven essays by leading academics and
analysts of the military-industrial complex, who provide assessments of President Bush’s defense policy and strategy.
This scholarly but thoroughly readable
collection examines preparations for,
and the execution of, war and regime
change in Iraq, success and stalemate in
Afghanistan, and the sobering effects of
“transformation” on the Department
of Defense. Additional insights into
struggles within NATO and its relationship with the United States, the U.S.
relationship with Russia, the critical
issues of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and the implications of foreign
military sales complete this collection.
The editor sequenced the essays to
provide first the context of the times,
the political pressures, and the personalities of key members of the administration. These contextual essays are
prefaced by an erudite commentary on
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defense planning, including the brilliant
takeaway that the oxymoron “foreseeable future” deprecates the ability of
planners to make reliable resourceallocation decisions. This chapter alone
makes the book worthy of a place on the
unofficial list of “books to read before
reporting to a Pentagon tour.” The
essays follow with a critical (if sometimes unnecessarily pejorative) look at
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
behavior and his management of the department, along with the successes and
failures of “transformation.” Afghanistan and Iraq are closely examined in
several essays, in which are documented
examples of Secretary Rumsfeld’s overreaching policies, his broken faith with
uniformed leaders, and the systematic abuse of intelligence data used to
fabricate the case for invading Iraq.
Subsequent chapters address futureoriented defense strategy and policy
topics that were germane during the
Bush presidency and continue to have
implications now. One essay examines
the primary questions facing the NATO
alliance, including out-of-area missions and the ongoing debate regarding
burden sharing among member states
as they transition the institution from
a posture of collective defense to one
of collective security. This is followed
by three essays that address armstransfer policies and foreign military
sales, weapons of mass destruction
security, and U.S.-Russian nuclear
arms control and missile defense.
This book will appeal to military
and political scholars, but it also will
be immensely appealing to the novice seeking insight into the national
defense decision-making process. The
lessons provided in this study are
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directly applicable to current and future
decision makers in the Pentagon, on
Capitol Hill, and in the White House.
COMMANDER TATE WESTBROOK, USN

Assistant Director to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy–Financial Management and
Budget (DASN-FMB)

Reveron, Derek S., ed. Cyberspace and National
Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a
Virtual World. Georgetown Univ. Press, 2012.
246pp. $29.95

This new collection of cyberspace policy
essays includes the works of fourteen
scholars and thinkers who present a
panoply of views into how cyberspace
can be contemplated as policy, doctrine, and strategy. The essays are not
U.S.-centric but include focused views
of Russian and Chinese thought on the
domain, as ably presented by Nikolas
Gvosdev and Nigel Inkster, respectively.
Additionally, James Joyner provides
an excellent synopsis of American and
European Union thinking on cybersecurity and how these differing approaches
affect not only national-level policy
but also the debates within NATO.
These perspectives lend texture to the
questions of how cyberpower may be
considered and how cyberpolicy may be
crafted to be both credible and effective.
A section focuses on the legal aspects of
cyberspace operations and the potential
pitfalls of policy development. It pays
particular attention to the concept of
deterrence—an area that baffles policy
thinkers and technical mavens equally.
Of particular use is David Fidler’s
chapter, which provides useful terminology and definitions that help the
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layperson participate in legal-focused
discussions on the cyberspace domain.
Derek Reveron’s editing deserves
specific and laudatory mention. Rather
than merely a collection of articles
arranged by topic, he has produced a
broad web of writings that shows the
interaction of varied scholarly efforts,
makes few restatements of the same
facts, and brings the volume as a whole
to bear on a variety of subtopics.
Steven Bucci’s “Joining Cybercrime
and Cyberterrorism: A Likely Scenario”
lays out a useful rubric for understanding the operational environment of
cyberspace and employs time-tested
“most dangerous/most likely” threatevaluation analysis. This chapter would
be of particular benefit to planners and
leaders looking to develop “tabletop”
or other training events that would
focus leaders on specific threats and
the action, reaction, and counteraction options available to them.
Chris Demchak writes about “cybered conflict,” which I thought to be
a most remarkable approach of how
cyberspace should be contemplated in
national security, either as a domain or
as discrete operations. In it she raises
the point that all conflict from now on
will have some degree of cyberspace
flavor. However, very little will actually
be dominated by or within this domain. The key is how best to integrate
cyberspace into a coherent strategy,
recognizing cyberspace’s varied role.
Her use of the term “cybered” is not
random. It is a useful modifier and
connotes “all sorts of systems of people,
things, processes, and perceptions that
are computer-related but not necessarily
purely computerized.” More than any
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one particular chapter, this contribution opens the policy aperture and
offers a useful, broad term with which
coherent policy may be developed.
BRETT J. PATRON

Yorktown, Va.

Haywood, Robert, and Roberta Spivak. Maritime
Piracy. New York: Routledge, 2012. 184pp. $125

The resurgence of maritime piracy has
generated a renewed interest in the
subject across a number of different
disciplines, including law, history, and
security studies. Robert Haywood and
Roberta Spivak’s work draws from each
of these fields to provide a succinct
overview of the issues surrounding both
contemporary piracy and counterpiracy
operations. The authors, both affiliated
with the Oceans beyond Piracy project,
focus on how pirates are able to operate
in the twenty-first century in the face
of all the advances in military technology. Their answer highlights ineffective
governance at the local and global levels,
as well as outdated institutions and laws
meant to deal with piracy. These failings have created gaps in the international system that have allowed piracy
to flourish over the past several decades.
The authors provide a number of policy
recommendations to help quell the
threat. One recurring theme is the need
for a global reform of the merchantvessel registry system. Historically, flag
states have borne a large share of the
responsibility for suppressing piracy.
Since the end of World War II, however, open-registry states, also known
as “flags of convenience,” have undermined this line of defense against piracy.
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While this book benefits in many ways
from an interdisciplinary approach,
some of its historical analysis is simplistic or inaccurate. For example, the second Opium War was not fought principally because Great Britain felt that
Chinese officials had violated its flagstate rights during the famous Arrow
incident, as the authors imply. They also
attribute the rise in piracy around Hong
Kong in the mid-nineteenth century
solely to the fact that the Royal Navy refused to intervene against pirates unless
British interests were directly involved.
This is a gross oversimplification of the
issue. Such slips are perhaps unavoidable in a relatively short text that ranges
from Bronze Age maritime history to
best-management practices on board
contemporary merchant vessels, but the
authors may have been overly selective
in their historical account to add credibility to their policy recommendations.
That being said, this work is a valuable
addition to the growing literature on
contemporary maritime piracy. By covering a wide array of different topics, it
serves as an excellent starting point for
researchers interested in specific aspects
of the subject. Furthermore, many of
the policy recommendations will be of
value to those interested in maritime security in general. Although some readers may disagree with the authors’ belief
that international organizations like the
United Nations can play leading roles in
suppressing piracy, these policy recommendations merit consideration because of their originality and ingenuity.
EDWARD LUCAS

American University
Washington, D.C.
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Rosen, Stephen Peter. War and Human Nature.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005.
224pp. $23.95

Stephen Peter Rosen is Michael Kaneb
Professor of National Security and
Military Affairs at Harvard University.
In this ambitious volume he attempts
to counter the view that economicrationality models of human behavior
adequately explain human decision
making. He defines economic rationality as the assumption that people “have
a stable, ordered, and consistent set of
preferences and that they have a stable
way of making choices about how to
use scarce resources in a manner that
gives them the most utility for a given
expenditure of resources.” Rosen attempts to demonstrate the inadequacy
of economic rationality to explain or
predict human behavior by drawing
on a wide range of empirical research.
The book is organized into four major
chapters. The first explores brain structure from an evolutionary perspective
and in some depth. The central finding
here is that for very good evolutionary
reasons much of human decision making is performed by the nonconscious
portion of the brain. This clearly is a
survival mechanism in an environment where danger and challenge
must be rapidly assessed and action
must be taken much more quickly
than a linear and consciously analytical
process would allow. The implication
of this research for the overall project
is a need to contemplate more deeply
the limits of conscious and cognitive aspects of decision making—we
must think more on the role of economic rationality in human choice.
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The second chapter explores the genetic and personality variations among
individuals, stressing the degree to which
such variables cause individuals to make
different choices in the same situation
and fact set. The third looks at the various
ways different societies organize themselves and explores the degree to which
varying forms of social organization
cause different types of individuals with
different styles of decision making to
emerge as leaders. The last major section
explores the mechanisms of determining
political behavior of states. Rosen argues
that in some forms of social organization,
the decision-making styles and personality traits of individuals may be dampened by mechanisms of social control,
whereas in others they may be amplified.
Along the way, the book looks at the
effects of emotion, memory, dominance, testosterone, distress, depression, and varying time horizons, and
the decision-making styles of tyrants
(as contrasted with leaders in other
forms of government). It is, in short,
an attempt to synthesize a wide range
of information from the biological and
psychological disciplines to cause us to
think more critically about the role of
rationality in political decision making. Because of the work’s broad and
synthetic approach, the reader may
sometimes be less than thoroughly
convinced of the implications of such
diverse studies for political decision
making. The author acknowledges as
much in stressing the book’s tentative
and exploratory nature. As a preliminary effort to temper excessively
rationalistic narratives, however, Rosen
has provided a valuable contribution
and corrective to much political theory.
MARTIN L. COOK

Stockdale Professor of Professional Military Ethics
Naval War College
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Catsambis, Alexis, Ben Ford, and Donny L. Hamilton, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Maritime Archaeology. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011.
1,203pp. $150

The Oxford Handbook of Maritime
Archaeology is a survey of the current state of the field as seen by fiftyseven scholars from across the globe.
The volume is organized into seven
parts: an introduction by the eminent
American scholar George F. Bass, one
of the pioneers of the field; a section on
process, with fifteen topical chapters;
on ships and shipwrecks, with sixteen
chapters; on maritime culture and life
ashore, with seven chapters; on matters
“beyond the site,” with eight chapters dealing with an eclectic group of
topics ranging from maritime history
to underwater tourism, international
law, heritage site management, and
museum issues; a single concluding
chapter dealing with future directions;
and finally, a section that includes
both a glossary of ship terms and an
appendix on scientific analyses and
dating techniques. Each of the separate
chapters includes an extensive and useful selected bibliography, and there is
a general index of the entire volume.
Overall, this volume constitutes a
major complementary work to James
L. Delgado’s Encyclopedia of Underwater and Maritime Archaeology (British
Museum, 1997, and Yale University
Press, 1998), and as such it represents
a benchmark by which to measure the
growing sophistication of the field
over the fourteen years that separate
Delgado’s work from this one. As
George Bass points out in his introduction, maritime archaeology has

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss1/20

NWC_Winter2013Review.indd 132

become a worldwide methodological approach, one that has grown
from single-site research in the past
fifty years. Its future now rests on the
synthesis of geographically and chronologically diverse data. At the same time,
the volume demonstrates that not all
its practitioners have yet transformed
the breadth of their understanding
in order to achieve this vision fully.
This work suggests a number of important and encouraging signs of maturation within maritime archaeology. First,
there is a growing appreciation that the
field extends outward from underwater
shipwrecks and is linked to a number
of areas. These areas range from the
concept of maritime cultural landscape,
as explained by Christer Westerdahl, to
the remains of ships that have survived ashore, as Delgado describes, to
archaeological work being done on
coastal sites to understand the littoral
interaction between life afloat and
ashore, to studies of ancient harbors in
the Mediterranean, and the archaeology
being done in shipyard sites. Second,
and even more importantly, there are
clear signs of important broad synthesis
in topics where underwater archaeology
is able to provide information missing
from other sources. This welcome trend
is evident in the chapters by Mark Polzer
on early shipbuilding in the eastern
Mediterranean, by Deborah Carlson
on the seafarers and shipwrecks of
ancient Greece and Rome, by Eric Rieth
on Mediterranean ship design in the
Middle Ages, by Susan Rose on medieval
ships and seafaring, by Fred Hocker on
postmedieval ships and seafaring in the
West, and by Randall Sasaki on East Asia
shipbuilding traditions during the era of
Chinese maritime expansion. Curiously,
few authors mention at any length the

136

10/31/12 9:48 AM

War College: Winter 2013 Review

maritime archaeological contributions
to social history that constitute such
a feature of terrestrial archaeology.
As this handbook suggests, underwater archaeology is best known for its
contributions to understanding ship
construction in periods and places for
which other sources are either scarce
or nonexistent, but at the same time,
additional areas are opening up for the
field as it expands. The long section
with fifteen chapters on the processes
of maritime archaeology shows that the
field is becoming increasingly complex
and changing rapidly as new technological capabilities are brought to bear. This
work repeatedly displays the immature
aspects of the field, with several authors
suggesting that they prefer a closed
and private field of inquiry and others
noting the relative lack of analytical
publication, the numerous investigations that have produced little in the
way of written results. Nevertheless, this
work provides room for optimism that
more and more maritime archaeologists
are moving beyond the earlier narrow
foci on process, procedure, and intrinsic
objects toward wider interpretations.
Francisco C. Domingues, in his contribution, touches on this point when he
emphasizes the relationships of maritime archaeology to the broader study
of maritime history, the study of mankind’s interaction with the seas, oceans,
and waterways of the world. Indeed,
maritime archaeology is one of the
many complementary disciplinary approaches by which we can better understand that basic theme in global history.
It is a distinct methodological discipline,
but its meaning must extend beyond
its process and procedures, just as the
work of an archival researcher or library
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reader extends beyond methodologies
and processes. Maritime archaeology
is a means to find greater understanding and meaning in traces and remains
that can be found in an underwater
equivalent of libraries and archives, but
to do so its results need to be merged
with those from other complementary
methodologies and processes. As is
clear from this volume, practitioners
of maritime archaeology have a way to
go, but the reader is left with hope that
there is movement toward that end.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

Naval War College

Gerwarth, Robert. Hitler’s Hangman: The Life of
Heydrich. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
2011. 393pp. $35

Reinhard Heydrich, Reich Protector
of Bohemia and Moravia, favorite of
Heinrich Himmler, and architect of
the Nazis’ notorious “final solution,”
stares out of a seventy-year-old photograph looking more movie star than
monster. Yet monster he was, in a party
of monsters. Any biography of this
once-rising star of the Third Reich must
ask and attempt to answer the question,
How does a person become a monster?
Robert Gerwarth does as well as any
scholar in answering this question.
He meticulously charts the course of
Heydrich’s life. Heydrich’s childhood
was relatively normal. His family held
the values of the middle class, perhaps a
bit more so than most, since his father
ran a music conservatory. Heydrich accepted, along with most of his generation, the military myth of betrayal as
an explanation for Germany’s defeat in
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the First World War. The Depression
brought his family the specter of want
and uncertainty, as it did to hundreds
of thousands of families. He developed
a passion for sports, and throughout
this period there was never any sign that
Heydrich was destined for anything out
of the ordinary, but when he joined the
German navy as a cadet, as Gerwarth
chronicles, Heydrich began to display a
fierce ambition and an ability to identify
opportunities for advancement and
position himself to take advantage of
them. Heydrich was clearly on a path for
success when he was obliged to appear
before a naval court of honor, as a result
of a prior love affair that had surfaced
after he announced an engagement—a
minor scandal made worse by Heydrich’s arrogance before the court.
Heydrich was stripped of the uniform
that in many ways had defined him, and
his potential for historic impact seemed
slight. However, leaving the navy he
found himself at a unique and eventually rewarding nexus of personal, state,
and global changes. Heydrich’s fiancée
and her family were passionate Nazis,
and for Heydrich the party offered a
new path to power, position, and a positive self-image. For the rest of his life
Heydrich would commit himself to becoming a paragon of National Socialism.
He would succeed far better than most.
Getting in at what amounted to the
ground floor of the creation of the
Schutzstaffel (SS), Heydrich rapidly
rose in the organization, becoming
a confidant and trusted agent of
Heinrich Himmler. Gerwarth argues
convincingly that Heydrich was not an
ideologue when he joined the movement, but he increasingly acted as
an apparently true believer. Among
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Heydrich’s more interesting, and chilling, attributes was a belief that the times
called on true Germans to be hard,
even ruthless, in reestablishing their
place as the rightful rulers of Europe.
Heydrich was also hardworking,
athletic, personally brave, and fairly
good-looking. Upon several occasions
he disobeyed orders and flew combat
missions with the Luftwaffe. He was
quick to accept and master new challenges, particularly ones that would
enable him to rise within the party
structure or gain power. Increasingly,
these involved the removal of Jews and
other “undesirables” from the Reich. As
the regime moved inexorably toward
mass murder and genocide as policy,
so too did Heydrich. He was responsible for the Einsatzgruppen, special
task forces that followed the advancing
front rounding up intellectuals, professionals, politically suspect individuals,
and—always, always—Jews. Impressed
with pseudoscience and apparently
obsessed with sanguinary percentages,
Heydrich divided and subcategorized
the inhabitants of Europe on the basis
of the Aryan “purity” of their blood.
Early ideas, such as transporting
European Jews to Madagascar, quickly
faded, to be replaced with murder on
an industrial scale. By 1941 Heydrich
had crafted the so-called final solution.
For him the elimination of populations
was also the road to increased personal
power, advancement, and fame. It was
also a personally fulfilling task, for he
had come to hate these unarmed and
all but helpless enemies of the state.
To the German people Heydrich presented an image of the perfect National
Socialist, secure in his roles as loyal
servant of the people, good family man,
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and warrior standing between loved
ones and the war’s devastation. At
dinner parties he was urbane, charming, and attentive to women. It was
not surprising that he had affairs.
A workaholic, he became a master
of political infighting, and Gerwarth
chronicles how Heydrich continually
and successfully employed this skill,
which gained him many enemies and
opponents, such as Admiral Wilhelm
Canaris, the head of German military
intelligence. He knew how to hold a
grudge and how to take advantage of
opportunities for advancement. Still,
Gerwarth debunks the modern myth
of competition and jealousy between
Himmler and his protégé. Gerwarth
quite early in the book also disproves
allegations that Heydrich’s ethnic
heritage included Jewish forebears.
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Some readers may find Gerwarth a
shade too empathetic with his subject,
but it is important to note that it is all
too easy to paint Heydrich as a monster born or to suggest that somehow
the catalyst of National Socialism was
required to create him. The author
reminds us that the reality is far more
terrifying—that the conditions that
transformed Heydrich into an architect
of evil can all too easily be re-created.
If there is a shortcoming to Hitler’s
Hangman, it is the lack of an in-depth
examination of Heydrich’s leadership, which leaves a curious gap in our
understanding of the man. Still, taken
in its entirety, this book has earned a
rightful place on the shelves of serious biographies. The lessons it offers
are ones that should not be forgotten.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College
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LEARNING FROM MISTAKES

Sir:
I read with interest the thoughtful article by Capt. Mark Light on “The Navy’s
Moral Compass” (Naval War College Review, Summer 2012). Indeed it is a mystery to me why so many commanding officers, knowing what is at stake, hazard
their careers by indulging in unprofessional behaviour.
It seems that one can be relieved for failure on two main tracks. One is the
professional, where one loses the confidence of seniors through bad seamanship
(groundings, collisions, etc.), bad leadership (writ large), or just general incompetence. As the tolerance for imperfection of any sort seems to be close to zero
these days, people can lose their commands on a dime. We had a CO in the Royal
Canadian Navy in the late 1950s who mistakenly let a couple of shells loose over
Everett, Washington. He later rose to flag rank! I doubt this would happen today
in either the RCN or the U.S. Navy. But professional mistakes can happen for a
number of reasons, including simple bad luck.
The other track, of course, is personal. Here the tolerance for misbehaviour regarding alcohol abuse, sexual harassment, etc., is also nil. In fact, as Captain Light
alludes, the USN sets the standard of behaviour for COs (and all its officers?) at
a much higher level than society in general. This is not necessarily wrong but it
might be slightly unrealistic. For example, I would differentiate between the CO
who conducts an affair with one of his subordinates and another whose marriage
has broken down who begins a relationship ashore that has nothing to do with
his professional competence as a CO. If I understand the article correctly, both
would be relieved pronto for conduct unbecoming.
What I don’t understand, and Captain Light can’t answer the question either,
is why so many COs risk their commands by indulging in inappropriate behaviour. The USN officer corps is huge, so it must be an honour to be selected for
command. I would have thought that the gene pool from which to choose COs is
equally large. Is there a failure in the selection process? Don’t officers understand
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not only the values and ethics of their profession, but also what society now
expects of them? Or is human nature frail enough that a few will always do the
wrong thing given the chance? One would hope that any character deficiencies
would have been corrected by the time officers reach command. Captain Light
notes that this is clearly not always the case.
A word of caution, though: if any profession demands a zero tolerance for
mistakes of any sort in its people, it creates an environment of fear, caution,
and an unwillingness to take reasonable risks for fear of failure (and therefore
command or career termination). I understand the principle, but what we want
in warfighters is officers who seize the initiative in battle and perform. So by all
means let’s continue to educate on inappropriate behaviour whilst also allowing
a long enough leash so that officers can learn from their mistakes and become
the leaders we need.

DAVID B. COLLINS

Lieutenant Commander (Ret.)
Royal Canadian Navy
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Chief of Naval Operations’ Professional Reading Program. This article
was adapted from the October 2012 Navy Administrative (NAVADMIN)
message that announced the new program.

N

early two centuries ago, Samuel Southard, the Secretary of the Navy, ordered
that every ship in the fledgling U.S. Navy be provided with a professional
library of thirty-seven books on topics including mathematics, history, and philosophy. It was recognized in the earliest days of our Navy that a robust reading
program could greatly improve the quality of the force. This is no less true today. In October 2012, in conjunction with the Navy’s 237th birthday, the Navy
launched the new Chief of Naval Operations’ Professional Reading Program
(CNO-PRP). This program represents the evolution of the Navy Professional
Reading Program, which has been in the fleet since 2006. The popular program
has been significantly revised to serve today’s sailors better and to reflect the
changing world and growing challenges faced by modern mariners. The purpose
of the new CNO-PRP mirrors that of the earlier program—to facilitate the professional development of all sailors throughout the fleet.
The CNO’s Professional Reading Program is a great deal more than a suggested reading list. The books have been carefully selected and will be widely
distributed around the fleet to serve as tools to help extend the personal and
professional growth of all sailors beyond their day-to-day duties. One key to
maintaining the strength of the Navy is continually increasing the knowledge
base of the men and women in uniform.
To this end, Navy Reading

• Develops a greater appreciation of the views of others and helps all hands
better understand the changing world

• Enhances professionalism and improves critical thinking
• Fosters a deep appreciation for naval and military heritage
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• Increases knowledge of joint warfare and strengthens the ability of sailors at
all levels to make sound judgments

• Stimulates discussion about the maritime profession and the ever-evolving
role of sea power.
The structure of the program has been revised to make the books more accessible to sailors at all levels. Specific changes include movement away from
rank-based recommendations to a simplified division of books into two main
categories. Eighteen books, categorized as “Essential Reading,” will be distributed
during the last quarter of calendar year 2012 in hard-copy format to most ships,
squadrons, and stations. Commands with existing reading-program libraries will
integrate the new titles into their collections. Most of the additional twenty-four
books, categorized as “Recommended Reading,” are available as electronic books
(e-books), and many can be downloaded at no cost through the Navy General
Library Program site on the Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) portal. The program
now focuses on the three tenets outlined in the CNO’s Sailing Directions: (concentrate on) Warfighting First, (prepare to) Operate Forward, and (improve your
skills to) Be Ready. The forty-two books in the CNO-PRP have been selected for
their relevance to these tenets, and the lessons learned from reading them will
help all sailors meet future challenges.
The CNO-PRP has been streamlined to make our Navy’s Reading Program
more interactive, affordable, and wherever possible, electronically accessible. To
that end, first, CNO-PRP book sets will be distributed directly to commands
throughout the Navy in the final months of calendar year 2102. Internal control
procedures are expected to be put into place that will strike the appropriate
balance between maintaining accountability for the books and making them
available on a loan basis to as many sailors as possible. Second, a number of
the forty-two CNO-PRP titles will be available for free loan in e-book or digital
audio format from the Navy Library e-content link within the NKO portal, at
wwwa.nko.navy.mil. Efforts are under way to procure additional titles as publishers make them available in compatible formats. This NKO site also provides
authorized users with access to thousands of other free books, magazines, and
periodicals. Security restrictions preclude downloading CNO-PRP books and
other general reading books via Navy-owned computers, so downloading them
to personally owned devices will be required. Finally, for sailors who prefer to
purchase their own copies of these books, the Navy Exchange Service Command will stock these books for sale, most at substantial discounts, in its retail
stores and through the uniform-sales section of its online sales system, at www
.mynavyexchange.com.
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Reading, discussing, and understanding the ideas found in the CNO-PRP
will not only improve critical thinking skills but help everyone in the Navy to
become better sailors, better citizens, and most importantly, better leaders. The
CNO expects every sailor to strive to read at least two titles from the CNO-PRP
each year. This list is not intended to limit professional reading in any way but
merely to provide easy access to a few of the many titles that will benefit the naval
service. The American patriot Thomas Jefferson once said, “I cannot live without
books.” He clearly understood the benefits gained by studying the words of the
great minds of the past and present. The motto of the CNO-PRP is “Read to Be
Ready,” and all hands are encouraged to use reading as another way to prepare for
service with honor, courage, and commitment.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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